At Evolution News and Views, David Klinghoffer presents a challenge:
Man needs meaning. We crave it, especially when faced with adversity. I challenge any Darwinist readers to write some comments down that would be suitable, not laughable, in the context of speaking to people who have lived through an event like Monday’s bombing. By all means, let me know what you come up with.
Leaving aside Klinghoffer’s conflation of “Darwinism” with atheism, and reading it as a challenge for those of us who do not believe in a supernatural deity or an afterlife (which would include me), and despite lacking the eloquence of the speakers Klinghoffer refers to, let me offer some thoughts, not on Monday’s bombing, specifically, but on violent death in general, which probably touches us all, at some time. Too many lives end far too soon:
We have one life, and it is precious, and the lives of those we love are more precious to us than our own. Even timely death leaves a void in the lives of those left, but the gap left by violent death is ragged, the raw end of hopes and plans and dreams and possibilities. Death is the end of options, and violent death is the smashing of those options; Death itself has no meaning. But our lives and actions have meaning. We mean things, we do things, we act with intention, and our acts ripple onwards, changing the courses of other lives, as our lives are changed in return. And more powerful than the ripples of evil acts are acts of love, kindness, generosity, and imagination. Like the butterfly in Peking that can cause a hurricane in New York, a child’s smile can outlive us all. Good acts are not undone by death, even violent death. We have one life, and it is precious, and no act of violence can destroy its worth.
Who is it you are channeling for your argument of the form
1. Natural processes cannot give rise to “autonomous free will agency”
2. “Autonomous free will agency” is required for morality.
3. Atheists must borrow from theistic concepts of morality.
?
Robin,
I don’t agree. My views completely coincide with many of the most widely known, fundamental theistic philosophical arguments in history, such as the argument from morality, the argument from design, arguments about moral responsibility and free will; arguments about uncaused cause or the unmoved mover and other important arguments that support the existence of God in terms of fundamentals.
What my position doesn’t include are any particular religious interpretations and additions to those more fundamental theistic arguments. So, it is perfectly reasonable that I argue for a rational theism that is not of any particular theistic religion or sect.
While my argument is not about Christianity, or Islam, or Judaism, it is in fact an argument (or set of arguments) for theism as it has been argued by most of the great theistic philosophers in history, even if it eschews that which I hold that as unnecessary to the theistic position.
If you’re not up to a debate about theism vs atheistic materialism where your pre-sorted, canned responses about Christianity or Islam or Judaism are irrelevant, don’t blame me – it’s not my responsibility to only present arguments you have rote responses for.
1. Embodiment, or source, of logic, math, good, geometry and all necessarily existent commodities (innate qualities)
2. Uncaused cause, and as such source of free will capacity; first cause (unmoved mover)
3. Inasmuch as logic (an innate quality of god) allows, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent.
That’s probably not a complete list, but it will do off the top of my head and for now.
Liz,
Developing my moral code doesn’t begin with “X is self-evidently immoral”.
It begins by asking, and answering, questions:
1. Is it possible to develop a rationally coherent, meaningful moral system worth caring about in the first place?
2. If there is no substantial reason to care about morality in the first place, there is no reason to argue/consider it.
3. What would make morality worth considering/arguing?
Answer: necessary consequences. [Insert long argument here about haphazard consequences (for actor and recipient of a moral/immoral act) ending up in an incoherent moral system].
4. How would necessary consequences exist in a moral system?
Answer: morality must refer to an absolute, real commodity, like gravity, that is part of a shared mental landscape, like the physical world for our physical bodies, that mechanically – by law – delivers necessary consequences to moral/immoral behavior for both actor and recipient, so that on faith in this law of morality, we can know (assume) that when we do good, the effect is good, both for ourselves and for others, and when we do evil, the effect is evil, both for ourselves and for others, whether we can readily see that result or not.
Just as I can have faith to deliver mechanistic gravity “justice” to everyone, or just as I can have faith that the law of non-contradiction applies equally to everyone whether they accept it or not, and just as I can have faith that nobody can draw a 4-sided triangle, it is only through the assumption of an absolute law of morality that a coherent, meaningful morality worth considering can exist.
5. Is it reasonable to call such a “universal mind” where a law of morality exists, like a law of gravity exists (so to speak) in the physical world, “god”?
