I don’t think that science has disproven, nor even suggests, that it is unlikely that an Intelligent Designer was responsible for the world, and intended it to come into existence.
I don’t think that science has, nor even can, prove that divine and/or miraculous intervention is impossible.
I don’t think that the fact that we can make good predictive models of the world (and we can) in any way demonstrates that how the world has observedly panned out was not entirely foreseen and intended by some deity.
I think the world has properties that make it perfectly possible for an Intelligent Deity to “reach in” and tweak things to her liking – and that even if it didn’t, it would still be perfectly possible, given Omnipotence, just as a computer programmer can reach in and tweak the Matrix.
I don’t think that science falsifies the idea of an omnipotent,omniscient deity – at all.
I think that only rarely has this even been claimed by scientists, and, of those, most of them were claiming that science has falsified specific claims about a specific deity, not the idea in principle of a deity.
I do think that the world is such that IF there is an omnipotent, omniscient deity, EITHER that deity does not have human welfare as a high priority OR she has very different ideas about what constitutes human welfare from the ones that most people hold (and as are exemplified, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), OR she has deliberately chosen to let the laws of her created world play out according to her ordained rules, regardless of the effects of those laws on the welfare of human beings, perhaps trusting that we would value a comprehensible world more than one with major causal glitches. In my case, her trust was well-placed.
I do think that the evidence we have is far more consistent with the idea that life and its origins are the result of processes consistent with others we see acting in the world, and not a result of some extraordinary intervention or series of extraordinary interventions, regardless of any question as to whether a benign or otherwise deity designed those processes with the expectation that life would be a probable or inevitable result.
I don’t think that it follows that, were we to find incontrovertible evidence of a Intelligent Creator (for instance, an unambiguous message in English configured in a nebula in some remote region of space, or on the DNA of an ant encased in amber millions of years ago) that that would mandate us in any way to worship that designer. On the basis of her human rights record I’d be more inclined to summon her to The Hague.
I think that certain theological concepts regarding a benevolent deity useful, inspiring, entirely consistent with science, and may reflect reality.
I don’t myself, any more, believe in some external disembodied intelligent and volitional deity, simply because I am no longer persuaded that either intelligence or volition are possible in the absence of a material substrate. But I do understand why people think this is false, and that consciousness, intelligence and volition are impossible, even in principle, to account for in terms of material/energetic processes, and I also understand that, although I think, for reasons that satisfy myself, that they are mistaken, the case is not an easy one to articulate, not least because of the intrinsically reflexive nature of cogitating on cogitation.
I think that “free will” is an ultimately incoherent concept; I think that the question “do we have free will?” is ill-posed, and ultimately meaningless. I think the better question is: Do I have the ability to make informed choices for which I am morally responsible?” and I think the answer is clearly yes.
Anyone else want to unload?
I consider the “purposes” to be that for which the universe (and objectively existent aspects of mind) was built. It is constructed to carry out that purpose. Some of those structures are physical, some mental. We can ascertain some mental structures with logic, some with math, some with our conscience. We are not actually describing the “purpose” with our moral models, but rather the structures that are intended to serve that purpose.
IOW, torturing a child would be like jamming a tire iron into the motherboard of a computer; you may not know exactly what the computer is doing, or what it exists for, but you damn sure know you’re screwing things up.
Conscience can force you to do something as powerfully as a man with a gun; the act of committing an unconscionable act can create life-long, even unendurable pain. To assert this represents a subjective matter of preference is to stretch the bounds of credibility.
We can ascertain some mental structures with logic, some with math, some with our conscience.
If two people perform the same equation, they get the same result. If not, then in practice they can examine the error objectively and determine who’s right.
If two people query their respective consciences, they’ll likely get two different answers. What’s the practice for objectively comparing their feelings and determining who’s right? Or do you take the position that every conscience leads in the same direction on every moral question?
I see subjective morality as a different concept from yours, William. My understanding of subjective morality is that the basis of morality is each person’s subjective perspective on things that can be done vs things that ought to done. But that does not then mean that I see all other moral systems and equally valid to my own.
For instance, I place a much higher premium on moral systems shared by many people. As such, I am under no obligation as a subjective moralist to judge a act “moral” or “immoral” for that person by that person’s code; I judge all acts according to my own moral code. Ultimately if a bunch of us come together and agree on a given set of moral principles, we judge all people by those principles, not by each person’s individual principles. That a group decided on what those principles are makes them subjective, but that does not mean that we have see other systems as equal to our own.
Well, let me see here . . . it could be something like this . . . .
