For many people, the idea of free will is bound up with the notion of “could have done otherwise”. By their lights, if only one future is possible for a person — that is, if the person cannot do otherwise — then free will is an illusion.
Philosopher Christian List — author of the recent book Why Free Will is Real — proposes an interesting species of free will based on the claim that while physics may be deterministic, behaviors at the agent level are not. Agents can do otherwise, according to List, and this is enough to ground free will even if physics is deterministic.
I think List is mistaken, but I’ll save my criticisms for the comment thread.
Readers can find List’s argument in this paper:
Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise
See you in the comment thread.
You have to suppose she DOES want to. Really loves her dad, you know?
Bruce,
Determinism isn’t fatalism, and reasoning still matters even if determinism is true. It’s just that that the reasoning itself is also determined.
Substitute a different person, or a different version of the same person, and you may get different results.
I don’t see a problem with mixing levels of description, as long as it’s done carefully.
What makes yours apparently “not extreme” is your use of proximate causation, which is just a way of avoiding what responsibility is actually about. In a way that connects with bruce’s point about the epistemic/ontological issue here. We can grasp the ‘proximate causes’ but the ‘ultimate ones’ elude us. So you say, let’s pretend the proximate ones actually mattered. But as phoodoo points out on some essential level….they don’t. The daughter can’t but you pretend she can. You don’t know your name but you pretend you do.
It’s all philosophy of “as if”
walto,
She’s conflicted. The “loving daughter” part of her wants to fly to NH, but the “flying phobic” part of her does not.
Crucially, the fear outweighs the desire, so in the final analysis, Ursula does not want to fly to NH.
If the desire outweighed the fear, then Ursula would want to fly to NH, and she would proceed to do so.
Suppose her bus doesn’t come.
And can she want her love to overcome her fear? Ought she do that?
Also, i forgot your take on moral principles. Again, on your view we’re supposed to (morally?) act as if.
You’re making the same mistake as phoodoo.
Her bus might not come even if determinism is false. So by your reasoning, no one should ever say “you can fly to NH” to anyone, regardless of the truth of determinism.
The bus might not come, there might be a terrorist attack, the person might come down with a sudden illness, the TSA might detain them, a meteor might hit them 15 minutes from now, etc.
Might not? Metaphysical? Epistemic? Physical?
This is key. Why ‘should one not”? When is it ok to?
Come on, walto. You snipped a key phrase (bolded below). I wrote:
You and phoodoo are arguing that under determinism, it’s illegitimate to use “can” if unforeseen circumstances might turn “can” into “can’t”. That’s silly, and if it were actually true under determinism, then it would also be true if determinism were false.
walto,
You’re equivocating on “can”.
Which is odd, because you agreed with me when I wrote:
Have you changed your mind already?
walto,
Not at all. People are responsible for what they choose to do. They’re just not ultimately responsible, because the ultimate causes are outside their control (and prior to their own existence).
They do matter. Moral choices — whether determined or not — have consequences.
keiths,
Only you say she doesn’t want to do X. If she’s sad, she probably wishes she could do it because she wants to so much. And we don’t know if she can want to do x if she doesn’t in fact want to.
I’d put it this way, if she wants to do x and will do so because of this, she can do x. If she doesn’t do x we know she couldn’t have, given her predispositions, the state of the world, and physical laws. That’s deteerminism. It’s compatible with free will ONLY because if she does something because she wants to, she’s doing it freely.
I call that quibbly. It’s like saying the ball is red because of the red glasses. Really it just looks red. In the case of responsibility, it’s you who is equivocating. We want to know if somebody is blameworthy when we ask if they’re morally responsible. I think, with phoodoo, that the determinist should answer No. For you, responsibility is a weasel word (like knowledge) . Nobody ultimately knows, but they know, nobody is ultimately responsible but they’re responsible, nothing is objectively morally good, but this or that is morally good. That’s a ton of weaseling.
