A few times I’ve referred to my view about “the God question” as “radical agnosticism.” I thought it might be fun to work through what this means.
For the purposes of this discussion, by “God” I shall mean follow Hart’s definition of God as “the one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, perfectly transcendent of all things and for that very reason absolutely immanent to all things” (The Experience of God, p. 30).
Next, I shall stipulate that our assertions about the world fall into two classes: those that take a truth-value in all possible worlds and those that take a truth-value only in the actual world. This is a contemporary version of “Hume’s Fork”: there are “relations of ideas”, “truths of reason”, analytic a priori claims and then there are “matters of fact”, “truths of fact,” synthetic a posteriori claims. (There are some reasons to be skeptical of this neat distinction but I’ll leave that aside for now.)
Whether or not God exists would therefore seem to be either a “truth of fact” or a “truth of reason”. I shall therefore now argue that it cannot be either.
Truths of fact are either directly observable phenomena or they are posited phenomena. (Though the boundary is strictly methodological and shifts over time.) But there are many presumptive truths of fact — claims with truth-value about the actual world — which we know have turned out to be false. And we know that because of empirical inquiry, and in particular, in the collection of techniques of inquiry called “science”. (I shall not insult anyone’s intelligence by assuming that there is a single thing called “the scientific method”).
Central to disciplined empirical inquiry, including and especially the sciences, is the act of measurement: intersubjectively verifiable assignments of quantitative variation across some interval of spatio-temporal locations. (It might be said that “the Scientific Revolution” is the historical period during which measurement slowly becomes the dominant conception of objectivity.)
But with that notion in place, it is perfectly clear that it is not even possible to take measurements of a perfectly transcendent being. A being that transcends all of space and time cannot be measured, which means that no claims about Him can be subjected to the tribunal of scientific inquiry. And hence no matters of fact about God can be verified one way or the other. That is to say that all claims about God that are restricted to the actual world have an indeterminate truth-value: they cannot be determined to be true or false
The epistemic situation is no better when we turn from a posteriori to a priori claims. In a priori claims, the tribunal is not science but logic, and the central epistemic concept is not measurability but provability. Can the existence of God be proven? Many have thought so!
But here two things must be pointed out: a proof, to be deductively valid, consists of re-organizing the information contained in the initial assumptions. One can generate a logically valid proof of the existence of God. (Gödel, for example, has a logically valid version of the Ontological Argument.) The process of proof-construction is not going to give you more information in the conclusion than was present in the premises.
Logic is limited in another important way: there are multiple logics. What can proved in one logic can be disproven in a different logic. It depends on the choice of logical system. Once you’ve chosen a logical system, and you’ve chosen some premises, then of course one can prove that God exists. But neither the premises nor the rules are “self-evident”, inscribed on the very face of reason or of reality, etc.
Hence we cannot determine that God exists or does not exist on the basis of logic alone, since provability is no more reliable here than measurability is.
On this basis, I conclude that it is not even possible for beings such as ourselves to assign any truth-value at all to the assertion that God exists. This yields a radical agnosticism. Whereas the moderate agnostic can accept the logical possibility of some future evidence or reasoning that would resolve the issue, the radical agnostic insists that beings with minds like ours are completely unable to resolve the issue at all.
Radical agnosticism is at the same time compatible with either utter indifference to the question of the existence of God (“apatheism”) or some quite definite stance (ranging from theism to pantheism to deism to atheism). All that radical agnosticism insists on here is that all definite stances on the God-question are leaps of faith — no matter what direction.
I’m not taking sides here. There have been several recent posts which pushed the boundaries. Can we all just stop that.
That was not his point. His point immediately followed: It’s not a rational thing. Meaning: His actual point was, It’s not rational for people to adopt the ism of their parents. The thing is that atheism is also an ism, so he ended up saying that atheism is not rational when adopted from parents.
