Nearly ten years ago, on the 15th September, 2001, I read this piece in the Guardian, by Richard Dawkins.
I was a theist then, a catholic, in fact, by conversion, in my early twenties, having been baptized in the Episcopal Church of Scotland, sung at matins every Sunday until from age 8 to 11, sent to a Quaker boarding school, where I was devout, if rebellious, and became a Friend, later being confirmed at a High Church Anglican church in Devon, and finally, having married a catholic, feeling I had “come home” to the catholic church.
Always liberal, though – when I was being prepared for reception into the catholic church by the university chaplain, a Benedictine called Fr Fabian Cowper, he asked me if I had any concerns. I said, yes: contraception and papal infallibility. He replied: well, contraception is a good example of papal fallibility. So I thought I’d be OK. It was still not that long after Vatican II, liberation theology was in the air, and the Dominicans in Oxford were regular attenders at the Greenham Common protests, and there was a sense that the church might be a slow vast tanker but the People of God would turn it round. I hung on in there, even when my mother, who later converted herself, was temporarily excommunicated for publishing a book that argued that the church’s moral teaching on medical ethics was mostly wrong (a Jesuit professor of moral theology preached the eulogy at her requiem mass, and paid tribute to her for “having the courage to say what we dare not”, and for having had more faith in her church than her church had had in her. But looking back, that piece in the Guardian was the beginning of the end.
I remember thinking, and saying to my fairly recently bereaved father: “he makes a devasting point – it will be interesting to see how the churches rise to the challenge”.
But they didn’t. There were a couple of peeved responses, IIRC, but no-one took up the challenge. No-one had anything to say to rebut the charge that religion was not just not the defender of morality, but its actual enemy.
I think there is a rebuttal. But it’s a sad reflection on religion IMO that the response has been so pathetic.
Ideology should have died that day. I don’t think religion is the only evil ideology, and it seems to be a human tragedy that the worst deeds are done in the name of some perceived greater good rather than out of simple brutal appetite. One of the most evil things in the world seems to me to be the conviction that your own views are right. Hence the strapline to this blog.
Sorry, missed this till just.
How wide do you spread the net? Is Coptic morality objective? Eastern Orthodox? Catholics and Protestants have fought wars over belief (ostensibly, at least). Can we agree that Judaism and Islam are not in the fold or do we need to clarify if their moralities are objective?
First, no “morality” is objective. “Morality” is a list of statements that serve as “oughts” – guides that serve a purpose, which we call “good”. Morality is a subjective model that describes “advancing towards the good” in terms of “what we ought and ought not do”.
The real question is whether “the good” or “the purpose” (that morality serves as a guide towards) is presumed to be objective, or presumed to be subjective. If we presume “the good” or “our purpose” to be objective, then we begin our descriptions of “the good” the same way we begin our descriptions of anything we presume to be objectively existent: we begin with (1) self-evidently true statements (such as: it is always wrong to torture infants for personal pleasure), then discern (2) necessarily true moral statments (some thing are always wrong, regardless of society/circumstances); we can then develop general principles of morality (golden rule, categorical imperative), and then use reason and inferences from those principles to solve contingent moral problems.
This reasoned-based approach serves as the basis for (1) avoiding subjectivism, which allows everything and ends up nothing but equivocated “feelings”, and (2) a formal, rational basis for challenging what any group, society, or institution claims to be moral or immoral without either self-referential circularity (because I say so) or descent into essential self-contradiction (subjective perspective vs subjective perspective).
Both subjective-good based morality and morality based upon arbitrary, decreed “good” are, in the end, nothing more than might makes right. If “good” exists, it must exist as a fundamental aspect of existence, not as a subjective fashion/taste or the arbitrary whim of a capricious god.
Otherwise, it’s not worth talking about and is just a way to manipulate people into behaving the way you want.
I don’t disagree much or at all with much of what you say here except for two things.
1 That we can think of things that are almost universally good does not mean that “good” is an objective concept. One can always ask “good for whom” and there will always be someone or something for whom things are not so good. No objective good.
2 You cannot avoid subjectivism. In fact you cannot escape subjectivism.
I used the term “moral superiors” in response to the issue you had with “moral equals”.
Thomas Paine; The Age of Reason
That’s a very good point and I think that really is the position of most churches, which is, the adoption of an “absolute moral code” that serves as a mechanism for the goals they hope to attain.