Answer: Yes.
So, only if God exists (at least as universal mental architecture operating under lawful architecture including logic, math, and morality) can a coherent, meaningful morality exist.
6. IF such a situation exists, how would one go about recognizing and vetting valid moral principles?
Answer: as with gravity, one could start with self-evidently true statements (what goes up must come down – gravity, or it is always wrong to torture children for personal pleasure – morality) and use logic to parse general and conditional moral guidelines from there (figure stuff out about gravity in order to more fully understand and work with it).
Etc.
You are certainly entitled to disagree, however your argument doesn’t rebut my point. That your particular “theism” coincides with many of the most widely known, fundamental theistic philosophies does not mean that it reflects the main tenets of most theists. For example, Young Earth Creationism certainly coincides with many of the most widely known, fundamental theistic philosophies too, but it’s still fringe theism.
It’s still just your personal theism William. You’re comments and assumptions are not representative of any other major theistic perspectives, even in general.
If that is the case, it should be no trouble to provide a set of references to these supposed “great theistic philosophers”.
I’m perfectly capable of discussing theology William and I can (and have) debated theism vs atheism. However, the claims and arguments you’ve presented thus far have not been based in any sort of mainstream theism, nor are they representative of any mainstream theistic philosophies that I have studied. That doesn’t particularly bother me as I have had some education in fringe theism and I’m familiar with some of the concepts you’ve presented, however it does strike me as odd to me that you wish to frame your argument as one of theism vs atheism when it’s quite plain that it isn’t.
Robin,
Then quit whining that my theism isn’t mainstream and debate the argument I present.
I’m not whining about; I’m noting that you have created a contradiction. That do not wish to deal with the contradiction presents a question to the validity of your arguments.
I’d appreciate WJM’s take on this.
http://recursed.blogspot.com/2007/06/kirk-durston-apologist-for-genocide.html
Whose argument from morality, William? Kant’s non-argument? CS Lewis’s assertion? That seems to be what we have so far. Or the argument from objective moral truths?
Which arguments about moral responsibility?
Who on free will?
What argument, William? The only thing I see is you sharing your overactive imagination.
And what debate? You already know that ‘darwinists’ are ‘willfully blinding’ themselves, so you’re not really listening to them. You’re just repeating the same thing over and over.
You have zero interest in learning anything. That’s why you continue to talk about molecules ‘bouncing around’ randomly. And why you refer to ‘darwinism’ as if it’s synonymous with atheism.
Questions to self: Why am I so drawn to conversations involving WJM? Is it because I like wasting time? Is it for the same reason some people slow down to peak at an accident on the road?
That, of course, reflects the standard issue faced by theists in Keiths’ question to William. William dodged the question, insisting that the question is incoherent given his theism. I doubt we’ll get a straight answer to the above.
I suggest it’s the curiosity/acceptance of authority variation. You’re too curious. 😉
Just my personal perspective on this, but I suspect few people come to these types of discussions/debates expecting to learn anything from the “other side”. Or rather, I think few people come to these discussions/debates with enough of an open mind to be convinced of anything by the “other side”. The thing that does bug me is the bull-headed arrogance and agenda that some folks bring to these discussions such that they refuse to even try to understand what the “other side” is presenting. It’s not a question of not understanding it; it’s a question of outright ignoring the other side because one’s agenda is the whole point.
petrushka,
What about it? A book (the Bible) claims God committed genocide and/or ordered genocide. So? Genocide is wrong regardless of what any book, figure of authority, social convention, or supposed mouth of god says otherwise.
It is the absolute nature of morality that gives any individual authority to challenge and defy espousers of false morality no what they claim to be representing – god, social consensus, etc.
It doesn’t take a learned man to understand the basics about gravity, but it probably takes a learned man (or an ideological zealot) to deny what is patently obvious.
William J. Murray,
Thanks for this, William. I think I begin to understand. I will respond later.
Lizzie,
To a theist, a self-evident truth is held as true regardless of what anyone else says, or how many other people agree. It is an absolute. Consensus agreement doesn’t make or validate a truth as self-evident.
That there are absolute moral truths is the reason – whether one admits it or not – that one can confidently challenge or defy consensus moral truths and validly refuse a social dictum or command draped in the authority of social “morality”.