Remember his earlier I think not believing is the default state, absent any social pressure. But when people adopt the ism of their parents, this of course goes under social pressure. So, it follows that either “not believing absent any social pressure” is something different than atheism or that he didn’t really mean seriously one or some of his utterances.
It’s such a mess that it doesn’t deserve this analysis.
That’s really what he posted. Additionally, he has said “I don’t distinguish between true believers in various isms.” And that’s profoundly problematic. If this means that he doesn’t distinguish those whose world view is the result of rational analysis from feigners or opportunists, then you don’t want to stand by him, studies notwithstanding.
I’m going to ask again, how does reason apply to belief?
I’m not being snide, although I am being doubtful.
It’s a serious question.
On what basis does an adult convert from one theism to another?
I have been quite open in saying that my generally skeptical stance on just about everything is not the result of pure reason.
It does seem consistent with the environment I grew up in, in which ideas were tossed about with any heavy overlay of moral judgement. No one in my family ever asked me what i believe about anything, at least not anything philosophical or theological.
But my brother grew up in the same household and has spent a lifetime holding strong opinions about everything.
ETA: his religious convictions lean very conservative, but still within the family ism. His take on them just seems rigid to me.
Religion is not belief. God is not a skydaddy. These are things you never learned in your theist years, so you were merely a nominal theist. Nominal believers are unreasoned by definition. The same applies to nominal atheists, by the way.
Your question could be interesting, if your superficiality were not so transparent.
It’s not rational for people to adopt -isms…any -isms. That includes atheism. …and?
Adopting any particular stance on some metaphysical concept has nothing to do with a rational inquiry or assessment regarding knowledge or understanding. I don’t see how anyone could argue otherwise.
I personally think that non-theism is different from atheism, particularly given how folks like Walto use the term. Simply not adopting any -ism whatsoever seems a reasonably rational solution (if you feel you need to be rational).
I’ve decide to go with apathy. It’s not an -ism…and frankly, I don’t care.
Then don’t analyze it.
I really have no idea how you’ve arrived at this conclusion. What do people with rational analysis-based world views, feigners (sic), or opportunists have to do with “true believers in various isms”?
I’m not, per se, “standing by” anyone. I’m trying to understand where your reaction to Petrushka’s post is coming from.
Has the cock crowed three times yet?
My reaction? I made some calculated moves to see if I was reading him right. From his responses it appears that I was. He cooperated well. Thanks, petrushka.
No need to thank me. You seem to need certainty, and I have no such need. I see no value in reasoning about fictional objects. Other than for entertainment
We do seem to be able to communicate our differences to each other.
Without lashes, stonings, and such. Pity much of the world.
My reading of that statement is that adopting the ism of one’s parents is not typically the result of rational analysis. When one is indoctrinated from a young age in a particular belief system, it’s difficult to extricate oneself.
It’s certainly logically possible to adopt one or more of one’s parents’ isms for rational reasons.
Certainty, consistency, and comprehensiveness. This is achieved by means of hard work only by those who are persistent in their philosophical quest. It’s not entertainment.
Logically, yes, but petrushka did not mean it this way. He said rather pointedly: It’s not a rational thing. Upon my inquiry, he didn’t provide any nuance.
I would modify “not typically” to typically not.
But I see no value in reasoning about fictional entities.
Again, let’s try to avoid getting personal.
And Skeptic-ism! Of course. It’s so irrational. The Irrational Zone would be more like it. Closer to the truth.
LoL!
The certainty in that statement is palpable.
Sadly have not had time to spend on this thread.
Some initial thoughts:
Hume’s Fork is probably wrong and KN’s argument is likely to be self-defeating.
If Hume’s Fork is rejected, then what of the argument of the OP?
Mung,
Hume’s Fork is an underlying assumption in the OP. If there are good reasons to reject the Fork, then those reasons would undermine the argument in the OP. But thus far no arguments against the Fork have been presented.
Hume is not your “skeptical” friend.
Three Minute Philosophy – David Hume
You Kant be serious.
