The Science of the Supernatural

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If Darwinism fails then supernatural causes are back on the table and should be included in science.

I do not think there can be a science of the supernatural.

I do not think that if Darwinism fails that supernatural causes will become acceptable.

If the hope of ID is that supernatural causes will be allowed back into science if they can only just get rid of Darwinism, ID is doomed.

The tools and methods of ID cannot differentiate a supernatural cause from a natural cause anyways.

Thoughts?

1,433 thoughts on “The Science of the Supernatural”

  1. Kantian Naturalist:

    That [ie selection intersubjectivity] would be too far by my lights, too. I’d probably urge a distinction in the vicinity of “ecological norms” and “socially instituted norms”,

    Yes, the idea was especially poorly considered by me. A bit of semi intellectual fun, or at least it seemed that way when I posted it!

    One thing I would say about trying to connect shared cognitive models with the Peircean limit of inquiry view: what gives the Peircean limit of inquiry its sense is its connection with the idea that even here-and-now we have better shared cognitive models than did previous generations of inquirers.

    These ideas seem right to me too. However, I am stuck with how to fit philosophy of language in with them.

    I find the Sellarian approach to causes/norms somehow interacting to be elegant, though I really don’t understand it much more deeply than at the slogan level. Plus I understand that the parts of it that were detailed by him have been rejected by later work.

    Of that later work by his students, neither Brandom’s “pure” inferentialism nor Millikan’s selection approach are appealing to me, again under the constraint that my understanding of both is only superficial.

    One reason neither attracts me is that causal theories of reference are appealing to me. Another reason is that I have no idea how to make any type of philosophy of language integrate with neurolinguistics and with embodied linguistics in a way that is similar to how philosophy of mind works closely with the cognitive sciences. Such integration is necessary for me to accept an approach.

    That’s pretty much my working view as well: there’s plenty of room for various cultures to enact norms that are conducive to human flourishing, and those will local and contingent in various ways

    Of course, this will be a challenge when we have to extend ethics to AIs we think should be part of the moral community. I don’t mean the current focus on making sure AIs respect human morality; I mean AIs themselves as having their own type of flourishing that enters into an overall morality for both of us.

    I do think this is AML*, however

    —————–
    After My Lifetime, which admittedly could still be a nearer-term r than I like to think about!

  2. walto: I’ll ask Carol that too. She’s not home right now though.

    I wonder if that’s an accurate description of reality.

  4. Neil Rickert: You have lost your way.

    Of course that is only your opinion. In your worldview that is all it could ever be.

    No matter how ridiculousness a statement seems you can never know that it is not in fact true.

    peace

  5. fifthmonarchyman: No matter how ridiculousness (sic) a statement seems you can never know that it is not in fact true.

    What does “not in fact true” say that “not true” doesn’t?

  8. Alan Fox: What does “not in fact true” say that “not true” doesn’t?

    How sad.

    True just means in accordance with fact or reality.

    So if something is true then it is in accordance with fact or reality
    and if it is not true then it is not in accordance with fact or reality

    It is a shame that your presuppositions are such that you are not able to tell the difference or even if there is a difference.

    peace

  9. fifthmonarchyman: No matter how ridiculousness [sic] a statement seems you can never know that it is not in fact true.

    Spoken like a committed skeptic. My own view is: Sure you can. Why the hell not?

  10. walto: Spoken like a committed skeptic. My own view is: Sure you can. Why the hell not?

    My comment was actually directed to Neil.
    He is one of the group here who says that he can’t know whether or not something is true.

    I really don’t know enough about what you believe about this mater to say that you can’t know if something is true or not.

    I will say that just asking your wife won’t get you there 😉

    peace

  12. Neil Rickert: Where have I said that?

    I don’t know………… everywhere and……all the time.

    Every time single time I ask if X is true you say something like “it’s neither true nor false.”

    How about you tell me one thing that you know for sure to be true and how you came to know it to be so.

    no fair using “Cogito, ergo sum”

    peace

  13. fifthmonarchyman: Every time single time I ask if X is true you say something like “it’s neither true nor false.”