(1) Let us call a serious moral conflict any situation where two or more individuals or groups (i) disagree about some course of action, where (ii) the action has wide-ranging repercussions for how one lives, (iii) the disagreements are grounded in differing conception of the good life; (iv) the different conceptions are incommensurable, i.e. there’s no further framework, available to both parties, into which those conceptions are translatable and which would thereby settle the conflict.
(2) A serious moral conflict can be resolved in two ways: either (i) by some neutral arbiter or (ii) by the imposition of force of one group or individual on the other.
(3) One believes in an objective moral code if and only if one believes in the existence of a neutral arbiter of serious moral conflicts.
(4) Hence, if one does not believe in the existence of a neutral arbiter for serious moral conflicts, then one is committed to believing that serious moral conflicts can be resolved only by the imposition of force.
It’s a separate line of thought, though of course closely related, to show what it is that the neutral arbiter does in order to resolve the conflicts. In WJM’s account, what He/She does is lay down certain purposes that all human beings have, so that the moral view which does a better job of satisfying those purposes is the objectively better view.
(This is why he thinks that materialists, denying the existence of such a Being, must be committed to resolving serious moral conflicts through imposition by force, aka “might makes right”, and also why he doesn’t think that materialists are entitled to call themselves defenders of objective morality.)
Given that set-up of Murray’s position, there are couple of options. The most promising to be, I think, is to show that (2) is a false dichotomy, because there is also (iii) by rational conversation, empathy, mutual perspective-taking, and so on. That option would treat serious moral conflicts as being no different in kind than, say, a fight between friends or lovers.
Of course, there are cases where (2iii) fails, and then (2ii) is the default. There’s no rational conversation that liberal democrats can have with Nazis, which is why it’s so easy to pick out World War II as satisfying the criteria stipulated by just war theory.
But that does not then mean that I see all other moral systems and equally valid to my own.
Are you aware of anyone who does? I’m not, although I wouldn’t be terribly surprised to learn that some philosophers take that position.
WJM’s position as I understand it isn’t that subjectivists do prefer all moral systems equally, but that logically we must.
Pro Hac Vice:
Or they may find that both are right, in that their conclusions follow validly from their axioms, but that the axioms themselves differ. One person may affirm the parallel postulate, for example, while the other denies it.
It’s the same with morality, except that there is far greater disagreement over the axioms, with no prospect of resolution. Consciences differ, and William knows this.
In the past, William has backed off from asserting that conscience is a reliable source of moral guidance. Instead, he has argued that we must assume the existence of an objective morality even if we have no reliable access to it. He’s never been able to support that argument, however.
Exactly! Well…”we must…”to stay internally consistent or some such. That qualifier is what I am rejecting as well. That is not how I see moral relativism.
Regarding this “might makes right” business, might is what allows you to impose your will on others, whether your will is morally right or wrong.
The question of whether it is right for me to force someone into slavery is not resolved in the affirmative (even in my own eyes!) merely because I have the power to do so. This should be obvious, even to William.
KN,
Some objectivists (Barry Arrington and possibly WJM) seem to disagree that (1)(iv) is the case in the real world. BA at least has taken the position that in fact all people do share his moral compass; I think WJM is leading in this direction too, although I don’t recall him saying so directly. Unless we call that shared conscience a neutral arbiter, then, (3) is false from such a perspective.
And as you note, (2) is obviously a false dichotomy. Even in cases where all components of (1) are true, there are often resolutions other than neutral arbitration and force; non-violent dispute resolution is a fairly ubiquitous phenomenon.
What WJM would need, I think, is some further argument for why non-violent dispute resolution is highly unlikely for serious moral conflicts.
Though in one sense this is the very heart of the temperamental divide between liberals and conservatives: liberals optimistically think that we should try to apply non-violent dispute resolution even to serious moral conflicts, and conservatives are pessimistic about whether the conflicts can be resolved that way.
What WJM would need, I think, is some further argument for why non-violent dispute resolution is highly unlikely for serious moral conflicts.
That’s an easy argument to make–many non-violent solutions (democracy, for example) rely on the implication of violence (majority control of the police, for example). But I don’t think it would be sufficient, since he’s insisted that his argument is about logical necessities rather than the practice of the real world.
Nonsense.
When I judge someone else’s behavior, that judging is part of my behavior and thus subject to my criteria.
Usually a self-deceiving form of “might makes right”, first offered as some sort of supposed social consensus. Then when ask if they are obliged to agree with social consensus, they insist they have he right to go against social consensus if they so choose – meaning, they only let social consensus dictate what is right as long as it dovetails with their own personal preference.
Which brings the principle down, ultimately, to “because I prefer it”, enforced or intervened on others “because I want to” and “because I can”.
IOW, personal preference defines right; might (of some form, physical, manipulative, etc.) makes right (enforces it/intervenes), society and consensus be damned.