Awesome.
petrushka:
You think that atheism and skepticism are “approaches to knowing” what, exactly?
Philosophically yes, politically no. Edwards vs Aguillard
Idist are fond of the cosmological argument, there must be a Uncaused Cause.The Christian God is the ultimate cause. Are you saying the classical theistic God does not preform miracles when He chooses? What are miracles but tinkering with the laws of nature?
As he said, just about anything. Consider that the opposite of atheism and skepticism implies knowing a priori. The approach of accepting without evidence, or despite evidence, is not an approach to knowing, it’s a way to avoid knowing.
We await the results.
Didn’t I do it in my very first post?
This is what I mean by sidestepping. The thing is there, but you ignore it. Up front, you define God and you purport to argue that “God exists” cannot be true. And you do it by ignoring the definition. My main problem (thought it’s a fundamental problem) with your post is your usage of the Fork and I said so up front, loud and clear, but let a few days pass and you don’t remember it.
Kant argued that arithmetic, Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian mechanics are all synthetic a priori.
Do you agree?
On the contrary, I remember your objection very well — but your objection is not yet an argument.
Your point there was only that we cannot have knowledge of God if we accept the Fork. That is true. But that objection does not by itself tell us whether we have better reasons to reject the Fork or to reject the intelligibility of both theism and atheism. Thus far all you’ve done is point out that the intelligibility of both theism and atheism depends on rejecting the Fork.
That’s true, but that’s not actually a reason to reject the Fork. At most it’s a motivation for not wanting the Fork to be true, if one is committed to theism or to atheism on non-epistemic grounds.
The original creation of the universe and its subsequent evolution look distinct to us, but are one to God. Similarly, natural events and miraculous events look distinct to us, but are one to God.
In classical theism, God makes no special effort to bring about a miracle. Everything that happens was already decreed “from the beginning” as it were. The most miraculous event is creation. Creation is the singular act of Creator God. When extended in time, this act is more properly called God’s decree.
In physical terms, different substances have different natures and should behave accordingly as per laws of nature – and this is indeed true, mostly. However, sometimes the match lights up when you strike it, sometimes it doesn’t. So, in addition to substances, there are also dispositions at work. Dispositions vary so that they include strange and wondrous, outright miraculous, events.
The difference between a miracle and a natural event is that either you figure out the dispositions or you don’t. When you don’t, the event will look unnatural, out of place, or it will look like a miracle. But whichever way it seems to you, from God’s point of view it is as originally decreed.
The Fork does not get around to addressing the definition of God that you cited. Are you saying this is a bad reason to reject the Fork? Maybe you are, because what you have done thus far is like trying to eat soup with a fork, and when it doesn’t work you blame the soup…
excellent point
ditto
preach it bro.
I would add that those events that look miraculous were decreed to look that way from the beginning.
Often these events are important from the perspective of redemptive history and the apparently miraculous nature of the event serves to focus our attention where it belongs on God.
peace
I thought I did it with my gottcha question to DAZZ. Perhaps we were being to subtle.
peace
That’s not quite right, FWIW.
That depends on one’s definition of “miracle.” As it’s generally defined, that’s false.
That also depends on a heterodox def of “miracle.”
That’s better. Something could LOOK miraculous and not be.
The OP takes the argument that we cannot know whether God does or does not exist, given a classical theist conception of God and an updated version of Hume’s Fork.
Where does the argument go wrong?
Again, incompatibility gives us nothing. One would need a positive reason to prefer classical theism over Hume’s Fork in order for the incompatibility of classical theism with Hume’s Fork to give a reason to reject the Fork.
The sheer fact of incompatibility cannot by itself be a reason to reject the Fork. If we did have strong reasons to accept the Fork, then the incompatibility of the Fork with classical theism gives us a reason to reject classical theism.
That part is OK if ‘accept’ in the post I responded to means the same thing as ‘given’ here. My point was that the acceptance might be mistaken and so not foul up the knowledge.
