Last night I was talking with an old friend of mine, an atheist Jew, who is now in the best relationship of her life with a devout Roman Catholic. We talked about the fact that she was more surprised than he was about the fact that their connection transcends their difference in metaphysics. He sees himself as a devout Roman Catholic; she sees him as a good human being.
This conversation reminded me of an older thought that’s been swirling around in my head for a few weeks: the disunity of reason.
It is widely held by philosophers (that peculiar sub-species!) that reason is unified: that the ideally rational person is one for whom there are no fissures, breaks, ruptures, or discontinuities anywhere in the inferential relations between semantic contents that comprise his or her cognitive grasp of the world (including himself or herself as part of that world).
This is particularly true when it comes to the distinction between “theoretical reason” and “practical reason”. By “theoretical reason” I mean one’s ability to conceptualize the world-as-experienced as more-or-less systematic, and by “practical reason” I mean one’s ability to act in the world according to judgments that are justified by agent-relative and also agent-indifferent reasons (“prudence” and “morality”, respectively).
The whole philosophical tradition from Plato onward assumes that reason is unified, and especially, that theoretical and practical reason are unified — different exercises of the same basic faculty. Some philosophers think of them as closer together than others — for example, Aristotle distinguishes between episteme (knowledge of general principles in science, mathematics, and metaphysics) and phronesis (knowledge of particular situations in virtuous action). But even Aristotle does not doubt that episteme and phronesis are exercises of a single capacity, reason (nous).
However, as we learn more about how our cognitive system is actually structured, we should consider the possibility that reason is not unified at all. If Horst’s Cognitive Pluralism is right, then we should expect that our minds are more like patchworks of domain-specific modules that can reason quite well within those domains but not so well across them.
To Horst’s model I’d add the further conjecture: that we have pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “theoretical reason” (abstract thinking and long-term planning) with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and also pretty good reason to associate our capacity for “practical reason” (self-control and virtuous conduct) with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and especially in its dense interconnections with the limbic system).
But if that conjecture is on the right track, then we would expect to find consistency between theoretical reason and practical reason only to the extent that there are reciprocal interconnections between these regions of prefrontal cortex. And of course there are reciprocal interconnections — but (and this is the important point!) to the extent that these regions are also functionally distinct, then to that same extent reason is disunified.
And as a consequence, metaphysics and ethics may have somewhat less to do with each other than previous philosophers have supposed.
Truth is not a material thing. It is not “contained” anywhere. You can’t bottle it
No truths whatsoever are “contained” in the book. Your book has pages and ink not truths.
Again you are assuming that an immaterial thing can be contained in a physical object.
On the contrary it seems you are assuming something about truth that is manifestly false.
peace
In an empty world the following statement is true
“this world is empty”
I think instead we need to ask
Is it incoherent for nothing at all not even truth to exist?
peace
Well you wrote this:
I’m just saying that If there’s something in that world, then it wasn’t the case that there was nothing in it. It’s contradictory to say of one world both that there’s nothing in it and that there’s something in it.
It’s true, but if you’re correct both that truth requires propositions and that there are no propositions in W1, then it can’t be true in W1. These are your own premises, Fifth. It’s easy enough to change one, and you’ll have to change something someplace not to be caught in self-contradictions, I’m afraid.
Well, sure. If he’d added “apparently” (as you have) I wouldn’t have objected that he’d contradicted himself. He didn’t say that, though.
I mean, “Jones went to the store yesterday.” doesn’t contradict “Jones apparently stayed home all day yesterday.” However, it does contradict “Jones stayed home all day yesterday.”
What is merely an appearance can make all the difference, keiths!
According to your proposition requirement, it is not true IN that world, it’s only true OF that world.
If propositions are required for truths, and your hypothetical requires the absence of propositions. then your hypothetical requires the absence of truths. Simple modus ponens.
fifth:
Let me apply a one-word correction:
ETA: Ninja’d by walto.
If that truth is present in the world, then the world is not empty. Which is exactly what you were arguing above:
Excuse my philosophical illiteracy, but does it even make sense to refer to a world with nothing in it? Can that be a thing at all?
dazz:
I think so. A set can be empty, so why not a world?
Right. You can think of it as subtracting galaxy after galaxy until…..poof. Nuppin.
Can you elaborate? What proposition requirement?
I’m not sure what you are getting at.
Spacial descriptors like “in” don’t seem to be helpful when discussing a concept like truth.
Take Keith’s book example whether you are a person holding the book or a microscopic ameba residing in between the pages it’s still true that the cover is green.