That’s really just imposing my personal preferences on others because I want to, and because I can. Does anyone here think that’s a moral system?
Which brings the principle down, ultimately, to “because I prefer it”, enforced or intervened on others “because I want to” and “because I can”.
Which obviously doesn’t materially distinguish subjectivists from objectivists. If two objectivists disagree on an important moral point, does one try to enforce his morality on the other? He does if he prefers to. Is he able to? If he has the power. Does that make him right? No more than the subjectivist who resorts to force becomes “right” as a consequence of that force.
You’ve conflated “the use of force” with “might makes right.” You’re omitting any sort of argument as to how a subjectivist’s use of force makes that person “right.” Unless all you mean is what you write above, that might “enforces it/intervenes,” in which case there’s no distinction between subjectivists and objectivists.
If morality = subjective preference, then subjective preference cannot be used to “validate” which morality is superior to another. That would be a circular argument. You’d have to refer to something besides “personal preference” in order to validate a personal preference as superior to any other personal preference.
What do you mean by “validate”? I don’t need to “validate” my own beliefs to myself–they are my own beliefs. I measure them against themselves and my a priori assumptions.
I think you’re once again trying to sneak in an assumption that there is an objective standard, which is of course inapplicable here (since you’re either trying to establish the logical results of subjectivism, in which case the assumption is invalid, or trying to prove objectivism, in which case it’s circular).
Folks, who do you think William J. Murray represents?
He certainly doesn’t represent Christianity. He doesn’t seem to represent a coherent worldview at all. Yet you are arguing with him as if he is defending something that you would rail against to save your lives, your freedom, your alternative agnostic/atheist worldview.
“If morality = subjective preference, then subjective preference cannot be used to “validate” which morality is superior to another.”
If ‘morality’ were what William J. Murray believes it to be, then everyone in the world should bow to his ‘intelligence’ for discovering it, as incoherent and non-institutional as his worldview has been called in his own words. No credible worldview position will claim him as their own, so he goes it alone here with you folks as an eccentric quasi-IDist. The irony is that you bite on his fakes!
This thread’s got 367 posts already! And eclectic, pantheist/atheist Lizzie just wanted to get something off her chest.
Yet you are arguing with him as if he is defending something that you would rail against to save your lives, your freedom, your alternative agnostic/atheist worldview.
Or maybe we just enjoy conversation.
That is a good way to solve the problems with your neighborhoods in a condo, not for solve moral conflicts. Usually moral conflicts are personals. What I have to do? And there, there is no arbitre just our conscience.
I think he represents William J. Murray.
Gregory,
I certainly don’t think Murray represents any worldview except his own, and I wouldn’t take him as representing either theism or ID.
Personally, I’d rather talking about the disenchanted conception of nature and the bifurcated conception of reality. But no one seems too engaged in my thread on those issues, and this is where is the action is at, and I do enjoy philosophical conversation for its own sake, so . . .
But that’s avoiding my central claim here, which is that at least some serious moral conflicts (as I defined above) really are just like conflicts between neighbors in a condo, except that the condo is our planet.
There is, however, another class of serious moral conflicts that I wasn’t thinking about when I made my previous comment there, and those are cases of conflicts between values to which oneself is antecedently committed.
For example, I might be antecedently committed to bodily autonomy as a moral value: everything else being equal, I hold that people have control over their own bodies and what they do with their bodies is their business, except insofar as the exercise of bodily autonomy threatens that of other people. And I might also be antecedently committed to religious freedom: everything else being equal, I hold that religious communities and traditions should express themselves as they see fit, except insofar as doing so threatens that of other people. If I hold both moral values, I might be genuinely perplexed about male circumcision. Opponents of male circumcision insist that the first value trumps the second; supporters of it insist that the second value trumps the first. Insofar as both values are of approximately equal motivating strength on me — both being values I take very seriously — I might feel a genuine moral dilemma within myself about this issue.
That’s not what I had in mind by “serious moral conflict,” since I was thinking in the first instance of conflicts between individuals and groups rather than within the individuals themselves, but obviously we need something intelligent to say about both kinds of conflict.
As near as I can tell, the only “objective morality” these cases illustrate is that if you don’t want other people to do certain things to you, don’t do them to other people.
An individual’s cruelty to animals appears to be seen as a red flag that signals the potential for that individual to carry such cruelty over to other humans. It may betray a lack of empathy and respect for other creatures, especially those creatures that respond to cruel treatment in ways that can be easily anthropomorphized.
But it still doesn’t answer the question about “moral” behavior that is labeled by sectarians – and others who have grown up in a society that has been influenced by sectarian beliefs – who purport to hold to moral “absolutes.”