Do you have an argument against Hume’s Fork?
Maybe you’d call it more of a bias. But my views have been affected both by Quine from the left and Kripke from the right. Anyhow, I’m not sympathic to Humean positivism at all.
ETA: (Also Putnam from both left AND right.)
This is funny because in order to say this you should be able to provide the orthodox definition of “miracle”. Please do so.
“The sheer fact of incompatibility” in this case is the fact of incompatibility of your method in relation to your subject matter. When your purpose is to eat soup, but the fork does not fit the purpose, then for a rational person this is enough reason to reject the fork and try something else. Apparently not so for a pragmatist.
Anyway, given your background, you should have dozens of philosophical methods up your sleeve to go over the matter again and again in different ways until it fits. For now, classical theism explains things far better than the Fork.
Incidentally, this part is completely missing in the OP and in your comments. There are absolutely no reasons given that we should accept the Fork, strong or otherwise.
The point of the OP is to argue that radical agnosticism is entailed by Hume’s Fork. Whether we should accept the Fork in the first place is a different question.
You have an odd sense of humor. I did an OP on defining ‘miracle.’ You can look it up under ‘McKinnon’. The remark still won’t be funny to most people though. I can’t help with that issue.
Btw, you haven’t told us what this awful country is that is grinding you under it’s anti-theist boot. Do tell!
I found it. It’s interesting, but not at all orthodox.
This is irrelevant. And you misinterpreted what I said. The anti-theist boot already did its job. Now the people are supposedly free again – free to be irreligious, while formerly they were forced to be irreligious at gunpoint. This is how it works.
Yes. And it does a poor job of it, as explained.
It’s a question you yourself raised by asking for an argument against Hume’s Fork. My argument against it is that it doesn’t do the job you gave it to do. For comparison, let’s see an argument from you why Hume’s Fork is still appropriate.
They’re free to be religious now too, right? In fact, I’m guessing there’s much more religious freedom there than in most theistic countries. That’s actually how it’s generally worked. Theists tend to have very little patience for theistic positions that are not their own. (Look up ‘Inquisition’ for some examples.)
Right. And for an answer to your question about official atheism, look at the history of XXth century.
I’m a radical agnostic about Hume’s Fork.
I see nothing that an IDist would object to , ultimate causation rests with the Christian God who is outside of time.
So God knew from the beginning what He would do. Ok, ID is completely ambiguous about mechanism, can’t see that would a problem.
Ok
That does not mean a non lighting match negates the laws of nature unless there is a law that all matches must light. You seem to be getting close to denying free will.
Such as the strange or wonderous or miraculous something which caused the flagellum to occur, the IDist might ask.
I think you are saying that ignorance of nature can lead to false positives of miracles, I agree. The second part is confusing, are you saying there are not miracles because God cannot decree a miracle?
Kantian Naturalist,
Do you think this definition is consistent with the simulation hypothesis that Salvador wrote an OP on?
I disagree. If we accept all of the following:
1) The classical theistic definition of God;
2) All objectively valid assertions are assertions about the actual world or about all possible worlds;
3) All objectively valid assertions about the actual world are warranted if and only if they are intersubjectively verifiable;
4) All objectively valid assertions about all possible worlds are warranted if and only if they are proven within a formal system;
[with (2), (3), and (4) comprising “Hume’s Fork”]
then it does follow that there are no objectively valid assertions about God, and hence no objectively valid assertions that God does exist or that God does not exist.
And hence Hume’s Fork does precisely what I was calling upon it to do, which is to serve an epistemic basis for radical agnosticism, given a classical theist definition of what God is.
If you think that the argument from the Fork & classical theism to radical agnosticism doesn’t succeed, then perhaps you don’t understand what it is that I’m trying to do in the first place.
I’m happy to do that, though I doubt it would be of interest to most people here.
I have no idea.
Is that particular assertion proven in a formal system?
peace