…that I can’t seem to resist posting here:
I have a question for our materialist friends. Let’s imagine a group of chimpanzees. Say one of the male chimps approaches one of the female chimps and makes chimp signals that he wants to have sexual relations with her, but for whatever reason she’s not interested and refuses. Is it morally wrong for the male chimp to force the female chimp to have sex with him against her will?
If you answer “no it is not morally wrong,” imagine further a group of humans. On the materialist view, a human is just a jumped up hairless ape. Is it morally wrong for a human male to force a human female to have sex with him against her will? If you answer “yes, it is morally wrong,” I certainly agree with you. But please explain why on the materialist view it is not wrong for a hairy ape to force a female to have sex with him, but it is wrong for a hairless ape to force a female to have sex with him.
Link.
- Is it wrong for a man but not for a chimp? Yes, it is wrong for a man but not for a chimp.
- Why is it wrong for a man but not for a chimp?
- It is a meaningful question in regard to a man, whereas it is not for a chimp, because human beings are capable of moral choice, by virtue of many factors, including our theory of mind capacity, our complex social structures and our capacity for linguistic cultural transmission.
- The answer to the meaningful question for a man is “yes”, because prioritizing our own desires the wellbing of others lies at the definitional heart of human morality, and rape is a clear example of such an act.
What difference does it make? Who are you to tell me otherwise? If I and my community consider it in the best interests of the well-being of humanity to rape others, or kill off the Jews, or sterilize those with a low IQ, or eradicate the “lesser” races, it’s moral by definition, right?
It would be mating and selection- reproduction and death- nothing more- well the drive to reproduce and death
This does not, however, reflect Dawkins’ views on morality. What he says is:
Unfortunately, this reflects a serious tension in Dawkins’ views — a tension which I do not think he is able to resolve, given his various other philosophical commitments.
It’s the same tension that appears at the end of The Selfish Gene, where he says — and here I’m paraphrasing from memory, so don’t hold me to it! — that whereas all other organisms are somehow ‘enslaved’ to their genes, human beings alone are able to rebel against their genes. How is that possible? If everything is determined by the genes, then how can we rebel against them? It would be, at best, some genes rebelling against others.
I do think that modern evolutionary theory is compatible with a humanistic ethics (for that matter, it’s compatible with theological ethics*!), but not in the version that Dawkins provides us with.
Best,
Carl
*= either divine command theory or natural law theory. There are, I think, excellent and in my view decisive arguments against both approaches,. but those arguments do not depend on accepting or rejecting anything in contemporary evolutionary theory.
If morality were left up to God, rape would be a purely economic crime, and women would be forced to marry their rapist, bear and raise his children, wait on him, and serve him for the test of their lives.
So under God’s morality plan, in a man wants to marry a women who does not want to marry him, rape is a pretty good deal, for the man.
I think both atheists and theists would answer the following question in more or less the same way.
Q: Why are you angry at the man who raped your sister?
A: Because he forced himself on her and refused to respect her wishes when she said no.
I don’t think that one single theist would say, “Because he violated the absolute moral code when he raped her”.
Morals have to do with the relationships between persons, not the relationships between a person and a religion.
Religions have no business writing codes of behaviour between people.
That’s something of a red herring, since neither devout Jews nor devout Christians interpret the Law in such stark terms. For Jews, there’s the huge body of commentary, the Talmud, which for devout Jews has the same status as the written Law of Torah. For Christians, the Law is rescinded by Christ, which is precisely why there’s a new revelation that supersedes the old one. Don’t ask about the Mormons, though; I have no idea what they’re doing.
Now, if you want to argue with a rabbi or priest that they should interpret the Old Testament as you do, go right ahead.
Carl
I suppose you could argue that human intelligence and consciousness, even though emergent from our genetics, nonetheless act as an independent domain.
How would that benefit the society?
Of course they don’t that’s what makes religion so dangerous.
There is a claim that morality comes from God, but when it comes down to the nitty gritty, it comes from priests and interpreters.
So much for the source of morality. It’s a complete sham.
I posted the following at UD:
When he said I didn’t answer the question, I replied something like this: “Barry, why do you think it’s wrong? And invoking a belief in an objective moral code doesn’t count as an answer. I’m not going to answer a question based on the false premise that materialists have a problem with this question that theists don’t.”
He deleted my post because I wouldn’t answer the question, and was “changing the subject”. I can’t even begin to describe (especially if I want my post not moved to Guano) how I feel about his behavior.
As Carl Sachs has eloquently noted, the so-called morality derived from god is actually derived from what priests say about God, and they feel free to ignore their own scripture when it is convenient.
The the absolute morality argument boils down to an argument for giving a priestly class the hammer to enforce whatever the whim of the days happens to be.