The question about sexual preferences and gay marriage is topic that has received a lot of political attention in the US in recent elections as well as in the US Congress and state legislatures around the country.
Then there is the issue of abortion. How about gun “rights?” Is it moral to teach children evolution?
Moral absolutism appears to a typical assumption among a number of sectarian Christian groups in the US as well as among sectarians in other religions. Thus, when someone says they are a moral absolutist, such sectarians come easily to mind.
I have no idea what you are, and I don’t give a damn. You have already said that you believe whatever suits “your purposes.” That would suggest a complete lack of morality and empathy for others and other creatures; you just decide what your “purposes” are at the moment and to hell with their effects on others. Playing with people is like playing with flies for you.
Could you give an example of moral conflict between individuals and groups?
It’s unsurprising that William fails to justify his morality as objective.
He’s already told us that he doesn’t care whether his beliefs are true. That means it doesn’t matter to him whether a behavior is actually objectively moral or not. The only thing that matters is whether he believes it is, and whether that belief “works” for him.
It’s pitiful, really. He talks and talks about objective morality, and yet by his own admission he doesn’t care whether any of it is true.
Let’s see if I can unpack the obvious in a straightforward way.
Is it ever morally acceptable to force personal preferences on other adults, regardless of how strongly we feel about those preferences?
That question would be enough for reasonably open minded people to see the folly of the view that morals are personal preferences. However, I’m in a more expansive mood.
If morality is a personal preference, how would that rationally translate into assessing the relative moral value of the behavior of others?
We can agree that “I prefer vanilla ice cream” is not a moral statement, even though it is a statement of personal preference. Therefore, not all personal preferences are moral statements, even though all moral statements are personal preferences (under moral subjectivism).
The principle of “moral subjectivism” is that there is no objective moral standard by which all or any moral views can be evaluated and compared; the only intrinsic “moral-ness” available is how a person feels about a an action – whether they ought do it, or ought not do it. Only **they** can tell if they ought do a thing, or ought not do a thing, because “oughtness”, under subjectivism, is entirely determined subjectively by whether or not that particular individual prefers to do that particular thing or not.
If morality is subjective, then only the person performing the act can know if their act is moral or not, because the moral nature of the act is determined by their subjective feelings about it. The only way an outside person can pass judgement on the moral quality of someone else’s act is if they were that person performing that act and feeling what that person is feeling, because that is what defines if the act is moral or not.
When one person looks at the behavior of another, they have no means – by definition – of determining if that particular act by that particular actor is moral or not (unless that person tells them how they feel about committing the act). The observer can only comment on how he or she feels upon watching the act or contemplating the act. The only subjective sensation available from either watching the act or imagining it is how the observer feels in relation to the act – not how the actor himself is feeling in relation to the act.
Therefore, the best an observer can do is conclude that the act would probably be wrong for them, but cannot have a valid rational opinion about whether or not the act is immoral for the actor himself without hearing from the actor.
There can be no rational moral basis for intervening, because nobody but the actor can say if the act was moral or not. The observer can certainly avoid acting the same way if he thinks acting that way would be immoral for him, but he cannot pass judgement on whether or not the actor himself was behaving immorally, and he/she can certainly not justify intervening to stop an act they have no way of determining is moral or not (except by asking the actor).
Now, if a moral subjectivist uses their own personal preferences as an arbiter by which they evaluate moral value of the activities of others, and as justification to intervene, they are setting aside the principle that morality is determined subjectively, by each and any individual, and instead putting in place a de facto objective moral arbiter of everyone’s behavior- their own personal preferences.
Either:
1) only the individual can tell if what they are doing is moral, because whether or not it is moral depends on how they personally feel about it,
or
2) a second party can determine if the actions of a first party are moral by comparing them against their own preferences.
IF 1, the second party cannot pass any judgements on the moral value of the first party’s actions, and so has no right or obligation to intervene;
IF 2, the second party has set their own preferences up as an objective standard by which he or she can judge the actions of all other actors.
In the case of #2, even if you don’t call it an objective standard, and refer to it as your subjective standard, you are still employing it as a de facto objective standard.
TL;DR: You can’t rationally assert that morals are subjective and then act as if your personal preferences are objectively binding on everyone else. That’s called having your cake and eating it, too. And, if you assert that morals are just personal preferences that you feel strongly about, then you are saying that it’s okay for you to force your personal preferences on others if you feel strongly enough about them and if you are able to.
This theory of morality boils down to “because I say so” and “because I can”, or as it is colloquially known, “might makes right”. I submit that “subjective morality” is obviously not a serious attempt at understanding morality at all, but rather a flimsy justification for forcing one’s will on others and a means of hiding that bare, brutal fact from yourself.