A strange argument. If someone can be excused for having no choice when committing a crime, surely I can be excused for having no choice when admonishing punishment. Or does nobody have free will but me?
walto,
If you ask her to book a ticket, she’ll tell you that she doesn’t want to, because she’s afraid to fly.
Is she lying? Simply because part of her wants to fly to NH to be with her dad? I say no.
Her final desire is not to get on a plane, and it’s this desire that determines her choice.
Hah. What if she says that she wants to (desperately!) but she just can’t? You go into argument mode?
walto,
That’s why I say you’re reversing yourself. Earlier you agreed with this:
You’ve suddenly become uncomfortable with the provisional “can”.
walto,
Part of her does desperately want to. Overall, her desire is not to get on the plane, because the fear is too great.
People do feel conflicted at times, you know.
Same for me. And it will be so for all non- weaseling determinists.
Sometimes you just have to bite a bullet, bro.
faded_Glory:
I do believe that people have choices, even if determinism is true. A determined choice is still a choice. You’re still considering and evaluating options and selecting the one that seems best to you.
keiths, They’re the same for me. And it will be so for
non- weseling determinists.
Sometimes you just have to bite a bullet, bro.
walto,
What comment are you responding to here?
ETA: I see you’ve now included a link to the comment.
keiths,
I.e, you go into argument mode and tell her what it is she really wants. No doubt she’ll thank you for substituting your judgment. All you’re doing is begging the question here; saying, if she doesn’t go, she must not want to.. She’s telling you she does want to and can’t.
I fixed it. You snuck in a comment before mine appeared.
keiths,
I didn’t suggest that the argument is yours – as you said, ‘many people’ feel uneasy, which doesn’t automatically include yourself.
If I genuinely believed that the person committing the crime didn’t have a choice, I would not feel uneasy about admonishing punishment, because to be consistent I would have to believe that I didn’t have a choice in that either. Therefore, I think those ‘many people’ haven’t thought through their position very well.
walto,
You’re arguing as if she only had one desire — to rush to her father’s side. That’s not correct. She also desires not to get on a plane, because of her fear.
Those desires conflict, and only one can win in the end. In Ursula’s case, the desire to stay off a plane is the one that prevails.
faded_Glory,
People do have choices, even under determinism. It’s just that those choices are determined, like everything else.
But yes, punishers are ultimately no more or less culpable than the people they punish, since their behavior has its roots in causes that preceded their existence and are therefore outside their control.
That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t encourage them to lay off the retributive punishment, or that we shouldn’t encourage criminals to stop committing crimes.
keiths,
That she also wants to go is incosistent with your theory that if she wants to go and can go she will go. Now you need some additional provision about her having no “more powerful wants” at the time.
walto,
They aren’t the same. This one is limited to cases where she actually wants to and will do X…
…whereas this one is not:
“Will do so” versus “would” is what makes the difference.
On the other hand, if you really do intend for them to mean the same thing, then you’re (perhaps inadvertently) agreeing with my usage, because then you’re allowing for counterfactual cases of wanting and doing.
walto,
If it’s a problem for me, then it’s a problem for you, because you’ve agreed with this:
Anyway, the problem (if it really is a problem) is easily handled by specifying that we’re talking about what Ursula wants in the end — her aggregated desire.
In the end, Ursula’s aggregated desire is not to fly to New Hampshire. So she doesn’t.
I would put it this way: Part of Ursula wants to fly to NH, and part of her doesn’t. Overall, she doesn’t want to fly to NH. There’s no reason to mention the ‘overall’ qualifier unless you want to stress that she’s conflicted. ‘Overall’ is understood by default.
Actually, there are a number of differences, if we’re going to be technical about it. One is a conditional: the other is actually even more than an equivalence, because it claims synonymy. So my claim that they’re the same was loose. They’re close enough for general purposes, but the second one isn’t actually right.
