Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.
This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.
It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).
This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).
The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).
However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.
To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).
But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified.
And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.
As a criticism of naïve empiricism this is quite right.
But the same point can be turned against rationalism: thoughts by themselves give us only an internally consistent set of axioms and theorems, NOT a way of “approaching true reality”.
To do that one needs sensory information AS WELL AS a coherent system of judgments, and ways of revising one’s thoughts on the basis of the sensory information one receives.
Moved a couple of comments to guano. Attack the comment, not the commenter.
Good to agree.
That’s an evidence-free and untestable claim. It’s also harmless. 🙂
I resemble that remark!
No God could not exist if there was nothing.
On the other hand
In a world with nothing truth would still exist so there would be something there after all.
We call that something God 😉
That’s what it means to be a necessary being
peace
If you are arguing that being able to imagine a perfect circle is evidence for God, then I see it as an unfalsifiable non-sequitur. In which case, of couse I can’t falsify your claim.
In fact I found imagining swirling patterns of bubble trails left by a dimensionless point moving in a fixed timeless void creating spheres, cylinders, cones with the added ability to focus in on the infinitesimal or pan out to the infinite gave me insomnia.
You should say “I”. You call that something “God”. The statement “God is Truth” explains nothing unless you presuppose “God”.
ETA perhaps “unless” should be “even if”.
Actually, the notion that golden mountains and perfect circles are in people’s heads makes the same sort of mistake that “I resemble that remark” makes to be humorous. It takes itself seriously, however.
Of course we don’t resemble remarks, except metaphorically; mountains are really much bigger than anybody’s head; and gods can only tell–can never BE–truths.
Little philosophical fallacies can make for great big, sometimes life-altering errors.
ETA: In case anyone is wondering or confused, that notions can “take themselves seriously” is also just a metaphor.
I cannot speak for KN, but I was not thinking of you when I wrote the original remark.
OTOH, this article on semi-automating moderation of game chats and its potential for a “kinder internet” did make me think of you and your upcoming replacement.
can-a-video-game-company-tame-toxic-behaviour
Good luck in your summer time project. I suspect it’s much closer to summer where you are than here in Toronto.
But a person could be represented by an information equation and that equation could be considered a remark in an artificial language.
In that case, the person could be said to resemble the remark.
If you don’t agree, then you take on the burden of explaining how Star Trek transporters work.
But you are right about the “life-altering errors” bit, as numerous episodes attest, let alone the “The Fly”, especially the Cronenberg version.
Anything can resemble anything in respect of something or other, as far as that goes. I resemble that remark in being, I don’t know….pseudo-clever.
Star Trek transponders are extremely interesting as Parfit’s book shows. As for “The Fly,” Goldblum is no Price.
I agree with what you are saying but only if we confine our thinking to what Owen Barfield called alpha thinking. In this type of thinking we stand in a certain sense outside the focus of our study. Scientific thinking is, he said, the most “advanced stage” of alpha thinking.
Differing from this we have reflective thinking which Barfield termed beta thinking. It is through this type of thinking that we can apprehend entities such as the ideal circle. It is so easy to imagine that this ideal circle is just a product of our own minds, but it is not. For reflective thinking our inner thoughts become perceptions. I “see” Robin’s circle with my eyes, external senses, I “see” the ideal circle by looking inwards.
This circle is not a product of my mind, it is an objective entity.
So thinking, when it confines itself to the external, sense peceptible world gives us only a partial reality, by adding to this what we peceive internally we achieve full reality.
Thanks.
Do you agree that there are no physical circles which conform to the ideal? And do you still think that you can prove that there are an infinite number of ideal circles?
By the way, I think you provide a perfect example of how posters should conduct themselves in arguments.
I prefer to leave God out of this argument.
Then you should try counting archetypal Ovis aries
You’ve just contradicted yourself unless you can coherently describe how and in what sense “truth” can exist in the absence of anything else.
But that’s the point: the mathematical representation of a circle is not truth; it’s the map. The territory – that is actual circles – is the truth.
What you’re arguing is that we should all worship Rally Mcnally or Waze because they are “Truth” and “Unity” or whatever. But…as should be obvious…that’s just silly. It’s silly to idealize any map…including the mathematical ones we come up with.
No, no, no, no…a “map” is a man-made representation of some real element in the world. Mathematical concepts are all maps. To cite an example, Newton’s Laws show that planetary orbits are ellipses, but the actual orbits are not; they actually move in waves in a dance with other areas of gravity. Are you seriously suggesting that Newton’s “perfect” mathematical description of planetary orbit is the actual “TRUTH” territory and trumps the actual movement of the planets?
EXACTLY!!!
(though I do…humbly…think the ones I make come close…)
This does not show that “beta thinking” yields any knowledge of reality. In this quote Barfield accepts the distinction between the transcendental and the transcendent, which is the very conflation you are making in assuming that the mind’s reflective knowledge of itself adds to its comprehension of reality.
You want to say that the intellect can transcend the senses and attain knowkedge of reality at a “deeper” level than that of the senses. Barfield does not agree with you here.
If you start with the empty set (i.e. with nothing), then every proposition in that set is true.
You are arguing that the truth is dependent on human cognition. The only true circles are those that can be seen by the human eye. Do you think that the laws of the circle is something that has been invented by humans? That they do not stand on their own without human thinking? Do you believe this for all mathematical truths?
Understanding mathematical truths is a step in the direction of realizing that the world of our senses does not consist of true reality. It is transient and perishable in a way that mathematical truths are not. That is why mathematical forms make good subjects for meditation. Meditation in the sense of deep concentration and focus without jumping to hasty conclusions and pre-judgements.