If there is a society where homosexuality is condemned as immoral by 99% of the people, and it is held by them that homosexuality is self-evidently immoral, that doesn’t make it either self-evident or true. Under what authority would you fight to remove homosexual behavior from the “immoral” category? It can’t be consensus-as-self-evidently-true, because the consensus is against you.
Perhaps you’d make an argument about “harm”, “greater good”, or “causing no harm”? But if 99% of the population considers homosexuality harmful, and “the greater good” served by their execution, and that “causing no harm” is best served by providing a quick and painless execution, on what grounds would you defy or challenge such social consensus?
Only a morality assumed as absolute can provide any such individual, rational authority, and only a morality with necessary consequences could provide good rationale (not to mention motivation) to actually defy such a social convention to your own detriment and fight for what is good and right.
I disagree.
I could well decide for myself in this scenario that the majority was wrong, and fight to change things, without assuming or claiming that there was any absolute morality.
Why does morality need an “authority”? A “rationale”, yes (preferably), but an authority?
You can determine that the consensus morality is wrong by what standard? Your personal feelings?
Why not? That appears to be what you are relying on for your “self-evidence”. Clearly there’s no way to substantiate this supposed “theistic authority” – you even basically admitted such yourself. You’ve noted repeatedly that your perspective is based on the assumption of such an entity, but how do you substantiate it for all? And Keiths’s little exercise then demonstrated that not only can you not substantiate this supposed “authority”, but that you can’t even rely upon your “self-evident” morality. People can lie or be mistaken as can the books they write regarding deities and morality, so basically your “theism” can’t be established or agreed upon. It’s simply whatever William believes. I don’t see that as any different from personal feelings.
If religious authority is irrelevant then it is irrelevant. I could agree to that. In fact most of us here have been arguing that.
What I argue — and have not heard an answer to — is that even given moral guidelines that everyone agrees to, it is not easy or not possible to determine the moral action except in the simplest cases.
The biggest problem that I see is determining the consequences of anything but the most trivial actions. Even such mundane situations as disciplining a child are fraught with questions about long term consequences.
It’s fairly easy to say thou shalt not steal or murder, but in the real world, things come up that make decisions difficult. The military and the police are constantly faced with difficult problems. Politicians are constantly faced with projecting the consequences of laws.
Which goes directly to my point that a haphazard-consequence moral system is not worth worrying about; only a necessary consequence, law of morality system is worth worrying about.
This is also why, IMO, the clear focus of all moral choices should never be too far-reaching or involve obscure or complex justifications or calculations.
The more one must calculate and justify, the more prone to convenient rationalization and error. One of my maxim’s is, “if you’re trying to justify taking an action, you already know it’s wrong”.
The argument is empty. For every ‘uncaused cause’ where one can insert a deity, one can insert an equally vague quantum fluctuation. For every individual who claims their sense of right and wrong (including the sense that there is such a thing as right and wrong) comes from ‘god’, another can claim it is their shared genetic and cultural heritage talking. Either could be right. Since both positions are possible, adopting either is rational. And claiming dibs on the concepts is rich. “Don’t do this, that or the other – we invented that!”. No you didn’t.
Naturally, people who have reached a particular conclusion believe that they have done so for rational reasons. And they generally have. It makes perfect sense to them on the basis of what they know. There may in fact be logical flaws, and if they perceived those, their position would not be quite so rational. And of course, they could simply be wrong, even with a thoroughly rational position.
But WJM’s supposed logical flaws in atheist ‘morality’ are no such thing. If part of an organism’s inherited or acquired brain-states operated by making certain behaviours abhorrent, it may perceive that as an absolute, external imperative, and it would congratulate itself on having reached the rational conclusion that its purpose was to anticipate the expectations of the external Source of this (in the scenario, illusory) sense. Equally, it may recognise the restraint as instinctive or conditioned (which, in the scenario, it is).
Trumpeting as argument from authority the unnamed ‘theist philosophers’ is not going to cut it. One merely needs to play Top Trumps with the names of the equally thoughtful philosophers who rejected those philosophical positions, and let them have the interminable debate on your behalf. Saves a lot of bandwidth.
So how do you tap into the Absolute’s opinion on homosexuality?
It must be nice to be so oblivious that the ethics of every issue seem black and white.
That ole truthiness! Or what you feel in your gut.
