At Evolution News and Views, David Klinghoffer presents a challenge:
Man needs meaning. We crave it, especially when faced with adversity. I challenge any Darwinist readers to write some comments down that would be suitable, not laughable, in the context of speaking to people who have lived through an event like Monday’s bombing. By all means, let me know what you come up with.
Leaving aside Klinghoffer’s conflation of “Darwinism” with atheism, and reading it as a challenge for those of us who do not believe in a supernatural deity or an afterlife (which would include me), and despite lacking the eloquence of the speakers Klinghoffer refers to, let me offer some thoughts, not on Monday’s bombing, specifically, but on violent death in general, which probably touches us all, at some time. Too many lives end far too soon:
We have one life, and it is precious, and the lives of those we love are more precious to us than our own. Even timely death leaves a void in the lives of those left, but the gap left by violent death is ragged, the raw end of hopes and plans and dreams and possibilities. Death is the end of options, and violent death is the smashing of those options; Death itself has no meaning. But our lives and actions have meaning. We mean things, we do things, we act with intention, and our acts ripple onwards, changing the courses of other lives, as our lives are changed in return. And more powerful than the ripples of evil acts are acts of love, kindness, generosity, and imagination. Like the butterfly in Peking that can cause a hurricane in New York, a child’s smile can outlive us all. Good acts are not undone by death, even violent death. We have one life, and it is precious, and no act of violence can destroy its worth.
What makes what your designer does special or different? If we are the purposeful products of design then given that we can observe that we seem to be (there is strong evidence for) that we are evolved replicators evolving then why is there not also strong evidence of design?
Stronger, in fact, there should be no?
To show, by reason and/or evidence, that your claims are likely to be true. Your argument depends on those claims. If you can’t justify them, then there is no reason for anyone, including you, to accept your conclusions.
No, those assumptions are not necessary. I’m beginning to suspect that you don’t understand the concept of logical coherence. To show that something is logically incoherent, you need to show that it leads to a contradiction.
Where is the contradiction in not assuming that God is perfectly good? Where is the contradiction in not assuming that we have access to objective moral truth?
As for “meaningfulness”, I can assure you that my moral system is quite meaningful to me without requiring either of those baseless assumptions.
You came here to challenge the rationality of atheist morality, but you’ve ended up exposing the gaping holes in your own moral system.
I’m satisfied with the case I’ve made. If one doesn’t assume absolute moral values, then one is left with relative moral values, which boil down to “because I say so”, or eventually might makes right. Liz’s “because I say so” “Altruism” as moral foundation, and “because I say so” use of some agreed-upon (read: because I say so) “scientific” measurement of benefit, harm, etc.
Essentially, under the relative morality, nobody has any more right to anyone else to invent their own moral code based on whatever they want, because there is no assumed absolute standard.
As I further argued (and to my satisfaction showed), a morality without necessary consequences is not a morality worth considering. Haphazard consequences enforced by fallible and often corrupt governments or authorities is worthless as a consequence. Therefore, there is no need to even consider morality in the first place. All there is need to consider is the appearance of social conformity.
As I further argued, the only reasonable repository of an absolute morality and necessary consequences would be a universal mind, which can reasonably be called god. Absolute morality – or, how humans should behave – implicates a purpose. If humans are created for to fulfill a purpose by doing what they should do, then it follows that they require a means to do so via recognition of self-evident moral truths and he capacity to reason out less obvious moral “shoulds”.
Also, if humans are biological machines that are programmed to do whatever they do, then they have no autonomous choice if the do something immoral; moral choices require autonomous free will. Without it, if a human harms some one it is exactly the same as if a rolling rock harms them. Free will, autonomous choice is required for any meaningful morality.
Non-absolute morality has no means by which to establish a coherent, meaningful morality. Atheistic materialism cannot supply an absolute morality. Even if many or most or even all current moral systems that posit an absolute moral basis promote immoral choices, that doesn’t change the fact that it is only by positing an absolute moral source that we can have a logically consistent morality worth caring about.
Furthermore, absolute morality doesn’t require fallible and corrupt human enforcement. Absolute morality provides a rationally sufficient basis for challenging any moral claim by any authority or consensus without engaging in hypocrisy.
OMagain,
Yes I do.
William,
Above, I wrote:
To show that something is logically incoherent, you need to show that it leads to a contradiction.
Where is the contradiction in not assuming that God is perfectly good? Where is the contradiction in not assuming that we have access to objective moral truth?
You answered:
Don’t be! Morality is too important to be based on a faulty argument.