    Most of the time, I probably just ignore it. But I do not say that all statements are neither true nor false. I say that only of statements for which there are no widely accepted criteria by which we could, in principle, judge truth or falsity.

    How about you tell me one thing that you know for sure to be true and how you came to know it to be so.

    I know my name, for sure. And I know where I live, for sure.

    I do not know your name — I only know your online moniker. But if you were to tell me that your real name is “John Smith”, I would agree that is either true or false.

    no fair using “Cogito, ergo sum”

    I don’t speak Latin, so I would avoid a “for sure” there.

  15. walto: I’ll ask Carol that too. She’s not home right now though.

    Did Carol get home yet? How does she decide whether a statement is true?

  16. Alan Fox: Googled “Ramsey sentence” which I see Rudolph Carnap developed. If Wikipedia is accurate, Carnap was on the right track.

    You may be right on who popularized the idea, and of course remember that Ramsay died young with lots of undeveloped ideas. But AFAIK it is always called a ‘Ramsay sentence’.

    For me, it’s a formal way of saying that entities in science are defined/characterized by the theories they are part of. There is nothing more to fundamental things than their behavior. There is no essence to the fundamental entities of physics. (Not so I suspect for emergent entities).

    That relates to the futility of insisting that the definition of scientific terms must be grounded in operational measurements. It is futile since all such definitions/measurements depend on some theory in the end. Or so I say.

  17. Neil Rickert: I would agree that is either true or false.

    My reading of FMM is that truth and knowledge require (or maybe is?) a God’s-eye view; then human truth/knowledge is grounded in revelations from God.. Maybe just human foundational knowledge needs to be revealed and we can take it from there. I am not sure, because I’ve only completed FMM 101, AFAIK.

    I suspect you might have some disagreement with that Viewpoint.

  18. fifthmonarchyman: Corneel: But it does imply that merely getting the molecular configuration correct is insufficient to create a person. Yet that is all that happens in the teletransportation scenario

    Fifth: It’s all that happens physically. There could be all kinds of other things going on.

    You must be the only person in the world that fails to control for confounding variables in a thought experiment.

  19. BruceS: Maybe just human foundational knowledge needs to be revealed and we can take it from there.

    I would say all knowledge is based on revelation though not necessarily revelation from God.

    For instance I know some things about you because you have revealed them to me. That’s because all knowledge is personal and relational. The “personal” is what separates knowledge from data.

    If it’s true knowledge about the world rather than about individual persons then it must come ultimately from God who is the only person with objective access to that sort of information.

    peace

  22. Corneel: You must be the only person in the world that fails to control for confounding variables in a thought experiment.

    The point is that it may be impossible to control for those things. We don’t know till we conduct the experiment.

    As I see it the experiment is not about how the second physical body is constructed but whether the one Kirk can be two Kirk’s at the same time and in the same respect

    peace

  23. BruceS: You may be right on who popularized the idea, and of course remember that Ramsay died young with lots of undeveloped ideas.But AFAIK it is always called a ‘Ramsay sentence’.

    Wikipedia says :

    Ramsey sentences were introduced by the logical empiricist philosopher Rudolf Carnap. They are also known as Carnap sentences.
    I like how Ramsey is a link between Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap and logical positivism.

    For me, it’s a formal way of saying that entities in science are defined/characterized by the theories they are part of. There is nothing more to fundamental things than their behavior. There is no essence to the fundamental entities of physics.(Not so I suspect for emergent entities).

    If you are referring to Platonic essences, I agree.

    That relates to the futility of insisting that the definition of scientific terms must be grounded in operational measurements. It is futile since all such definitions/measurements depend on some theory in the end. Or so I say.

    Not sure about that. Empiricism seems a productive approach.

  24. Alan Fox:

    Not sure about that. Empiricism seems a productive approach.

    I agree we need to test theories empirically. What we measure as part of that testing depends on the theory and not on some standalone operational definition.

    I leave the history regarding the relative roles of various philosophers to KN, who teaches this stuff. Just understanding current ideas is challenge enough for me.

  25. fifthmonarchyman: If it’s true knowledge about the world rather than about individual persons then it must come ultimately from God who is the only person with objective access to that sort of information.