Robin,
The significant difference lies in the principle used to justify the challenge or defiance, and how it fashions the logical inferences and conclusions thereof.
If one is tying their moral boat to the principle of “personal feelings”, then how can moral codes that others (the consensus you disagree with, in our hypothetical example) “personally feel are correct” be “wrong”?
Thus, your principle of “personal feelings” as arbiter of “what is right and wrong” falls into incoherency and hypocrisy. In order for your “personal feeling” of what is wrong to trump the “personal feelings” of others, what other principle are going to retreat to?
A majority of personal opinion? Then you lose, and have no principled right to defy consensus.
For the theist, that the consensus is wrong is not based on the principle of “personal preference’ but rather on the principle of absolute moral truth. This principle gives them the rational basis by which to coherently defy or challenge any consensus or claimed authority.
It doesn’t mean that any specific claim of reference to absolute moral truth is actually accurate or valid; – yes, humans are prone to erroneous views and must keep that in mind. However, reference to such absolute moral authority – even if perilous and easy to err – is still the only rational, coherent principle that would authorize the individual to challenge and defy any consensus or so-called authority without falling to hypocrisy and incoherence.
By “absolute moral authority” I’m talking about the actual, supposed architecture or law of morality that even god cannot change – not some entity dressed up as an authority or an entity claiming to speak with authority.
The absolute authority of the law of gravity is gravity itself, that anyone can investigate on their own, not anyone who claims to understand it perfectly or speak for it.
It’s certainly a wonderful concept. So I’ll bite – how does this “necessary consequence” moral system work? Is there an immediate, irrevocable consequence for going against a “self-evident” moral or is the consequence delayed? Is there a one for one ratio that can be collected as data and plotted on a graph? For example, you have stated that torturing babies self-evidently immoral. Is there an immediate repeatable and consistent consequence to anyone and everyone who tortures a baby? Do such immoral people immediately catch fire, have their hair fall out, get cancer, go into depression, or have some other physical effect occur to them or is it an abstract consequence? I’m just curious how one can understand this necessary consequence system.
Oh I see. God has installed phone lines to our hearts, but the phones aren’t working properly…
It’s like Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis. It definitely exists, but it doesn’t work properly in everyone. Alvin blames sin (even though it apparently works in some sinners).
What do you blame for the imperfection of the moral sense, William? If we don’t know if it is working, what use is it?
Ah. That was not what I thought you meant by “self-evident”. I thought you mean, essentially, undeniable.
I think the conclusion that “torturing babies for personal pleasure is wrong” is undeniable in that sense, because it is a paradigm case of harm being caused (pain in this case) to another for personal benefit (pleasure), and it is therefore undeniably non-altruistic. And I define moral behaviour as altruistic behaviour, because it’s the way the word is used – behaviour we ought to do when benefit to others conflicts with benefit to ourselves (we also use the word “ought” to refer to self-discipline – conflicts between what we want now, and what we want later – but we usually don’t call that kind of ought “morality” – unless it affects others, as in “I ought to lose weight, I’m becoming a burden on my family, so I’ll forgo that chocolate eclair”).
That’s not a “consensus” conclusion, it’s definitional. Morality the term we give to the domain of what we ought.
Yes indeed, which is why I distinguish between “morality” and “ethics”. People can and do differ profoundly about what constitutes moral – i.e. altruistic behaviour in any given circumstance, but there is really no disagreement that moral behaviour is altruistic behaviour. Or do you think there is?
And I don’t appeal to consensus. I simply appeal to the universally held definition of morality as what we “ought” to do when self-benefit conflicts with benefit-to-others. If 99% of people think that homosexual behaviour harms either those engaging in it, or other people, then 99% of people will find it unethical. 1% of people may differ, and cite evidence to show that homosexual behaviour is harmless between consenting adults and hurts no-one else. In this scenario 100% agree that moral behaviour is altruistic behaviour, but consensus says that homosexual behaviour harms others, and 1% say it doesn’t. The way to decide is not by consensus but by proper scientific investigation.
Scientific grounds. Harm is measurable.
I think you are still missing a crucial distinction between a definition of moral behaviour as altruistic behaviour (and that seems definitional, to me) and ethical decisions as to what, in this context, constitutes altruistic behaviour. Consider the following ethical questions:
I suggest that 100% of people, theist or atheist, will agree that the moral decision in the all the above scenarios is whichever one is the more altruistic.