Clearly, the goals of people differ and the church should not be serving it’s own goals, but rather the goals of the church membership.
So the problem has moved up a layer but it still exists.
At some point, you have to be able to say to the church, and it’s goals, no.
If you can’t say no, you have no free will.
You seem to be a theist then, with a subjective theology.
How do you explain a theology which only applies to yourself in any other way but subjective?
Maybe William meant to say he is an empirical theist or even a religious pragmatist. That would solve the “free will” issue.
Alan Fox,
I’m not sure what you mean by “we cannot avoid subjectivism”. I can choose, on an a priori basis, to regard what morality refers to as objectively existent, or I can choose to regard it as subjective.
I can also choose to regard rocks, trees, and other people as subjective mental manifestations (solipsism), or I can choose to regard those things as objectively existent (existting outside of my mind).
What they actually are isn’t really relevant to that choice, and the logical ramifications thereof. There are logical ramifications to each premise.
If we dismiss the idea that there are self-evidently true moral statements, then there is no place left to go but moral relativism, which eventually allows all things and makes moral judgements nothing but rhetoric.
Self-evidently true doesn’t mean “almost universally accept moral truths”; they are held to be true whether there is consensus or not. If a true moral statement was only true by power of consensus, one would never have the moral authority (at least not in a rationally consistent manner) to challenge consensus morals.
I didn’t say it only applies to myself. All humans with free will have the same purpose, and thus are subject to the same moral rules, just as all humans are subject to the laws of gravity whether they believe it or not. Just because different people might present different theories of gravity and offer variant formulas and interpretations doesn’t mean they are all living under different gravitational structures.
Sure you can choose, subjectively. 🙂 Shared experience is a way of reducing subjectivity and is essential to an empirical approach to understanding of phenomena. Empiricism is essential to scientific progress.
Under subjectivism, all views are morally equivalent as long as they are subjectively held. I am not a moral relativist. Because some church holds some actions as “moral” doesn’t make them my moral “superiors”, although they might be superior to my “might”.
But, suppose for the case of argument, no moral statement can be justified as absolutely objective, does the sky really fall in? It changes nothing.
That “shared experience **is** a way of reducing subjectivity”, and that it **is** essential to an empirical approach to understanding phenomena, and that empiricism **is** a means of understanding anything at all, are also all “subjectively chosen” metaphysical assumptions – they are a prioris.
That we subjectivly choose our a prioris is not in contention here. Yes, we subjectively choose our a prioris; the question is where those a prioris lead, and whether or not one’s beliefs are (1) rationally justifiable from their a prioris, and (2) if those a prioris lead to a coherent, rationally justifiable worldview that doesn’t self-destruct, self-contradict, force hypocrisy or inevitably lead into absurdity.
And that, really, is the point; whether or not one has done their due diligence in examining their worldview for logical flaws and dead ends. The a priori that what morality describes is itself subjective (subjective good) leads to intractably problematical conclusions about morality that, in the end, self-destruct – unless, of course, one agrees that morality is really nothing more than rhetoric and that all things are ultimately permissable.
Which is where the a priori of a subjective good necessarily leads.
An example might help. Could you give me an example of something that is objectively moral? (Or indeed objectively good)
Fair enough. So at least you recognize that morality is inherently subjective.
No, that cannot be a real question. If morality is subjective, then to presume it objective is not reason; it is just dogma.
What does matter, is that it be adopted as a society standard. It does not need to be presumed objective for that.
The point, really, is that one can hardly call what a religion does, or promotes, as “evil” if one’s basis is that the good that morality describes is subjective. It really amounts to nothing more than saying you dislike cherry pie or prefer boxers to briefs. Big deal. So you don’t like the actions or views of a religion; unless you can make a case why their subjective view is “worse than yours”, you’re just whining.
And you can only make that case if there is some assumed-to-be objective standard by which to rationally arbit the comparison.
Try reading it again, or try reading prior posts for context. Morality and “the good” morality describes are two different things. One is a subjectively-created model, the other is what the model presumably describes in terms of “oughts”.
You can invent or utilize any “moral system” you want – consensus, social, religious, might makes right, and say it is founded on any principle you wish, and that it does anything you say it does – warm up your waffles, cure athlete’s foot, etc.
That doesn’t mean it is a rationally consistent and rationally justifiable system.
I already gave you an example of a self-evidently true moral statement: It is wrong to torture infants for personal pleasure.