Are you saying it is possible that there is a world where the law of noncontridiction does not hold? It seems that is what would be necessary in order to posit a world with out truth.
In any world whatsoever is seems that it could be said “It is true that contradictory statements cannot both be true” Don’t you agree?
peace
I agree with much of what you say there, Fifth, although I don’t have exactly firm intuitions about some of these “worlds.” Your proposition claim was part of some trinitarian biz, I believe. I took you to say that truths require propositions. So I’m just saying that if truths require propositions, then a world without propositions would have no truths in it.
The move for you there, I think, would be to modus tollens. I.e., you retort that as there are truths in every world, there must be propositions in every world. QED.
Which is fine, except that it’s not true to say of such a world that there is nothing in it. I mean, if there are infinitely many propositions in it that ain’t nothing. And then one may want to know if there are false propositions in such a world as well. Because after all, 2 +2=5 is false in this “empty world,” right?
Anyhow, I have no love for propositions myself–or trinities either for that matter.
If truth exists at least one proposition must exist. A world without propositions is incoherent as far as I can tell.
If nothing at all can be thought even in theory in a particular world does it exist?
peace
Fair enough. This reminds me of Sean Carroll’s excellent post over at preposterousuniverse.com re: ‘A universe out of nothing’. Considering set theory, even “nothing” is “something” (an empty set). But do theories or physical laws need grounding themselves as theists claim? I don’t think they can ultimately argue anything for that grounding god that can’t be said of the theories or laws themselves (they stand on their own).
But I digress, sorry for the off-topic
I can imagine a world in which there was no 2 in such a world 2+2=5 would be meaningless not false.
peace
That’s fine, but as I said, if you take that position, the world you’re describing will be far from empty. Dunno why you’re so fond of propositions. What do you think they consist in or of, exactly?
I don’t know what you mean either by “nothing can be thought” or “even in theory” here.
FWIW, I don’t think “2” is a proper name.
fifth,
They do when you’re talking about possible worlds. What’s true in one world may not be true in another.
There are some possible worlds, and at least one actual world, in which Obama is the POTUS. In others, he isn’t.
Once again, FMM demonstrates only that he doesn’t understand the Stolen Concept Fallacy or basic logic.
It is erroneous to borrow a perspective from our current world to evaluate principles of a different world. In other words, there would be no way that anything could evaluate that “it would be ‘true’ that nothing existed in a world where nothing existed because there would be no FMM (or anything else, including FMM’s rather pathetically weak god) to evaluate the condition. There would be nothing and thus FMM’s god would be nothing along with that condition.
No. Robin is positing a world of nothing. As you say FMM, “Truth cannot independently exist. Ergo, in a world of nothing (wherein Truth cannot exist independently), there could be no Truth because there would be nothing. Your “Truth” would be nothing.
‘
A), you’re looking at the wrong Charlie quote. And B) I never indicated anything about ideal maps. So, once again it appears that you are rather confused Mung.
Incorrect. In an empty world there could be no statements as statements are “something.”
The answer to that is no. It is not incoherent for nothing at all to exist. That is a perfectly coherent hypothetical. What is incoherent is think that a set with nothing somehow can be considered to have something snuck into it.
Before I posted my response to you I looked at every CharlieM post in the thread, specifically looking for any that had to do with map/territory. I didn’t wish to say you were misrepresenting what he said but that’s where the evidence led me.
Then who wrote the following, if it wasn’t you?
You made a claim about what CharlieM says about ideal maps. CharlieM never insisted there are ideal maps. You were wrong.
If you have evidence to the contrary I’d like to see it.
Seems to me CharlieM can speak for himself.
Sorry, I forgot to take off my keiths hat.
Ahh…
So if people don’t actually use specific words, they can’t actually be referring to those subjects in your world, huh Mung? Got it. The bible must be a real puzzle for you.
Seriously Mung? You’re just going to ignore the context and quote mine me? Particularly when that was a comment in reference to your use of the term. Yeah, that’s not an example of dishonesty or anything…
Care to try again, this time actually…you know…attempting to respond in context?
Nope. You’re just being disingenuous or ignorant. Either way, you’re not doing Charlie’s point any favors.
Tell you what. I’ll provide my evidence when you explain why you directed that comment about an ideal map of London at me when I had not brought up anything about an ideal map of anything at that point. I mean…if you’re being honest and all. My guess is, you aren’t. Heck, I’m betting you’re incapable of a straight answer.