Since you didn’t mention any, I take it you were unable to identify any contradictions arising from the absence of those two assumptions. If so, then you have no rationale for claiming that those assumptions are necessary parts of a coherent moral system.
1. “Might makes right” is by no means the only alternative to a system that assumes objective morality.
2. If you want to avoid the problem of conflicting subjective value systems, it’s not enough to establish the existence of objective morality. You have to be able to access it perfectly. You’ve offered no evidence that humans can do this, and I’ve shown that they cannot — otherwise sincere individuals would never disagree on any moral issue they considered to be “self-evident”. Yet they do.
3. The lack of an objective morality does not lead inevitably to “might makes right”. But even if it did, so what? There’s nothing incoherent about “might makes right”. You may not like it. You may think it’s a poor moral system, and I would agree, but that doesn’t make it incoherent. Reality is not obligated to conform to our wishes.
4. Even if we were sure that objective morality actually exists, you would still have the “because I say so” problem. Humans do not have perfect moral knowledge, so they must rely on their imperfect moral intuition. If two people, using their faulty moral compasses, disagree on a fundamental moral issue, then there is no way of objectively adjudicating the dispute, even if objective morality exists.
Again, this is just your preference. You may not like the idea of a morality with no necessary consequences, but that doesn’t mean that it would be incoherent. Reality is not constrained by your desires.
Yet another preference. There doesn’t have to be a repository of objective morality and necessary consequences. A world without them is perfectly coherent.
No. But even if it were, so what? A morality that isn’t meaningful to you can still be coherent.
William, again and again you are mistaking your desires and preferences for logical necessities. Reality is what it is, whether you like it or not. If you want to think rationally, you can’t continue to assume that the world will always conform to your wishes.
No, William, you aren’t getting my point. I mean, you may eventually get it and disagree with it, but right now you aren’t getting it!
The reason I say that altruism is the basis of morality is not because I, Lizzie, like the idea, but because it seems to me that it’s the essence of any definition of morality.
We define morality (universally, I suggest) as the domain of what we “ought” to do.
Would you agree? If not, why not?
And we use the word “ought” as a contrast to words like “want” – in other words its the word we use when there is a conflict between our immediate desires and some alternative, more distal goal.
And I further suggest that there are two kinds of conflict, which can be distinguished:
One is where present personal benefit conflicts with future personal benefit (“a moment on the lips, a lifetime on the hips”).
The second is where present or future personal benefit conflicts with the present or future benefit to others (“this would suit me, but it would be rough on X” or “this would be rough on me but X would benefit”).
And I suggest that, universally, we consider the first the domain of self-discipline, and the second the domain of morality.
This is not because I, Lizzie, say so. It’s because we, collectively, as members of social communities, simply do not use the term “morality” to self-interested behaviour per se (although often self-interested behaviour may be morally neutral, or even altruistic – looking after yourself saves other people doing it for you).
If person says: “My morality is: look after Number One regardless of the cost to others” – I am arguing that they are not choosing “a” moral principle from an infinite menu; they are adopting a principle that is counter to the one that underpins social cohesion, and is collectively termed “morality”, by virtue of our shared vested interest in our collective welfare. And are therefore likely to find themselves ostracized and/or outlawed, and deemed “immoral” or “amoral”.
Morality is not altruism because Lizzie says so: it is altruism because we are interdependent social animals.
Alone on a desert island, morality can be what the heck. But No Man Is An Island.
There are many in the ‘objective morality’ brigade who would wish to interfere even there. No masturbation – it offends the arbiter of objective morals. If there were two of you, same gender and homosexually attracted, stay away from each other because it offends the same arbiter. In fact, don’t enjoy sex with anyone, period.
How do we know these rules? Because someone says so. If it is supported by Holy Writ, a lot of people may get to say so. Their might gives them the authority to say what is right, straight out of The Book, Objective Morality’s prime communication method with the human soul. It’s a pretty crappy way to determine a code of what one ought and ought not to do.
I think you’ve noted at least indirectly why some of those in conservative Christian circles so despise science in general and evolution in specific. It’s not just that the institution and concept in general threatens their beliefs, they see scientific ideas as slowly eroding what once gave them the might to be right.
The argument I have made doesn’t posit that you know the rules “because someone says so”, but rather that because the individual recognizes what is obviously right and wrong uses reason to figure out that which is morally ambiguous.
Nobody can tell you what is right and wrong, but they can make reasoned arguments why something is right or wrong. Without the assumption that morality is absolute, however, such arguments inevitably fall into incomprehensibility and end up being nothing more than “because I say so”.
Also, with absolute morality as I have outlined, there is no need for any human or government to enforce any moral rules on the population; they can stop worrying about “what is moral” and just focus on social rules and laws.