Does arbit = judge? Unless you can demonstrate in some way that this “objective standard” exists beyond some common arbitrary agreement in (presumably human) society, your objective is really only your subjective view.
Not to say, of course, that there are not or could not be excellent and practically universally accepted subjective standards.
It “changes nothing” if one is already basing their morals on whatever “feels” right or wrong to them, or is just going along with the consensus flow (until, of course, they happen to disagree with consensus).
It changes everything if one attempting to hammer out a rationally coherent morality that provides them with a principled basis for disagreeing with what authority figures (such as the church) say other than “nanny nanny boo boo, nyah nyah, I don’t feel like it”.
If one is going to make a case that some church doctrine or edict is wrong, or evil, or a “misfire” and “it makes me feel bad, so it’s evil” is your only basis, it’s not much of an argument in my book.
But where does the objectivity come in? I am sure almost everyone you ask would agree that torture of anyone, babies or not, is wrong, whether done for pleasure or under the aegis of the state. But what makes it objectively so? It is consensus. Might makes right as you put it. In Medieval Europe (and elsewhere at other times) torture was commonplace and condoned by religious authorities such as the Catholic Church. Where’s the objectivity?
Yes, but I am not making the argument that some church doctrine is bad in some respect. I readily concede that some religious doctrinal edicts sometimes coincide with practically universally acceptable rules for communal living. I am just pointing out that none of this is objective.
How did you reach this conclusion?
excellent, apology accepted. it’s very rare that atheists treat me with politeness.
I’ve already answered this. Nothing “makes it” objective; nothing proves it to be objective. That it is an objective good must be assumed on an a priori basis in order to maintain a rationally consistent moral worldview that avoids “might makes right” and can challenge consensus and authority from a principled position.
The only alternative is either an essentially non-rational morality or an anything goes, might makes right morality.
Try to keep this in mind: I’m not arguing that god or an objective good can be proven or demonstrated to exist; my argument is that in order to have a consistent, rational, moral, sane worldview, one must assume god exists, and that there is an objective good, on an a priori basis.
Toronto,
It’s not a conclusion.
If none of it is objective, and none of it can be arbited by any objective good, what are you debating, and why?
You make it sound as if we should turn society into a Stalinist dictatorship.
We should be able to challenge what is said to be an objective good. You cannot challenge what is assumed a priori.
William J Murray,
Let me rephrase my question.
1) What leads you to believe the above statement of yours is accurate?
2) Do humans without a free will have a different purpose?
What prevents me from having a “consistent, rational, moral, sane worldview”, if I don’t assume the existence of a god?
I disagree for the simple reason that I assume that Gods do not exist except as human constructs (as you construct your own, for example) and all moral principles are arbitrary and subjective. You can state that a rational etc worldview is desirable (and I wouldn’t disagree and maybe there would be considerable overlap) but I don’t see how insisting on an objective “good” beyond that which human society has created has any bearing on it. We just have to put up with it or imagine things as we wish them to be. It’s a personal choice.
Frankly, because I have time on my hands as my wife is away for a couple of weeks. And I am curious about other people’s religious convictions and what makes them tick.
Though I am not debating; I consider the whole high school debate nonsense of proposition, rebuttal etc an unsatisfactory way of proceeding but that’s another issue.
Lizzie has talked in depth about her former theism and whilst I find it fascinating, it is also incomprehensible to me. I can never recall a time, even in my earliest childhood, when I felt the religion I was presented with (Church of England, C of E) made any sense and I never felt any emotional need for that or any other religion. I guess I lack the God gene. 😉 I am convinced religion works at an emotional level and if the emotional response is not there, when you take the trouble to examine the logic and evidence for religious dogma, the whole house of cards tumbles. That’s why I question your claim about an objective “good”. It’s illusory, in my view, and, so far, you have not begun to persuade me otherwise. Not that you are under any obligation to try, of course!
When Ms. Febble declined to accept your debate invitation, noam ghish, your immediate, kneejerk response was you’re a stinking COWARD. Is this a typical instance of how you behave towards atheists? If it is, there may be an explanation for the putative rarity of politeness among atheists who interact with you.
It is only by the a priori assumption that there is an objective good that all humans have the rational basis for challenging specific moral statements issued any authority or agreed by social consensus. Without reference to an assumed objective arbiter, such “challenges” amount to nothing but self-conflicting, hypocritical rhetoric.