Now let’s say Sarah “wants most” to go to NH, but her bus fails to come to take her to the airport. Shall we say she can’t come or that she could have if she’d rented a car instead or taken an earlier bus instead? She wanted to “in the aggregate” but still didn’t make it, right? Is there no limit to considerations about what she might have done? Could have ridden her bike if she’d started early enough, no? If it was wrong not to visit him, when do we say she’s bad?
Anyhow, i’m much more comfortable with my weaker conditional.
Let’s not mince words. The two statements are not the same. They differ in a crucial way, and it’s necessary to abandon the older one in order to consistently maintain your current position regarding “can”.
walto,
You’re not appreciating the full implications of your position.
The bus might not come even if determinism is false. So by your (and phoodoo’s) reasoning, we can never say that Sarah can take the bus to the airport, because we don’t know whether something (such as a meteor strike) is going to prevent that from happening.
Phoodoo isn’t likely to stop using “can” in reference to future forestallable events, and I doubt that you are either. If so, then the two of you are being inconsistent.
walto,
I don’t know why you keep bringing morality into this. I’m just saying that if she wants to rush to her father’s side, she should fly.
Of course its odd, and one reason why I don’t believe in determinism, and DO believe in free will.
What I think is more odd, and logically nonsensical, is your belief in determinism AND free will. As if you don’t understand that the two concepts are complete opposites. You can say you believe in God and are atheist, but its just as nonsensical.
All you can really say, that would make any sense, is you believe in determinism, and the sense of free will-even though you would have to know, unless you are insane, that this belief is an illusion.
Believing in illogical positions is only good for you, its useless to try to convince anyone else.
You are struggling with this. I have never said I belief in determinism, so why in the world would I need to change my verbiage?
It is you who needs to change your verbiage, or else just admit that what you say is just a convenience, and not really compatible with a rational belief.
People can be atheist and believe in a God!
They just have to ignore what words mean.
Then what’s the difference between a determined choice and a non-determined choice?
Might not? Epistemic? Metaphysical? Physical? What are you trying to say here?
Beause of the ‘should’ you keep using. Drop it, and I won’t talk about morality.
Why I am an Atheist Who Believes in God.
Phoodoo’s not being inconsistent. He’s a libertarian. He has every right to “can.” I could be accused of inconsistency when I “as if” but I at least have the stones to recognize that, for the determinist, even the compatibalist kind, there’s not a lot of actual “cans”: only what we actually do can we do. That’s determinism in a nutshell. You, on the third hand, are trying to weasel a position in between.
Can, but not ultimately. It’s as if she actually could when she doesn’t–but, uh, only if she didn’t want to that second (maybe) and maybe could have if she’d wanted to (in a different world). It’s determinism with false teeth.
But hey, what ever as if floats your as if boat. It’s your as if life as if after as if all!
phoodoo,
That entire comment is based on the misconception that I’m a determinist. Um, phoodoo — I’m not a determinist.*
* I (provisionally) accept the Many Worlds Interpretation of QM, so I think that determinism is true of the universal wavefunction, but not of measurement histories in any individual world.
I am, however a compatibilist, meaning that I think that free will (of the kind worth wanting) is compatible with determinism.
Keep in mind that even if determinism isn’t globally true of our world, there can still be deterministic events. Compatibilism says that such events are potential candidates for free will, since determinism and free will aren’t mutually exclusive.
phoodoo,
They’re not opposites unless you define free will in an incoherent, libertarian way.
Compatibilist free will is coherent and it actually depends on determinism (at least partial determinism).
phoodoo,
You’re confused. I didn’t claim that you were a determinist, and my argument doesn’t depend on it.
More on this later, in a response to walto.
keiths:
phoodoo:
Um — a determined choice is determined, and a non-determined choice isn’t.
Are you really trying to ask something different, namely, “How can a determined choice be a genuine choice?”
If so, my answer would be something like this: To choose is simply to consider a number of options and select one of them. That works whether or not the world is deterministic.