Of course it is.
Surely you agree that if the territory changes then the map should likewise change to conform to the territory otherwise it is an inaccurate map?
The ideal circle never changes but physical circles do. Does this make it an inaccurate map of your physical circles? If not how can this be?
*rolls eyes*
So, is geometry the only language that reveals this “ideal world” or does trigonometry and algebra give us a glimpse too? But maybe it doesn’t go that far…is the “ideal circle” the only unity revealed, or are hexagons just as unifying? Lost souls need to know…
Just curious there Mr True-Reality-Is-Beyond-Our-Senses, but how exactly did you acquire this knowledge of geometric idealized circles? Divine inspiration? Because the Greeks who came up with it did so by actually studying the Earth (you know…”geo” being Greek for earth and metri being “to measure” and all.) But hey…maybe you’re special…
My eyes crossed involuntarily while reading that.
So Truth is nothing…got it…
No, that means your god is nothing.
You misunderstand both Barfield and me. Beta thinking is not so much the mind’s reflective knowledge of itself, it is an inner experience of an objective reality. You would have a point if Barfield was a subjective idealist. But he classed himself as an objective idealist.
Why do you say he does not agree with me?
Of course I am. I’ve argued that from the beginning. I even provided definitions that indicate that’s the case.
Indeed. Or touched for that matter…
In way, yes. What…you think that “THE PERFECT UNIFYING IDEAL OF DIVINE CREATION” would have a number that goes on to infinity like 3.14…n? Why didn’t the grand mathematical angels just make it 3 and be done with it?
Absolutely. 2+2 does not equal squat without humans to conceptual such groupings.
*Yawn*…
That would be your opinion, but it doesn’t much demonstrate any kind of truth…
Surely you agree that if the territory changes then the map should likewise change to conform to the territory otherwise it is an inaccurate map?
Yes. And…?
WHAT?!?! When has any physical circle ever changed? I’d love an example.
Where can I buy the ideal map of London?
A Beautiful Question
Ooh, that’s deep.
Err, no, it’s deepity.
I understand that an object that is defined as a circle is cannot exist in a world with dimensions, how do we get to “the ideal world “from a universally mathematically defined concept of a circle? It seems to be a category mistake.
I may be misunderstanding the concept of the ideal world but It seems to me the entities of what would constitute” the ideal world “are directly the result of human sense perception and inclinations,the entities of the ideal are dependent on the physical world to define them
It seems to me you have it backwards, the ideal world is edited copy of the physical world. It is the derivative not the source.
What about the continuum hypothesis — is it true, or not?
Maybe we should have a thread for sharing recipes!
Phew!
Read the article and the conclusions gel with my experience.
Gloating about the burst of spring weather here would be a derail! Thanks for the good wishes. All we need now is Lizzie turning up.
Ask Charlie. He’s the one insisting there are such things…
I’m persuaded by Neil and Robin that mathematical concepts are useful fictions that help us conceptualize reality. Reality is out there.
That wasn’t quite what I was claiming. I said I could imagine an infinity of circles. The space swept by a dimensionless point is zero in my imagination, so I can stack an infinite number of my imaginary circles and still not need any space to do so.
I see what you did there but I’ll take the compliment anyway! 🙂
I’m for that, but…uhh…I don’t know many recipes…
I suppose I could come up with one for some of my curries. But you’ll have to be able to measure in “some” and “about”…
CharlieM has never said that there is any such thing as an ideal map of London.
I’ve never said there’s an ideal map of London either, so your response makes no sense.
Charlie at least insists there are ideal maps. So why not ask him where to find any ideal map of London since ideal maps fall under Charlie’s delusion?
I think he’s contradicted himself even if he could provide a coherent description of how truths could exist in the absence of anything ELSE. Either there is nothing at all in W1 or there is something there.
No, all that is necessary is a coherent description of how absolute nothingness is an irrational concept.
If nothing existed it would be true that nothing existed. Truth would exist!!!!!
So Robin is positing a world with nothing and something at the same time and in the same respect. An impossibility.
Also keep in mind that truth can not independently exist.
In fact there is a Trinity present whenever truth is present.
The reality
The proposition
The relation between these two.
Each of these is eternal omnipresent and completely dependent on the other two for it’s existence.
peace
Fifth, if truth exists in every possible world, then it’s not true that there’s a possible world with nothing in it. Thus. you contradicted yourself.by suggesting that a world with nothing in it would have something in it. N’est pas?
That’s not all, though. As KN pointed out, “There is nothing in W1” could be true OF W1 without being true IN W1.
If you’re right that truth requires propositions (which I deny, incidentally), and there are no propositions in W1, then there are no truths in W1. QED
Again, that is incorrect. Charlie did not say there are ideal maps. In fact he pretty much stated the exact opposite of that.
I don’t recall suggesting it was possible that there was a possible world with nothing in it.
Instead I asked if it was true that nothing existed in the worlds posited by KN and Robin.
I don’t buy this distinction.
Is it true that nothing is true in W1? If so truth exists in W1
peace
walto:
Not really, because he’s saying that a world that apparently contains nothing actually contains truth, if nothing else. I think that’s wrong, but it isn’t a contradiction.
Your second argument is better:
walto:
fifth:
fifth,
A truth about X needn’t be contained in X. The book I am currently reading has a green cover, but that truth is not contained in the book.
To make your case, you need to establish that any world W necessarily contains all of the truths about that world. You seem to be assuming that rather than establishing it.
Patrick, to fifth:
A world that contained nothing but the single Platonic truth…
…seems coherent to me. A truth can be about itself, after all.
What fifth needs to demonstrate is that a truly empty world is incoherent.