(1) Morality describes what humans “ought” to do in regard; oughts only exist in relationship to a purpose or goal; if all humans with free will do not have the same purpose, then we are back to subjective purposes, even if they are arbitrarily assigned to us by a god. Humans with free will are not “assigned” purpose by god; “the good” (in the Aristotlean sense of a final cause) is a fundamental aspect of existence, meaning it is a fundamental, unchanging aspect of god. Even god cannot change “what is good”. God cannot create anything except for the purpose of good.
(2) They provide context (if they exist), much as everything else in the universe provides context, for humans with free will.
Lack of sufficient grounding for necessary a priori principles, such as source of libertarian (uncaused) free will (necessary for discerning true statements); uncaused cause solution to cause-and-effect, as in the first cause/sufficient cause argument; sufficient grounding for an objective good (Aristotlean final cause) as basis for rational morality; sufficient grounding for the expectation that the universe is orderly and lawful and can be successfully modeled via logic.
Without god as a grounding or complimentary a priori for such principles, they stand necessarily incomplete. For example, one must assume “the good” is an objective commodity to develop any rational morality not based on “might makes right”; but, such a “good” is necessarily a purpose towards which moral “oughts” drive us; on cannot get an “ought’ from an “is”, but only from a “what should be”; such purpose can only come from sentient entities (brute nature provides no “oughts”, only happenstance “is”); so the a priori that there is an objective “good” requires that there is a sentient entity that created humanity for the good final cause; the capacity to deliberately pursue the good (make moral chioces) requires a will that is not determined by prior cause, but is rather libertarian in nature; brute material provides no such free will, but only some form of determined will; so intention, or libertarian will, must be a fundamental, uncaused thing, which – again – can only exist within a sapient entity; etc.
Like Elizabeth, you can claim anything you want about anything you want, but unless you support your claims and positions via logic, your claims and positions are nothing more than rhetoric and appeals to emotion. I’m sure dismissing logic-bound debate principles is necessary for those whose views cannot stand the scrutiny of logical examination; unfortunately, it also eliminates your capacity to make a logic-based case for your views, or against any other.
I do appreciate your honesty, though. A lot of people try to imply that they are making a logical case for their views, when all they are using is rhetoric. Few admit they have abandoned logic when it comes to morality.
As I have said, though, my argument is about establishing a rational (logic-based) morality. Since you are not attempting to do so, you and I have no argument here. You are, of course, free to believe whatever you wish and pick your moral rules according to whatever feeling or concept you wish, regardless of whether or not they can be rationally reconciled.
I am not attempting to persuade you of anything.
William J Murray,
Above, I said: “(2) They provide context (if they exist), much as everything else in the universe provides context, for humans with free will.”
I meant to say, for entities with free will, not just humans.
You say that ‘subjective’ morality is flawed because if someone doesn’t happen to agree with you about whether or not something is Good, you have no rational grounds on which to rebut them. But you also say that “an objective good must be assumed on an a priori basis”.
Hmm.
Stupid question: What makes “I assume X to be Good, just because” any more rational a basis for morality than “X is Good because I like X”? For that matter, exactly how is your alleged ‘solution’ of “I assume X to be Good, just because” different from the allegedly-flawed “X is Good because I like X”?
Put it this way: I, Cubist, assume that obedience to Cubist’s will is an a priori objective Good. And my will is that you, William J. Murray, send me a quarter of your income every month. Since obeying my will is an objective Good, you’re clearly going to start sending me lots of money, and you’ll continue to do so for the rest of your life. Right?
See any problems with “I assume X to be Good, just because” as a putatively-objective basis for morality, WJM?
A priori assumptions are the problem. They are not the solution.
Exactly.
I observe that humans have different purposes. Some marry, some become priests.
Here you have two different purposes in life, one to serve a small personal family for the purpose of the continued existence of the human species and another that serves a god, for the purpose of continued existence of a particular religious viewpoint.
They are two completely different purposes that require radically different decisions to be made on a day-to-day basis.
The married man does not require the priest to successfully raise his family.
A thousand families in a group don’t require the priest to tell them what is right or what is wrong.
If every family came up in secret with their own version of a subjective moral code, you would see that they would all tend to be the same, simply because they are based on the same experiences of raising a family.
No god or outside moral code is required.