However I suggest that there will be no unanimity at all about which decision, in each case, is the more altruistic.
No, everyone cannot investigate it for themselves. Well, they can, but not usefully. Only skilled mathematicians with knowledge of the relevant physics and in possession of the relevant data can investigate it. We don’t have direct access to the laws of nature. You are claiming direct access to a moral sense. Your analogy is not a good one.
I certainly don’t see it as hypocritical or incoherent, though I freely agree with you that it is “of the same inherent quality” as the consensus’ feelings of what is right and thus does not, from any actual measure, trump their consensus view.
The flaw here is that there is no theistic “absolute moral truth”. There’s no collective agreement that all theists can point to and say, “yea verily, on this we all agree because it comes from not us, but from an absolute and incontrovertible source”. You said so yourself – “I hold all my beliefs – even that in god – provisionally. It’s not a problem for me to suspend my beliefs or change them if I find them to be faulty.” Thus, the standard can’t be a standard. There can be no “principle of absolute moral truth” if the theism – as you readily agree – is provisional because it can be found faulty. That leaves the theist in the same boat as the atheists – morality is whatever feels right in one’s gut.
This is question begging William and a contradiction in terms. If the absolute moral authority can be inaccurate, it can be no more rational to rely upon it then to rely upon the position of the stars, tea leaves, or one’s personal feelings. Each are just as arbitrary as any other.
And that’s fabulous. If you can point to some repeatable, consistent, and predictable phenomenon that occurs as a result of specific moral actions, I’d like to have a deeper look at this absolute moral authority. I’m sure you’ll agree that at this point there’s absolutely no reason for me to just take your word for its existence.
They work properly, davehooks. All sentient, rational free will creatures have a perfect connection to moral law, because the same moral architecture that is inherently in the mind of god is in ours.
But, we also have that feature called free will (well, some or most of us do). With free will, we can deny the obvious and even the absolute. We can justify, rationalize, self-deceive, and just flat out turn a blind eye to anything. This is why there is no such thing as incontrovertible (coercing, compelling) evidence; humans can lie to themselves about what is right before their eyes and maintain even the most blatantly absurd notions.
So each of us has the capacity to perfectly, directly access moral law – and much more – unless we have chosen to believe something else, or simply refuse what our moral eyes tell us.
All this only works for those humans with free will. As I’ve said before, It’s my opinion that not all humans have free will. Some humans are just NPCs, IMO.
This is a great example Lizzie and based on it, I am going to disagree with part of your premise.
I have met fundamentalist Christians who insist that the moral choice in each of the above scenarios would be for the pregnancy to go to term because that is what God wanted when he allowed the woman to get pregnant in the first place. Thus, the choice (and morality) in that case would have nothing to do with altruism and would only be a question of the assumption of what God wants, even if it meant that both woman and foetus died in the process.
I’m actually in agreement with William, I think (though he may not agree that I agree with him) that the criterion that separates moral from immoral behaviour is obvious (self-evident). In fact, I would go so far as to say that a deluded person who does something at great personal cost that is widely regarded as appalling, because she believes it will benefit others, is acting morally, even if we all agree that her actions did not benefit others and actually harmed them, and was therefore unethical.
Perhaps my distinction between the word “moral” and the word “ethical” is non-standard usage, but at least I have made my usage clear. In any case, I think the distinction is important, however we label it.
But there’s at least one precedent: I have to submit my research protocols to ethics committees. Nobody disputes this – we all agree that our research must must not cause harm, because such research would be immoral. We don’t need a morals committee to tell us that. However, we do need an ethics committee to check that we are really are not-harming people.
And atheists are perfectly capable of serving on ethics committees.
I disagree that morality = altruism, and I disagree that our self-evident truth is undeniable.
I consider myself moral, and I don’t have an altruistic bone in my body. I also hold the view that if there are people who operate out of actual altruism, they are far, far too few and far between to be relevant to any social system of morality.
Everything – everything – is deniable.
Your “scientific grounds” for “what causes harm” is an excercise in question-begging; from what metaphysical perspective, and from what social perspective, are we defining “harm”? Physical pain? Emotional pain? Long term results? Short -term? Psychological development? Towards what standardized ends? Is it weighed against harm to society? Based on what socio-political perspective of a healthy society?