    Aren’t individuals part of the world?

  26. BruceS: I agree we need to test theories empirically. What we measure as part of that testing depends on the theory and not on some standalone operational definition.

    Repeatingg oneself seems to be obligatory in these discussions, so here goes:

    Theories are neither true nor false. they are useful if they inspire new research. Often, this involves measuring stuff that hasn’t been measured before, with instruments that are invented for the purpose.

    Any “theory” that doesn’t suggest research isn’t.

    I am not qualified to judge string theory, but from what is written about string theories, perhaps they should be called conjectures.

    ID could be called a conjecture. There are spin-offs, like genetic meltdown, that are testable. My impression is that theorettes that have arisen from ID have been falsified or unconfirmed by observation.

  27. fifthmonarchyman: As I see it the experiment is not about how the second physical body is constructed but whether the one Kirk can be two Kirk’s at the same time and in the same respect

    I agree, the thought experiment assumes there is a device which is able to deconstruct all aspects of a human and reconstruct the identical pattern. Barring a malfunction.

    In your view, if an omnipotent Being has the abilty to create a person once, what is impediment to creating the same person twice if He choose?

  29. Neil Rickert: know my name, for sure. And I know where I live, for sure.

    You’ve surpassed keiths there.

    But you’re about to lose Alan’s faith, I fear.

  30. fifthmonarchyman: I would say all knowledge is based on revelation though not necessarily revelation from God.

    For instance I know some things about you because you have revealed them to me. That’s because all knowledge is personal and relational. The “personal” is what separates knowledge from data.

    Again conflates truth with knowledge, ratio essendi with ratio cognoscendi.

  32. newton: if an omnipotent Being has the abilty to create a person once, what is impediment to creating the same person twice if He choose?

    If A is over here and B is over there, even God can’t make them identical.

    The problem for FMM is that truth is over here and God is over there. Truth one thing, knowledge another. No “revelation” can bridge that gap: it’s conceptual. Apparent bridges are confusions only.

  33. BruceS: My reading of FMM is that truth and knowledge require (or maybe is?) a God’s-eye view; then human truth/knowledge is grounded in revelations from God..

    Yes, I agree that’s roughly his idea.

    Many people, including many non-theists, assume something like a “God’s eye view” account of truth. But I don’t see that as tenable. Even if there is a god, there is no reason that the way we see the world should be comparable to the way that a god sees the world.

  34. walto: If A is over here and B is over there, even God can’t make them identical.

    For various definitions of identical.

  36. BruceS: I have no idea how to make any type of philosophy of language integrate with neurolinguistics and with embodied linguistics

    I listen to podcasts while doing workouts and chores (and during bouts of insomnia when I am not posting here!).

    This morning’s W/O was done to this recent introduction to linguistics and to the roles of mathematics and learning theory in linguistics.

    Bonus content which also came up in the thread: Buddhism in the form of a Zen Koan, sorta real patterns expressed as equivalent math descriptions, relative roles of observation, theorizing.

    Greg Kobele discusses mathematical linguistics

  37. walto: You’ve surpassed keiths there.

    I believed you’d bring up keiths, as justified by many past exchanges. So now I also know it.

    (If you are lurking via Googling your name, hi Keith!)

  38. fifthmonarchyman: As I see it the experiment is not about how the second physical body is constructed but whether the one Kirk can be two Kirk’s at the same time and in the same respect

    That’s only an issue if you believe that reality is required to conform to your logic. I don’t have such a belief. If anything, it is the other way around. Our logical models are required to conform to reality. And if they don’t conform, then it is time that we adjusted our logical models of reality.

    The thought experiment challenges us to do just that.

  40. walto: You’ve surpassed keiths there…

    Someone has to.

    But you’re about to lose Alan’s faith, I fear.

    I was tempted to point out that the statement “My name is Neil” is only true accurate when uttered by someone called Neil but The same type of criticism can be made of many statements. “The sky is blue” might be accurate depending on context but not reliably so. (Anyway, the blue of the sky is a result of longer wavelengths of visible light being scattered more than shorter.)