If that is what moral subjectivism entails, then I most certainly am not a moral subjectivist. However, it is equally certain that I am not a moral objectivist.
Perhaps your analysis is faulty.
It looks to me like the position at SES was an endowed chair and the endowment got yanked. He’s dropped faster than I could follow.
I find it considerably more difficult to feel pity for him, though, being intimately familiar with how most academics are struggling in the adjunct marketplace today, at least here in the US. Tenure track positions are a thing of the past. Two years ago, I was teaching 13 classes at three schools, commuting 500 miles a week, putting in over 100 hours, making up for lost sleep by napping in parking lots, with no health insurance, sick days, or benefits, and I still couldn’t put together a median wage. I did get full-time offers from all three, and have been comfortably situated ever since, but the memory of that trip through hell is still plenty fresh.
Nowadays, I’m almost indolent by comparison, teaching a full-time gig and an adjunct on the side, eight classes total. And tomorrow, Spring semester begins again. Yay me.
As ever, Jesse
William,
How are the personal preferences of God, if he exists, any less subjective than yours or mine?
It should be unsurprising, given that I’ve flat out stated that’s not something I would ever try to do.
Yes, it’s pitiful that I don’t make the arguments you’d prefer I make, or care about what you’d prefer I care about.
Morals are not the personal preferences of anyone or anything, including god.
Let’s see if I can unpack the obvious in a straightforward way.
Thanks for putting in the effort.
Is it ever morally acceptable to force personal preferences on other adults, regardless of how strongly we feel about those preferences?
Yes, if you include moral principles within “preferences.” This is true for both subjectivists and objectivists. Suppose we agree that slavery is objectively wrong. If we act on that principle, though, we are acting on a preference for the morally good (as opposed to the morally bad).
Simply saying that a principle is objective does not get you out of “personal preference” territory. It’s a variety of the Euthyphro dilemma.
If morality is a personal preference, how would that rationally translate into assessing the relative moral value of the behavior of others?
It doesn’t need to be translated. If I believe slavery is wrong, that in and of itself supports my subjectivist moral condemnation of a slaver. There’s no intermediate step and no need for an external metric. The fact that the slaver disagrees with me is simply irrelevant to my own moral calculation.
Your concept of assessing the “relative moral value” of other people’s behavior is once again assuming some sort of objective standard. Since there isn’t such a standard, the only comparison would be between my beliefs and his beliefs. But my beliefs are my beliefs—I prefer them to his, or I wouldn’t hold them. Putting aside for now whether he can persuade me to change my beliefs, the process simply doesn’t include a comparison of “relative moral value.”
In practical terms, I see that Bob is enslaving his neighbors. I think slavery is wrong. I conclude that Bob is committing a moral wrong. I know that Bob disagrees as to whether slavery is wrong, but Bob’s opinion doesn’t affect my own judgment.
Only **they** can tell if they ought do a thing, or ought not do a thing, because “oughtness”, under subjectivism, is entirely determined subjectively by whether or not that particular individual prefers to do that particular thing or not.
This is a little fuzzy. Just to be clear, subjectivists certainly do believe that some of the things they “prefer to do” are morally wrong. All human beings are tempted to do (and actually do) things they know they shouldn’t. I don’t think this is actually a point of disagreement among us, but just in case.
When one person looks at the behavior of another, they have no means – by definition – of determining if that particular act by that particular actor is moral or not (unless that person tells them how they feel about committing the act). The observer can only comment on how he or she feels upon watching the act or contemplating the act. The only subjective sensation available from either watching the act or imagining it is how the observer feels in relation to the act – not how the actor himself is feeling in relation to the act.
This is not only wrong, it’s absurdly and lazily wrong. This has been explained to you at enormous length. Please make an effort to understand the perspective you are criticizing.
I do have a means of “determining if that particular act by that particular actor is moral or not.” I have my own moral principles. When I see a slaver enslaving, I apply my own principles and conclude that he is committing a wrongful act. The slaver’s opinion about his own conduct—how he feels about enslaving others—isn’t necessary for that calculation. It’s not even relevant to it.
Therefore, the best an observer can do is conclude that the act would probably be wrong for them, but cannot have a valid rational opinion about whether or not the act is immoral for the actor himself without hearing from the actor.
This is once again a very poor argument in that it simply does not engage with any thought other than your inititial (mis)conceptions. Try it logically: Sally Subjectivist believes that unjustified murder is wrong. Tom murders his neighbor without justification. Sally thinks Tom has done something wrong.