Plus, it assumes science is the best method for assessing harm, which is itself an imposition of personal metaphysics into the moral system.
Once again: why should I agree to any of it?
Perhaps not “determine” – but develop a rationale, as in “”they” say that homosexuality is harmful, but I have observed no harm done by homosexuality – so I think it wrong to execute homosexuals”
I’ve been wondering by what means an “authority” might transmit an “objective morality” and how the recipient would know
Aha, I hoped someone would say that! And I have an answer:
The big problems with altruism-as-principle are: where do we draw the line at who constitute “others” and how do we evaluate “benefit” or “harm”?
I suggest that fundamentalist Christians who insist that all pregnancies go to term are a) defining “others” to include God, and b) are defining harm as “not giving the foetus a chance to experience life” and “causing God displeasure”. Also, possibly, “woman spends eternity in hell”.
Whereas I don’t count God as an “other”, and I don’t consider that the death of a foetus can be construed as “harm” (although causing it pain might), in the sense that the death of a born person with dreams and plans and hopes, and relationships, is.
And I don’t believe in hell.
But my point is that we can (and do) argue about who constitutes “others” and what constitutes “harm” to them
William, when you say you haven’t an altruistic bone in your body, are we to take it that you mean you have never and would never do anything to benefit anyone else with no benefit to yourself?
Really?
In my experience, that would be quite unusual.
Well, in that case, William, I don’t understand what you think is self-evident. I’d assumed that your “torturing babies for personal pleasure” was an example – but are you saying that it is actually the only thing we should avoid doing to be moral? Or are there other things that we should, self-evidently, eschew?
Of course it’s “question-begging” – that’s my point! That what constitutes harm/benefit is a quite different question from the question as to whether we should, in the first place, seek to minimise harm to others and maximise benefit!
And we agree that such questions – ethical dilemmas – are not easy to solve, and cannot be decided by consensus. And I have some sympathy for your view that when it doubt, do the least complicated, most obviously good thing.
My point, however, is that there is NO disagreement THAT we should do the least harmful, most beneficial thing, if only we can figure out what it is. Or do you disagree with this?
Do you, rather, think that the moral thing is the thing least likely to have negative consequences for ourselves, either in this world or the next?
If so, we really do disagree rather profoundly!
Not really. It’s got nothing to do with metaphysics, and everything to do with coming to unbiased judgements. Ultimately, I think morality – altruism – is about fairness – how to conduct a society in which people don’t get away with cheating.
No reason I guess. I just can’t make much sense of what you’re saying. Every time I think I’m on it, it turns out I’m not. But I still need to re-read that piece you wrote a bit upthread.
While I do this, William, can you give us a worked example? Can you give us your moral reasoning on my list of terminations? Are there any you would condone, and, if so, why?
So the only thing would make one consider morality worth considering/arguing would be the conviction that immoral acts necessarily entail adverse consequences for the doer as well as others, and moral acts necessarily entail beneficial consequences for the doer as well as others?
Or am I still not getting this? Please answer yes or no!
OK.
This conclusion depends on the premise that morality is only meaningful if immoral acts carry necessary adverse consequences for the doer (and/or moral acts carry necessary beneficial adverse consequences for the doer). I don’t accept this premise. I think that morality is perfectly meaningful if moral acts are those intended to carry beneficial or non-adverse probable consequences for other people, whether or not they carry those consequences for the doer. So we disagree that morality is only meaningful if the consequences are necessary (I think probable is just fine) and if they affect the doer (I think that just others is just fine).
So how is my premise any less rational than yours?
I agree.
Well, only if we accept your premise. Not if we go for mine.
OK, how about demonstrating how it works on the pregnancy termination scenarios I gave? Seriously, that would be really useful. And I’m happy to apply my premise to them and see how they compare.
Fair enough. I thought this might be what you were thinking. I still have my doubts though. While there’s definitely a certain about of anthropomorphizing god in such circles (like thinking of “him”, to some extent, as a human-esque “king”), I do get the impression that the deflecting to god is also a dehumanizing of the woman and foetus. There appears to be a real belief that their needs – and they readily admit that they have needs in such situations – don’t matter because in the grand scheme of things the only thing that matters is God’s Plan.