“It seems to me….” and “I like the idea” both = “because I say so.”
Yes you did argue this, but I pointed our a flaw in this earlier and I’ll point it out again. The premise of the claim – that you feel the only reasonable repository of absolute morality and necessary consequence would be a universal mind that we can all agree fits the definition of “God” is fine as far it goes, but the problem is that just because you note such doesn’t make such the actual way things are. Unless – as Keiths and OMagain and a few others have noted – you can justify through argument that the premise is accurate, all the soundness of the premise in the world won’t make it true.
We agree it’s a great idea, but if it isn’t true, then what good is it as an idea?
Which brings me back to the questions I asked earlier: is there a repeatable, predictable, and consistent phenomenon associated with this “necessary consequence” that anyone can investigate to measure or otherwise analyze its association with morality? If not (as you’ve implied), then your morality system boils down to just what you feel is right, not anything objective.
Liz,
Even if I define morality as “doing what I ought”, such a definition doesn’t contradict or lie in contrast to “doing what I want”. I can, indeed, say that what I ought to do, is what I want to do, and that that immorality is acting in conflict with what I want – such as, doing things according to social mores, or what my peer group wishes.
Further, I could claim that the essence of morality is finding and acting on what I truly want beyond the social conditioning, rules, laws, and pressure. I could justify this by claiming that morality is finding the true self and acting fearlessly upon that essential “you”.
Oh wait. That’s right. I had a couple of books about just that very thing published. I think you even have one.
So you see, your definition (either as one you invent or borrow) boils down to the same “because I say so” as my “morality = true individual want” definition. Without necessary consequences or an assumed absolute frame of reference, I have no reason to even consider your particular version of a “because I say so” morality.
All you are doing is running around in circles trying to find semantics that make it appear as if your relativist moral principle something is other than “because I say so.
I’m failing to see the difference between “because I say so” when William applies it to what Lizzie says and when William says when he’s reasoned to whatever moral stance he is adopting (though I don’t think he’s got round to mentioning any details, yet – though I may have missed that bit..)
I certainly have used the term morality that way, and I know many groups and communities in the “new age” community that define morality exactly as “self-interested behavior” – finding what you truly want, who you truly are, and expressing that in fearless defiance of all social norms or supposed penalty. That has nothing to do with altruism or self-sacrifice; indeed, in their perspective (Followers of Science of the Mind, for example), there’s really no such thing as “altruism” per se, because we only pursue altruism for our own benefit – because it makes us feel good, or because not being altruistic makes us feel bad.
In Sant Mat, both good and bad behaviors are equally “immoral”, because they bind us to the wheel of karma. The only moral choice is what could be called indifference to worldly concerns.
In the example someone else gave about having been responsible for a person getting a pencil stuck in their neck, and the thought of harming others making them sick, why did they avoid such future actions? Because it made them sick? Because it filled them with revulsion? That’s self-interest. What about Robin’s statement that harming others was exactly like harming one’s self; so what if it wasn’t? What if harming others was a joyful, happy experience? What if sticking a pencil in someone’s neck filled one with contented euphoria? Since they are operating off of feelings alone – how an act feels, and have no supposed objective rule – then would it be moral to harm others?
One can argue that those with strong empathetic connections to others are behaving in a self-interested way, even when they are supposedly being altruistic, to avoid the guilt, pain, shame or whatever that they experience when they harm or do not help others. I can make the case that anyone who feels such pain, shame, or responsibility to others is indeed acting in their own self-interest.
“Because I say so” = “Because we say so” if you’re talking in terms of communities and societies. It’s just a bunch of individuals agreeing to the same “because I say so” principle.
Your convenient definitions and just-so stories are nothing more than that; just because – in your apparently polyanna, revisionist, rose-colored world – you can make sweeping claims about how you think all or most humans think or act has absolutely zero rational weight in this argument.
“I think most humans act or think like me and would agree with me ….” “I think most or all humans would agree with this definition of morality …”
Helluva debate tactic.
Could you link back to that outline for me, William?
So is this your basis for morality?
A really srange way to think. I think is more accurate to say that our first rule of morality is “follow the lider”. That we share with all the animals that life in groups. Follow the leader helps the survival of the group. Then human projected the leadership to tha strongest and oldest been: God. The authority was traslated from the human leader to God and in that way born monarchies and empires in which the leader always became semigod, son of god etc.
Your moral rule “be altruistic and no harm” is only the product of the education of our civilization that since 20 centuries believes that there is a good God that cares of us and commanded “be altruistic and no harm”. So your moral is nothing else that “follow the leader”.