What does Sally need to hear from Tom? And what difference would it make to her conclusion? Let’s assume she knows that Tom would say that he believes his actions were justified. So what? What effect would that have on her own conclusions?
There can be no rational moral basis for intervening, because nobody but the actor can say if the act was moral or not.
Of course there can. The fact that the actor disagrees with us is virtually a given, since the proposition on the table is intervention. There doesn’t need to be an objective signoff for such intervention. As a subjectivist, the calculation may simply be: I should stop moral transgressions. There is a moral transgression I can stop. It might be a moral transgression to interfere. If the wrong I can stop is greater than the wrong committed in intervening, intervention is morally justified.
Now, if a moral subjectivist uses their own personal preferences as an arbiter by which they evaluate moral value of the activities of others, and as justification to intervene, they are setting aside the principle that morality is determined subjectively, by each and any individual, and instead putting in place a de facto objective moral arbiter of everyone’s behavior- their own personal preferences.
You are conflating behavior and belief. If I act to stop slavery, I’m not declaring that my beliefs are objective. Slavers are still going to believe that slavery is good, and my contrary opinion won’t change that. I’m merely preventing them from taking actions based on their beliefs.
Recently a district court ruled that Utah must recognize same-sex marriage. No one, and I mean no one, believes that the court’s actions objectively resolve whether it’s morally good or evil for the government to recognize SSM.
IF [a second party can determine if the actions of a first party are moral by comparing them against their own preferences], the second party has set their own preferences up as an objective standard by which he or she can judge all other actions.
In the case of #2, even if you don’t call it an objective standard, and refer to it as your subjective standard, you are still employing it as a de facto objective standard.
I think of your choices, 2 is more correct. But even if I force the rest of the world to stop owning slaves, it doesn’t make my belief that slavery is morally wrong objectively true. It simply forces others to behave consistently with my subjective beliefs. They retain their own opinions, and there remains no actual arbiter to determine who’s morally right.
If you call my control over their actions the arbiter of moral truth, then it is you, not us, who is appealing to “might makes right.”
I mentioned some time ago that the world has invented ways of dealing between incompatible moral systems. It’s called law. Secular law.
Everywhere it has gained a foothold it has dominated.
It certainly isn’t perfect,
But those nations that have been accused of murdering tens or hundreds of millions of people in the twentieth century were operating from the position that a few elite persons had objective rules of morality.
In places where morality (law) is set by consensus or by elected representatives, the rate of violence is low (by historical standards).
I suppose one could argue that diminished violence is not an objective moral standard.
William,
You have said more than once that God created us for a purpose and that we are morally obligated to fulfill that purpose. For example, you wrote:
I repeat my question:
keiths:
William:
William, earlier today:
If you’d stop contradicting yourself, the discussion might get somewhere. How do you walk with so many holes in your foot?
Then why do you not rail against KF and his crusade against the queers?
You claim to be a moral person but what sort of morality is it where you are standing by mute while something you (supposedly) disagree with happens over and over.
Nobody here is suppressing anybody here, but you can find plenty of that at the place where you are happy to write OPs. Ever said something?
Fair enough, but I don’t have to “validate” a given morality. I only have to embrace it and hold it as valid for me.
And as a moral relativist, I’m not trying to argue for which moral system is better; I’m working with others to try to establish a society that most people can comfortably live with. That means I recognize that some of the moral principles I agree with are going to be ignored. Oh well. I may try to explain to others why I find them credible, but there’s no way I’m going to try to validate them to others. Why would I bother?
Let’s take homosexuality as an example. I happen to find nothing “wrong” with it whatsoever. Yet it seems that the majority of people still feel that homosexuality is immoral. Ok. Do I go around trying to validate the moral principle that homosexuality is “normal”? Of course not! That would be asinine, to say nothing of completely impossible. How would I validate such a principle? Instead, I try to participate in situations that normalize homosexuality as a non-threatening human characteristic to slowly reduce the majority’s negative feelings associated with the characteristic. Over time, it seems that the number of people who see homosexuality as a threat decreases, so there’s no need to then validate the moral principle; under such circumstances, other people adopt the principle on their own.
Ooooo…two Internets for you! 😀
Keiths,
As I have said before, your failure to understand the nature of my arguments doesn’t constitute self-contradiction on my part. There is a difference between describing my view on a subject, and attempting to “justify” it according to whatever systems of “justification” others might require. I don’t know what would “justify” my views in the eyes of others, so I don’t bother making such a case. I will, however, describe my views up to a point.
As I said before, morality refers to our ability to navigate the structure of universal mind by use of conscience. I have also explained that “mind”, as we generally use the term, is comprised of many different kinds of things, including both subjective and objective commodities.