Which is why nations began secularizing morality in the form of laws. At least it leaves room for discussion, and in the case of democracies, leaves room for the people or their representatives to amend the laws.
For the record, and my last attempt to say anything over there, Barry deleted this post also:
I’ll leave it as an exercise for the reader to come up with suitable adjectives concerning Barry’s behavior.
I posted this at AtBC, but it bears repeating here since there’s a healthy discussion of the subject going on:
Barry’s question regarding materials seeing chimp rape and human rape as the same is just plain silly for the simple reason that it begs the question that humans must know how chimps feel about rape given our close kinship. The assumption relies upon the assumption of what being closely related means.
Further however, it is based upon a strawman thesis, one Joe G has reiterated above: that all materialist behavior must be based on what is good for the species as a whole, ignoring that behaviors are engaged in, for the most part, on an individual level.
The reason materials (and almost all people for that matter) find rape “wrong” or “bad” is because most people are brought up to empathize with others. Thus, most of us recognize how a victim would feel and since that feeling is unpleasant, our physiological response to such an act greatly dampens dopamine (among other chemicals) production and increases pain chemicals. Hence most of us not only don’t feel “good” committing rape, we actually experience revulsion and pain. It’s that simple. That would also be the reason that most societies adopt laws against rape – the general agreement that it feels repulsive to most people and is thus not beneficial (contrary to Joe G’s incomplete thesis) to society.
Since chimps and humans are different enough to distinguish, most people do not have the same level of empathy for chimpanzee victims hence a lack of any feeling about their behavior and governance there of. As they are not a part of human society, their behavior is not taken into consideration when considering our own rules.
Aleta,
One cannot “prove” that “good” is an objective or a subjective commodity, so all we can do is assume one way or the other. Each premise – that “good” is subjective, or that it is objective – leads to certain logical, necessary consequences in terms of morality, expectations, behavior, etc.
If moralty refers to a subjective good, then if I consider it – subjectively – to be good to kill the Jews and subjugate women, the moral relativist cannot say that for me, this is immoral behavior. They might not like it, but so what? Who cares?
Only the moral objectivist can point at the behavior of others and say, “that behavior is wrong” for the person engaging in it.
Is it wrong for anyone and everyone to torture children for pleasure, in any situation or context? Only a moral objectivist (who believes that morality refers to an objective good) can rationally make that claim. The moral relativist can only say that if the person doing it considers it moral, then for that person, it is moral.
Why this reaction? Was his behavior “wrong” in some objectively arguable sense? If not, why the outrage? Mr. Arrington is just doing what he subjectively thinks is right – like any of us. Correct?
If moralty refers to an objective good, then if I consider it – objectively – to be good to kill the Jews and subjugate women, the moral relativist cannot say that for me, this is immoral behavior. They might not like it, but so what? Who cares?
Not all theistic morality is framed from “what priests say” or rooted in scripture. Theistic morality can simply hold that “good’ is an objective commodity (an intrinsic aspect of god and thus existence) and that, like any objective commodity, it is up to us as responsible individuals to identify/discern moral goods beginning with self-evidently true moral statements and reasoning outward from there.
I don’t need a priest or scripture to tell me how to interact with gravity, and I don’t need one to tell me how to be moral. However, unless I assume that “good” is objective, my moral reasoning must inevitably leads to the despair of might makes right and anything goes.
Is it wrong for anyone and everyone to torture children for pleasure, in any situation or context? Only a moral objectivist (who believes that morality refers to an objective good) can rationally make that claim.
The problem is that there is not a single, objective morality – or if there is, the limits of human understanding reduces it to hopeless subjectivity. For example, Quaker and Amish religious traditions have different views on what is morally good than the typical Evangelical Christian and yet all three operate as moral objectivists, or do you disagree?
No, William – you are engaging in the exact same error that Barry refuses to discuss: there is no “objective morality” in the sense you use that term, not for me and not for you either. Why do you think rape is wrong? How would you answer that question?
With respect to moral questions, actions speak louder than words. And what you just described is one of those actions that spoke very loudly.
William J Murray,
You and IDist’s keep making this rather glaring mistake over and over.
Morality has to do with systems, in this case, systems of people.
Whether it’s a system composed of two individuals, or a system of thousands, morality deals with the “relationships” of the individuals.
If two people are on a desert island and one rapes the other, that rape is an immoral act regardless of how much one side thinks it is “okay”, since the other side said, “it is not okay”.
To focus on any single individual and try to determine morality is pointless, since morality, as defined by most of us, deals with our behaviour in relation to others.
For the last man on Earth, morality between people doesn’t apply, since there is no other person who will suffer the results of that act.