  41. fifthmonarchyman:

    For instance I know some things about you because you have revealed them to me. That’s because all knowledge is personal and relational. The “personal” is what separates knowledge from data.

    I’d prefer to say that testimony, including personal testimony, is one way to try to justify claims of knowledge. Or at least to start to do so.

    I would question whether you could trust personal testimony provided anonymously over the internet and so whether it is appropriate to use such testimony as justification..

    But more importantly, how (ETA: can you trust that any such personal experience of revelation truly comes from God)? And even if you can, how can you justify Divine revelation as a source of knowledge to those of us who have not experienced it?

    Do you rely on something like Plantinga’s Sensus Divinitatis to claim reliability for your experience of revelation? Or is such trust part of your theology?

    Or do you think that such justification is unneeded because eg knowledge is at heart personal, and not something a community arrives at by working together.

  42. fifthmonarchyman: The point is that it may be impossible to control for those things. We don’t know till we conduct the experiment.

    But the thought experiment doesn’t answer that question. Even if we could conduct it as an actual experiment, it won’t tell you anything. “Hey, Kirk, are you the original Kirk that we beamed up?” “Yeah, sure. I guess”

    fifthmonarchyman: As I see it the experiment is not about how the second physical body is constructed but whether the one Kirk can be two Kirk’s at the same time and in the same respect

    Those issues are not completely separated, I think. Anyway, if you are going to rig your thought experiments, you are confusing the discussion. The idea of the teletransporter is that it is a machine, thus incapable of pulling off any supernatural wizardry. If you want to allow for God dipping his finger in during the assembly, that’s fine with me. I just expect you to be explicit about where you believe the supernatural rabbit is hidden.

  43. walto: You’ve surpassed keiths there…

    Someone has to.

    But you’re about to lose Alan’s faith, I fear.

    I was tempted to point out that the statement “My name is Neil” is only true accurate when uttered by someone called Neil but The same type of criticism can be made of many statements. “The sky is blue” might be accurate depending on context but not reliably so. (Anyway, the blue of the sky is a result of longer wavelengths of visible light being scattered more than shorter.)

  44. Neil Rickert: Y

    Many people, including many non-theists, assume something like a “God’s eye view” account of truth.

    Right, I think my approach to truth avoids that Viewpoint.

    Lately I’ve been reading some accounts of free will which say compatibilism can be justified by avoiding a God’s eye view of determinism and causation. Scott A has one based on QM theory, ‘freebits’, microstate versus macrostates. Jenann Ismael works with intervention accounts of causation.

    Both take a “freedom-from-the-inside-out” perspective, essentially that determinism of microstates means there is no reason to privilege the past over the present l in applying determinism.

    I may write about them if I ever decide an OP is worth it for me.

  45. BruceS: Lately I’ve been reading some accounts of free will which say compatibilism can be justified by avoiding a God’s eye view of determinism and causation. Scott A has one based on QM theory, ‘freebits’, microstate versus macrostates. Jenann Ismael works with intervention accounts of causation.

    Both take a “freedom-from-the-inside-out” perspective, essentially that determinism of microstates means there is no reason to privilege the past over the present l in applying determinism.

    I read Israel’s article on free will in the Scientific Metaphysics collection and thought very highly of it.

    Relatedly, yesterday I learned about A Metaphysics for Freedom. I might read it in the course of my next project on Nietzsche.

  46. BruceS: My reading of FMM is that truth and knowledge require (or maybe is?) a God’s-eye view;

    No. He’s said over and over again that it’s actually God Himself–not His view, but HIM (personally).

    It’s a total category error. I know.

  47. petrushka: For various definitions of identical.

    Well, of course. What matters here is numerical identity. Not, e.g. whether two shirts are both Ralph Lauren.

  49. Alan Fox: “My name is Neil” is only true accurate when uttered by someone called Neil but The same type of criticism can be made of many statements

    Look up “indexicals” some time.

  50. walto: Well, of course. What matters here is numerical identity. Not, e.g. whether two shirts are both Ralph Lauren.

    I fail to see how any reasonable definition of identity prevents an omnipotent being from creating identical objects. Or even from sustaining their identity.

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