Some of those commodities are analogous to gravity or entropy or other fundamental physical “forces” in the physical world. What morality refers to is the purpose for which god creates; god cannot switch or change the nature of it’s fundamental purpose. It is an intrinsic, fundamental characteristic of god. God might create all sorts of different things that god prefers to fulfill or express that purpose, but God cannot change God’s purpose. Because of this, god cannot change the nature of what is good, god can only express the nature of what is good in various creations and projects.
If something is a personal preference, it means that there are options that could be chosen other than one’s preference, that the individual could choose if they wanted. The purpose behind what god creates is an absolute, unchangeable commodity of god and thus existence; while god might express that purpose in many personal preference ways, morality only refers to that fundamental purpose.
Therefore, no Euthyphro dilemma, no command authority, no “personal preference” at the heart of morality.
Not just cats, but people too. So what do you think, were they insane or normal products of evolution?
They were products of the culture they were raised in. Have you already forgotten the Michael Vick dogfighting story? Forgotten the reports of the Southern culture in which he was raised where such cruelty to dogs is normal?
Enforcing your morality on others belies that position. They should also, according to the subjectivist position, not have to validate their morality according to yours, but that is what you are requiring – that their morality be validated as sufficient or good according to your own or else you will intervene.
You are ignoring how your view unpacks when it comes to the nature of “personal preference” vs “forcing something on others” and the justification for doing so. If they do not have to justify their behavior according to your personal preferences, why on earth would you be intervening in the first place? If you intervene without asking any questions, you necessarily consider the behavior unjustifiable according to your particular moral rules; if there is any doubt, you would ask first to see if they could justify their actions accordingly.
The reason this is hypocritical, outside of a might makes right system, is because you would be setting your own personal preferences up as the objective arbiter of all other systems (even if you called it “subjective”) while insisting that all morality subjective. You’d be calling it subjective, but acting as if your own system is the objective standard.
Whether or not homosexuality is “normal” is a non-sequitur when it comes to whether or not one “ought” to engage in homosexual activities. Let’s unpack your activity here; because you think people ought to not treat homosexuals badly, you have engaged in an activity you think will result in your goal. You don’t believe there is any “ought not” when it comes to homosexual activity per se – but, once again, by trying to convince others to behave in a way that comports with your “personal preferences”, you are acting as if your personal preferences should be how other people act. This is not compatible with the idea that morality is nothing other than your personal preference, and I’ll do some more unpacking of terminology to make this more apparent.
When a person says “it’s my personal, subjective view that X is immoral”, what does that statement mean? It cannot be a statement that X, in and of itself, “is” by nature immoral, if morality is entirely subjective. The terms “moral” and “is” are providing confusing cover for a sentiment that, when expressed correctly, are obviously not compatible.
Morality is a shorthand way of saying there are things we ought do (and ought not).
“Is” refers to the claim about the state of a thing; it can refer to a subjective thing or an objective thing, but in those cases “is” means something different. “Vanilla is the best flavor in the world”, an expression of personal preference, has an entirely different necessary implication than “The Burj Khalifa is the tallest building in the world”. In the vanilla statement, “is” is shorthand for “is, for me,“. There is certainly no intention that “vanilla” is by some objective measure the “best” flavor in the world. One could make a case for “most popular”, but that is a different kind of statement.
When one is asserting an “is” for everyone it implies that the claimed quality or characteristic can be objectively quantified in some way. The box is red. The computer is overheating. That is the wrong way to fix that machine. You are taller than me (are = is). When one is referring to a personal preference, “is” means “is, for me” That is the best movie in the world! That is the most exciting thing ever! That is a dreadful color!
One use of the term “is” necessarily refers to the expectation that there is some objective, quantifiable means of justifying/demonstrating/proving the claim. The other use of “is” just means “for me”, without any such reference.
Now let’s put the unpacked, more precise values together. When a moral subjectivist says “that is immoral” what are they saying in unpacked form?
Are they saying “That is, for me, what I ought do”, or are they saying “That is by some objectively quantifiable measure, what all people (for everyone) should do”? It is either a “for me” assertion, or an “objectively quantifiable” assertion. Obviously, a moral subjectivist cannot be making the latter, so it must be the former; that “for them”, they ought not do X.
A “for me” (personal preference) use of “is” cannot by definition be a “for everyone” (objectively quantifiable) claim. Under subjectivism, you can no more make a claim of what anyone else “ought” do than you can make a claim about what “is”, for them, the “best flavor in the world”.
Therefore, the statement “they ought not do that” cannot be rationally made in anything other than an “objectively quantifiable” format, because it makes no sense in the “for me” format. “For me, they ought not do that” = “Their favorite flavor is, for me, vanilla”. It’s a nonsensical statement, not a valid one.