Point me to the post where you think CharlieM insists there are ideal maps. If you cannot do it, I’ll understand.
Robin,
Understanding your frustration but…
Point taken. I’ll cease the snide hostilities.
mung, are you focussing on Charile not using the term “map”? Because I note that between 3/30 and 3/31, he said all of these things:
If you noticed those in your search, I take it that you’re denying that an ideal circle should be thought of as a map?
Yep, and I asked him to give an example of physical circles changing. I don’t see any response to that thus far. Do you? Do you have an example Mung? No? Then I stand by the fact that Charlie’s “geometric ideal circle” is a map.
Precisely. Thank you. And I think CharlieM would agree with me about that.
Maps change. The ideal circle does not change. It follows that the ideal circle is not a map.
see here
Do “ideal maps” change?
Consider the ideal geometric figure in various non-euclidean spaces.
Maps change in response to territory changes. So far, physical circles haven’t changed. So why would the mathematical descriptions?
You’re both using stasis as evidence, but neither of you seem capable of taking the next step and demonstrating that the math flows from those static items and not the other way around.
OK. Does any one of them change? (FWIW, I don’t understand this question myself.)
If physical circles are all the same as the ideal circle, then they are not ‘the territory.’ and there is no map/territory distinction.
CharlieM:
I think any map would change to reflect any actual change. The question is, has the subject of the map (the territory) changed? And I don’t think it has. The Greeks didn’t think it could (the Greeks were pretty convinced that nature was perfect, hence their study of the laws of nature to try understand this perfection.)
We already went over this, Mung. Physical circles are not identical to the ideal circle. The map/territory distinction is quite apt.
Perhaps I am being stupid, but an ideal geometric figure does not seem to be either a map or a territory.
It is not a territory, because it can have no physical instance. It is an abstraction, a definition.
It is not a map in any of the ordinary senses of the word map, because a map is a simplified representation of something physical.
All I am suggesting is that if you want to understand CharlieM then you should consider dropping the idea that he believes in ideal maps.
And all I’m suggesting is that his concept of ideal circles is erroneous. Whether he accepts that the geometric descriptions are maps is irrelevant.
I’m not inclined towards a Platonic conception of abstract entities, because Benacerraf’s dilemma seems unavoidable: if there were such entities, we could not know that there are any, because cognitive awareness involves causal interaction between the mind and the object, but it makes no sense to ascribe causal efficacy to objects that do not exist in space and time. (More precisely, the ascription of causal efficacy to non-spatio-temporal entities cannot be verified.)
However, there are rather significant problems with nominalism and also with fictionalism.
I am inclined to think that Peirce was basically right when he insisted that there are “real generals”: that the universe has a real modal structure that we can describe and explain. And that modal structure is also a mathematical structure, the deep geometry of space-time.
We don’t need to be Platonists in order to be mathematical realists.
We can approximate spacetime with models.
Map, from my perspective, is an apt description in the context of CharlieM’s argument. In his view, the geometric circle represents some supreme, unifying ideal. But geometry, as the Greeks fashioned it, only actually models and describes the what really exists. So what he claims is some eternal, ideal truth is actual just a model of what the Greeks thought was actually the ideal: objects in the natural world.
So, “map”, in this case, refers to a conceptual mathematical representation of the natural world.
And of course I think you are mistaken. The true (ideal) circle is timeless and is not dependent on anything outside of itself. It is subject to its own laws only.
The sun does not become multiple just because many organisms on earth observe it. In the same way the ideal circle does not become multiple just because it can be held in many minds.
Rudolf Steiner has this to say about truth:
Of course I know this a step to far for any materialist to even consider.
Wow, Rudolf Steiner. Is there ANYBODY that nobody reads anymore?
http://www.skepticreport.com/sr/?p=480
Maybe with a dozen less non sequiturs and question beggings I might consider that
What makes something a true ideal circle, is that it fits the definition. That’s a human definition. So human cognition is involved.
Geometry is the best subject, especially projective geometry which concerns form. Algebra isn’t suitable as it is more abstract and deals with the comparison of quantities.
The ideal triangle is a unity, but the hexagon which contains the laws of the triangle cannot be said to consist its own laws and nothing else.
You have answered your own question. In order to study the Earth we need to go beyond sense perception. We do this through the power of thinking. The senses give us an unconnected chaos. Thinking makes connections and unifies the separate sensations.
Euclid defined a point as that which has no parts, or which has no magnitude. This is something nobody will ever see with their eyes. The world of the senses is not unreal, it is just an incomplete reality.