My morality is based on my interaction with people, not my interaction with “rules cast in stone” as interpreted by my local theology.
No, I don’t think so. Arrington is, I believe, being ponderously mischievous and hoping to get ammunition for a campaign to show that “materialists”(whatever he means by that) are moral reprobates, as well as being incapable of rational argument.
Rather silly.
Am I the only person in this discussion who accepts objective morality and is not a theist? On days like this, I feel like the last little Kantian.
Carl
“Objective or subjective” sure seems like a false dichotomy. Neither term seems right. And, for that matter, “commodity” is a strange term to use for morality.
So can you explain (sorry if you’ve already done so, I’ve been busy backing stuff up!) what you mean by “objective morality”?
It’s possible I might agree with you.
If it’s objective, then everyone agrees with you, and the problem’s solved.
I would appreciate some explanation of what you mean here.
For most of my life, I thought that the distinction between objective and subjective was clear. But, over the last few years, I have come to realize that it is not nearly as clear as I had assumed, and that there are many disagreements.
WJM: If you consider morality to be an edict of the interests of a god, how do gain knowledge about these divine interests? And why should anyone submit to your claims of knowledge in respect to these divine interests?
WJM said: “most people around the world do not (IMO) consider morality to be any such thing, but rather to be “what best serves the interests of God” – considering that most people consider morality to be an edict of the interests of God. My view of morality doesn’t define it whatsoever as having anything to do with the “well-being” of others. Again, you refuse to say why I or anyone else should submit to your definition of what morality is”
WJM, if you consider morality to be an edict of the interests of a god, how do you gain knowledge of these divine interests? And why should anyone submit to your claims of knowledge of these divine interests?
Carl Sachs,
Objective in what sense?
(That’s better)
WJM said: “Only the moral objectivist can point at the behavior of others and say, “that behavior is wrong” for the person engaging in it.”
Really? On what basis? Do you have anything to point to that we can all objectively examine? So far NOTHING you have pointed to in the months of discussion on morality you have been involved in indicated that you have anything like that to point towards. All you have is your BELIEF that what this other person does is wrong. Beliefs are not an objective basis for anything.
Is too.
Because it serves against the purpose humans exist to fulfill. In order for morality to refer to an objective good, there must be an objective purpose. Nothing is right or wrong outside of a goal or purpose; without a purpose, any act or intent just is what it is. For something to be universally wrong regardless of what any group or individual thinks, humans must have a universal purpose.
Which is why a god is necessary.
Like that.
In case you hadn’t noticed, we live in an evolutionary world and, yes, a lot of it is about reproduction. In our little part of it, we’ve also managed to evolve some notions about morality.
WJM: “Because it serves against the purpose humans exist to fulfill.”
How do you know?
That’s right. Morals exist within society, not the world outside.
And this is what Richard Dawkisn had to say about it in an interview with the Austrian newspaper Die Presse:
Here’s what I had in mind: moral principles have objective validity insofar as their validity does not depend on the beliefs or desires of any particular moral agent. They are “objectively binding”, in the sense that if one is a moral agent, one ought to acknowledge them. Here an analogy might help.
We have no problem (it seems) regarding scientific theories as objective, in that the acceptability of a scientific theory doesn’t depend on the beliefs or desire of any particular scientist. The acceptability of a theory depends on whether the theory best accounts for the available data, not on whether any particular scientist wants it to be true or believes it to be true. Analogously, moral principles are objective in that their validity doesn’t depend on the beliefs or desires of any particular agent (or any particular group of agents).
The dis-analogy, of course, is that in scientific theories, the question is how well the models fit the data, how rigorously the data have been collected, and so on. We don’t have that kind of evidence to go on with respect to moral principles. But we do have lots of experience about what contributes to or diminishes human flourishing and well-being, and we also have empathy and imagination for testing our moral principles against our experiences as moral beings in the world.
Central to this view is the idea that “objective” is not “absolute”. Here too I think the parallel with scientific theories is helpful. We have no problem with the idea that scientific theories are objective; if someone refuses to accept a theory that passes muster by the community of inquirers, we usually don’t hesitate to say that he or she is being irrational. Likewise, moral principles can be in principle (and in practice) revisable in light of experience. There are many cases, past and present, that can be understood as revising or rejecting moral principles previously held. For example, the way that we made personhood a central moral concept, rather than religious or ethnic identity. We today can happily say that Aristotle was mistaken to think that ethics didn’t apply to “barbarians”, or to slaves.
In short, my suggestion is that “absolute or arbitrary?” is a false dichotomy, and that just as we can happily say that scientific theories are objective but not absolute, so too we can hold our moral principles in the same way. But it does follow from this that people can be mistaken about moral principles, or what follows from them, just as we can about theories. If someone maintains that racism or sexism is morally acceptable, I have no qualms about saying that they’re mistaken.