The statement “What they are doing is immoral”, when unpacked and applied from a subjectivist basis, is a nonsensical statement, only seemingly non-controversial because the abbreviated, packed-in terminology covers up an inherent self-contradiction. Adding “in my opinion” or “in my view” to the statement simply reiterates one half of the self-contradiction.
“In my opinion” either implies that your opinion is supported by reference to an objective quantification, or it is just personal preference without objective quantification.
So the unpacked version of that statement would be either “for me, what they are doing is, for me, not what they ought to do” (as if what they “ought to do” is service your preferences, making “your preferences” a de facto objective standard), or it reads “according to some objective quantification, they are not doing what, for me, they ought do” – which is a contradiction along with an implication that some objective standard involved in the judgement process.
There is no version of this where “subjective morality” doesn’t end up being tyranny by -ultimately – might makes right (because I so wish, and because I can).
TL;DR: Moral subjectivists make statements about morality and moral applications that, when unpacked, reveal self-contradictory and nonsensical concept arrangements that, when arranged properly, mean “others should service my personal preferences, and I am willing to force them to if they do not”.
To avoid setting up their own preferences as a de facto objective moral standard (by claiming it is what others ought do), they can only assert that they can, and will, force others to do as they wish, and admit that the use of the term “morality” is just a cover for tyrannical might-makes-right.
Take away sound bite: Jack, the moral subjectivist, believes that everyone else should service his personal preferences, and is willing to use might and/or manipulation to make them do so.
The only people I know like this are fundamentalists (the Taliban would be a good example though perhaps some Christian sects would also fit the paradigm) who would indeed like to impose their rules on those within their control and (the Taliban at least) are quite capable of using brutal methods to hold sway..
Having a set of beliefs about “objective morality” which justifies to oneself one’s imposition of one’s own beliefs on others is no different in reality from just imposing one’s beliefs on others. Justification that doesn’t actually persuade others — that doesn’t, in some way, engage with their own rational capacities — is mere delusion.
It’s not my job to stop others from doing immoral things (assuming the thing in question is immoral). My job is to do what is morally obligatory in a given situation. That I would intervene on someone torturing a child is not because I consider the torturer to be behaving immorally, but rather because it is my moral obligation is get the child out of danger. That it is obviously immoral to torture a child is not the reason I am intervening.
This is an important point. In the very same sense, to give a real-world example, I saw a toddler in a parked car on a hill by himself, then I noticed the car started rolling down the hill towards a busy intersection. My moral obligation to try and stop that car doesn’t reside in whether or not the car is behaving immorally, or if the parent was immoral by leaving the toddler in the car, but rather because an innocent child was in clear and present danger. So I acted, even though it put my own safety at risk.
There are lots of things that I consider to be immoral but, because they do not involve any activity that I am obliged by moral duty to act on, I don’t intervene. I don’t even offer an opinion unless it is asked for. It is my view that people should be allowed to behave as they wish, and that social rules or laws should only be about creating a basic, serviceable social framework.
Also, BTW, I never claimed (that I recollect) to be a moral person. I think I’m sufficiently good (meaning, doing what I’m supposed to do) to not warrant any serious negative consequences. I do enough good to get by, IMO.
William J. Murray,
There is a book out called The Wisdom of Psychopaths. Basically the author is saying that being a psychopath has many good benefits to succeeding in society, and they could almost be considered useful or essential. He claims that for a society to thrive it needs at least 10% psychopaths.
I wonder if the evolutionists here would argue that we should amend the laws to make life more accommodating for their tendencies?
Now, that doesn’t seem too far from my own view in that what anyone does is their own business up to the point where it adversely affects the rights of anyone else. The law (ideally developed by consensus) then may need to referee where rights and interests of individuals conflict.
I wouldn’t. (Though looking at your comment, I suspect the definition of psycopathy is wider in the book you mention than I might consider). Did you hear anything of the Bulger case?
ETA looking at Kevin Dutton’s website, he is casting his net much more widely for psychopaths than I would.
Yea, but I would assume there are a lot of psychopaths in society who just hide it well, because they know the advantages of keeping their feelings secret, even if they would have no problem acting on them. They are also apparently better at detecting lying from others, because I guess they have more experience with it.
Well, I would define a psychopath by their actions. Having psychopathic thoughts but staying generally within the parameters of the law is one thing. Torturing toddlers for gratification is another. Psychopaths who act on their impulses need to be incarcerated.
But actually its common practice in the United States to lock up psychopaths based on the belief that they have great potential for harming someone.
They are giving a psychopath evaluation score, and if they fall too strongly in to the “bad” zone they could be locked up forever.