I don’t know that I’ve explained my misgivings well, but my point is that in such discussions, it really came across to me that altruism really wasn’t being considered, not even in terms of God. I mean let’s face it, if you believed God was all-powerful, all-knowing, and everywhere, do you really think that you’d have any choice but to fulfill His plans? If such an entity really didn’t want a woman to have an abortion, you’d think that all the arguing about it would be rather moot.
I used to be altruistic – back when I was a Christian some 40 years ago. I can’t say what the future holds, but I don’t foresee altruism playing a role in guiding my behavior any time soon.
For the most part, unless I run into an obvious supervening aspect of moral law, my behavior is determined by a cost/benefit analysis (using various values) and maintaining a strict integrity when it comes to fulfilling responsibilities and debts. Which in itself is at least a kind of base morality.
I admit I’m morally lazy. I do what I need to to get by.
There are a number of problems with William’s argument. The section I pulled above is an example. In it, William has made a bad analogy coupled with question begging. The bad analogy can be seen in the way he’s tried to relate his self-evidently true statements. “What goes up must come down” is a self-evidently true statement for gravity because the second part (what goes down) IS (under gravitational law) a consequence of the first part. The same format does not hold for William’s “self-evident truth” that “it is always wrong to kill babies for pleasure”. There’s no consequence in that statement providing the “self-evidence” of the statement. Further, we can actually test the validity of “what goes up must come down” and determine the actual impact(no pun intended) of gravity’s self-evident truth. The same cannot be said for the killing of babies as yet, because so far there’s no identified consequence.
The question begging comes in from the earlier part when stating that because one can “faith” in delivering gravitational “justice” universally and thus one can only have faith in morality if there is an absolute moral standard. The problem is, we get to 6 and the absolute moral standard is the conclusion, but the premise was never substantiated – it was just shown to be required. 5 just changes the name from “absolute moral standard” to “god”, but that still doesn’t prove the original premise. The conclusion in 6 actually assumes the premise in the first place.
I never said I could prove it; I’ve explicitly said that this is something that must be assumed for the sake of a coherent morality that doesn’t digress into hypocrisy or self-refuting nonsense.
Fair enough. I won’t argue that it would be a great system if it were true. The problem I have is that given the world as-is, I see no evidence that even indirectly indicates it is true and thus I personally feel more secure relying on models that more accurately take into account the world as is.
BTW, I’m not actually asking you to prove it. I’m merely asking you to point me in the direction of some evidence for this system’s existence that I can test for myself. Anything would do – some anecdotes that people who did X seem to have Y events occur a lot in life. I’m happy to do the math myself if you can point to some variables of the phenomenon.
damitall2,
Given his personal description, It’s certainly possible that WJM is a sociopath (psychopath). Here’s one self-admitted sociopath’s take one morality: A frequent question I get is how can sociopaths be good? Why would sociopaths choose to “do the right thing” if they don’t feel the emotion “guilt” like everyone else does?]…
Yes!
WJM has to tell himself over and over that morality is self-evident because it actually isn’t to him.
Meanwhile, morality is self-evident to you guys–you aren’t psychopaths–and are trying to convince him that it isn’t!
Don’t you see the irony in this conversation?
I get the impression that a lot of religious people are psychopaths.
(Hearing “not that there’s anything wrong with that.”)
I don’t mean they are bad people of evil people; just that they keep asking what would make an atheist behave morally.I don’t understand the question. Hurting others is exactly like hurting myself.
Stupid and possibly pointless story follows:
In second grade I sat behind a guy who kept leaning back and plopping his head on my desk. I asked him to stop, but he persisted. One day I anticipated him leaning back and held a sharpened pencil where I anticipated his head would go.
The pencil lodged in the soft part of his neck and remained there when he got up.
Now I didn’t stick him with the pencil and I didn’t do anything without warning, but I knowingly did something that led to (very slight) harm.
But the image of that pencil has haunted me for over 60 years. It has shaped a lot of my behavior. I think about it every time someone pisses me off and I am tempted to retaliate.
I was not punished and he wasn’t seriously hurt. I’m pretty certain I hurt more than he did.
When I ask why I behave the way I do, I have to say I can do no otherwise.
Most of the people I associate with do likewise, to a greater or lesser degree.