Cubist,
As I’ve already pointed out, and as should be obvious, the assumption of a subjective, “just because” premise doesn’t provide proper grounds for any rational inferences, nor can it be the grounds of any debate intended to discern rational conclusions. “Just because I say so” doesn’t provide any grounds to arbit between differing moral views. IOW, when two “because I say so” statements meet, there is no rational expectation that differences in claims can be logically arbited, because neither side believes any objective standard exists. What then ensues is necessarily rhetoric – attempts by any means to sway the other side.
The assumption that there is an objective moral good (even without asserting any particular moral statements as self-evident) provides the essential basis that there is a means to rationally arbit what is and is not moral, because both parties at least agree that morality describes an objective good, and that it is the objective good, not “just because I say so” that ultimately arbits disagreements.
From there, those that premise that an objective good exists can search for self-evidently true statements they agree on, which then can be examined and extrapolated rationally towards fleshing out a fuller moral system.
With “because I say so” as ones “meta-premise”, even if two people agree to a basic moral premise, because the premise is rooted in “feeling” or “proclivity”, it is not necessary for personal feelings or “what seems to be moral” to any person to submit to logical extrapolations of agreed principles, because neither side believes they are describing somethng objectively real and thus necessarily subject to logical analysis.
If, however, the meta-premise is “the good objectively exists”, then when two people agree upon self-evidently true moral statements, their “feelings” and “seems” are thereafter subject to arbiting by rational extrapolations, inferences, and conclusions drawn from those self-evident statements as administerd by reason. Thus, “feelings” and “seems” and “because I say so” are no longer the arbiters of what is moral, but reason and logic are.
Under the objective-good meta-premise, if the application of logic to self-evidently true moral statements leads to a contradiction with another self-evidently true moral statement, then a premise is wrong in some way, because morals must be consistent, because morals are believed to be describing something real.
Under the “because I said so” subjective system, even if one holds apparently contradictory moral views, it is of no consequence because “because I said so” is not subject to logical moderation.
The other reason that “an objective good” is necessary for any meaningful moral system, is that without an objective good, and objective (inescapable) ramifications for moral and immoral behavior, moral debates in any practical sense becomes nothing but an exercise in sophistry, because the application and governance (consequences) of morality becomes nothing more than an “If I feel like it” and “If I get caught” exercise of the might-makes-right principle.
Without proper a prioris, you claim above would be without any value whatsoever. Without a prioris, one cannot rationally debate morality.
By that reasoning, if i decide that my purpose is to torture infants for for personal pleasure, kidnap and consume boy scouts, and kill the elderly because I enjoy it, then that is what is moral and good.
As I said, you can certainly call whatever you want moral, and you can certainly dismiss logic from being the arbiter of your moral system, but then that has nothing to do with my argument, which is making a case for a rationally coherent and supportable morality.
Perhaps you have failed to notice that debates on moral questions are rarely rational debates.
sez wjm: “The assumption that there is an objective moral good (even without asserting any particular moral statements as self-evident) provides the essential basis that there is a means to rationally arbit what is and is not moral, because both parties at least agree that morality describes an objective good, and that it is the objective good, not ‘just because I say so’ that ultimately arbits disagreements.”
I couldn’t agree with you more, WJM: There is an objective moral good, and this objective moral good is the rational foundation on which to approach questions of morality. All I’m saying is, obeying my will is that objective moral good which both of us agree exists. And my will is that you send me a quarter of your income, starting with your next paycheck. I couldn’t agree with you more that ‘because I say so’ is a terrible, unacceptable basis for morality, so I’m confident that you will do one of two things: Either (a) you will send me a quarter of your income, starting with your very next paycheck, or else (b) you will explain the rational, non-arbitrary, not-‘because I say so’ method by which you determined that obeying my will is, in fact, not the objective moral good which we both agree exists. Okay?
I have noticed, which is why I have repeatedly advised that I am making a logical argument for a rational morality.
William,
I still don’t see where your logic and rationality is to be found. I think my views are subjective and I see no difference in the subjectivity of your claims and assertions. Humans are social animals; we are vastly more successful* as larger groups than as individuals or families. Any set of rules that facilitates cooperation is superior to anarchy. And, in any socially organized group – past or present – we care to study, there will be an accepted code of communal conduct and behaviour. I don’t find, say, the Aztecs and their routine human sacrifices particularly appealing but I guess their priesthood deemed it essential to their way of life.
We haven’t agreed that is a self-evidently true moral statement. I don’t see how “your will” can be rationally posited as an objective commodity that can be logically arbited.