Criticisms of this view are welcome!
Best,
Carl
The Selfish Gene
By “moral objectivist” I mean “someone who subjectively believes that morality refers to an objective good.”
Only a moral objectivist has the rational basis to point at someone torturing children for fun and say, “what you are doing is wrong”. All the moral subjectivist can say is “Well, that isn’t something I would do.”
I’ve never claimed I can prove or show that “good” is objective, or that anyone can. This isn’t a argument about evidence; it’s a logical argument about the inferential consequences of two very different premises.
Only the “objective good” premise is rationally sustainable wthout morality. The “objective good” premise doesn’t mean one has an objective good, it only mean that one premises that an objective good exists which humansattempt to subjectively interpret.
William J Murray,
What you’ve said here is that if humans DON’T have a universal purpose, nothing is universally wrong.
Since we have no evidence of a universal purpose, there are no universal wrongs.
Do you have evidence of a purpose that would change this?
Carl Sachs said:
You’re begging the question. Why should I accept that morality has anything to do with human “flourishing” and “well being” in the first place? You’re doing the same thing every moral subjectivist does who doesn’t like admitting the anything-goes consequence of their materialist premises: attempting to sneak in their particular concept of morality as the de facto standard.
Not stemming from materialist premises you can’t, unless you steal the concept of an \objective good and sneak it into your definition of what morality is, as Elizabeth has already attempted to do.
Thanks.
With that meaning of “objective”, I agree that morals are objective.
I just started a topic where we can discuss what we mean by “objective” and “subjective” in a broader context (i.e. not limited to morals).
WJM: “This isn’t a argument about evidence; it’s a logical argument about the inferential consequences of two very different premises.”
No. This is an argument about the practical consequences of what you call “moral objectivism” and “moral subjectivism”.
You claimed: “Only the moral objectivist can point at the behavior of others and say, “that behavior is wrong” for the person engaging in it”.
I ask you again: what basis do you have to claim that you are correct over a person engaging in a behavior you think is wrong, and to attempt to stop them from this behavior?
I’ve been distinguishing between morality and ethics for years, or trying to, at least. But I’d regard my take a little bit different from Elizabeth’s. The way I see it, morality is always subjective, because it’s based on the rather idiosyncratic history and circumstances of the society in which it evolves.
Ethics can be considered fundamentally objective, at least to the extent that the root of human nature itself is objective — the universal human need for community and the sense of empathy.
Morality is societal in origins, ethics is biological. And as Elizabeth has pointed out, the history of group ethics has been one of increasing the size of the human family. We haven’t assigned this membership to others, we’ve discovered that it always existed.
William J Murray,
The type of arguments you make hinge on unsupported assertions though.
An equivalent argument would be that you have to buy a lottery ticket to win a lottery, which is very true, but to continue and say therefore you have to live your life as if a lottery exists that you can actually buy a ticket for, is a bit of a stretch.
I don’t know, and I’ve never claimed to know.
It’s the only rational inference available from the only premise that provides a basis for me to be able to step between a man and his abused child and say “What you are doing is wrong and I have the moral authority to at least try and stop you.”
If I don’t have a principle that allows me to take such an action based on the assumption that my moral authority stems from an objective good that is applicable universally, then the only other premise that allows me to take such an action is might makes right, which at the same time would authorize the very abuse I’m trying to stop.
We’re not talking about facts and knowledge; we’re talking about how we need to think about morality to have a rationally supportable and coherent worldview. A moral subjectivist has no grounds for stepping between the father and the abused child, or between the Nazi and the Jew, or the weak and the Eugenicist other than might makes right, which would validate the actions he’s trying to stop.
By what subjectivist, materialist principle can you step between a man and his abused child and tell him, “What you are doing is wrong.” ?
On the basis of the principle that “good” is a universal, objective commodity that results in the existence of self-evidently true moral statements humans can discern.
What else is morality about, if not human flourishing and well-being? Aristotle said that ethics concerns “the good life for a human being”. But I don’t think that really departs from Plato’s concern with “the Good”; it’s a further specification of the concept. I guess I’m not at all clear on what morality could be about, if not that. And the good life for a human being could include our responsibilities towards animals, plants, the environment — if we have any. So what am I missing?
Seeing as how I’m not a materialist, that’s not a problem for me.
Best,
Carl
By what subjectivist, materialist principle can you step between a man and his abused child and tell him, “What you are doing is wrong.”
As I previously argued, the objectivist’s morality is subjective within a larger (pluralistic) society. Furthermore, I think your question is ill-formed. I ought to be, ‘by what objective authority and/or system can a subjectivist, materialist intervene?’ To which I would reply: government.