Doesn´t this explnation fit more the data and the human history?
Now you can try to confort with this the victims of the bombers.
In my personal experience and in my observation of people close to me, we get our moral sense mostly from seeking to fit into our family and tribe.
When I had young children I assumed they would be more likely to copy what I did rather than to obey rules. So I tried to be the kind of person I wanted them to be.
The difference can be seen in how Liz approaches challenges to her moral perspective, and in how I do.
Unlike Liz, I haven’t claimed any “definition” of morality, such as altruism or “do no harm” or “cause the least harm”; nor have I tried to support my case by appealing to some ambiguous “what most people think” or “how morality is defined by most people”, or what I think morality “should” mean. Nor have I claimed that we should claim that what we do as a society towards those that will not conform to our supposed “moral rules” has any moral grounding (going down the perilous road of confusing morality with social conformity or the decree of experts, even if those experts wear lab coats instead of priest robes).
I approach the resolution of any moral disagreement as if morality is indeed an absolute, inescapable phenomena that doesn’t require definitions, consensus, or enforcement. I look for what we both agree is a self-evident moral truth (or more than one), and then reason from there towards rational conclusions about what one should or should not do. If we were having a discussion about why things fall instead of float, I would follow the same convention. Start with self-evidently true statements about the phenomena we can agree upon, and work from there using logic.
It is only a “because I say so” position that needs refers to authority, just-so storytelling, definition or consensus to try and make its case, and need refer to intimidation, fear and punishment as a means of enforcement.
I do not appeal to shame, or guilt, or “bad feelings”; I don’t refer to any outside authority or book; it’s you and me, figuring out if something is moral or not.
The most fundamental question to ask is: why bother? Unless there is some significant reason to even bother figuring out what is moral and what is not, we might as well be discussing our favorite music. Who cares?
Can we agree that “society will harm you if you do not agree to its morality” is not a worthy reason to care about what is moral? It might be a reason to care about social conformity, but not about morality.
Unless we agree that there is an innate, intrinsic, necessary reason to care about whether or not something is moral or immoral, what is the point in debating it?
My position has such an assumption. Liz’s does not. She’s trying to cajole me with appeals to “common definition”, consensus, and convenient just-so stories, scientific authority and some imagined broad-based similarity of views, none of which provide me with any substantive reason – other than fear of the haphazard & probably corrupt punishment by authorities – to even consider her concept of morality.
I personally hold that if one holds fear of social punishment as a valid (ethical) tool for browbeating the populace into moral behavior, that such a position is probably immoral in and of itself.
I haven’t called for any social implementation of moral code, any shaming or guilt or expulsions of any individuals for not behaving morally because an absolute morality doesn’t require it. You cannot escape the consequence of your moral actions, good or bad. I leave your moral or immoral behavior to you, do as your free will wishes. I might debate you about your choices, but ultimately I’m fine with you doing as you wish. Social rules should have nothing to do with any claims about what is moral or not, IMO.
No.
William, let’s see if we can find some common ground:
Do you agree that morality is, by definition, about what we ought to do?
If not, what do you understand by the term?
That is the historically perilous road Liz’s “because I say so” morality takes us down; equating “morality” with “what is good for society”, and agreeing to abide by “the experts” for our legally binding “moral” rules and enforcements. Putting the power of “what is moral” in the hands of the government to enact and enforce is, historically speaking, probably the stupidest. idea. EVAH.
Morality should never, ever, be equated with social law and conformity – which is why one should assume there is an absolute – not social, or consensus, or “definitional” – basis for morality. When society and authoritative power is in the business of defining morality and enforcing it, horror soon follows.
All of morality is about oughts, but not all oughts are moral considerations.
If we want to eat at a popular restaurant at a certain day and time, we ought to make reservations. That ought is not a moral ought.
If we want to avoid going to jail, then we ought not get caught committing a crime. That is not a moral ought.
If we want to succeed in life and be popular and have friends, then we ought socially conform to norms that would make this likely. That is not a moral ought.
If I want to avoid feeling bad and guilty, I ought not steal from or harm others. That is not a moral ought.
The only oughts that are moral have to do with fulfilling the purpose one is created to serve, whether they make us feel bad or good, whether they make us good citizens or not, and whether it harms others or not.
You seem to spend a lot of time telling us what you are not saying!
If I’m just making up my own purposes – like, “don’t harm others” or “do whatever I want” or “altruism”, then my purpose, and thus my morality, is based on “because I say so”, and we have a “because I say so” morality.
If, however, my purpose is generate by the God I’ve outlined (source of logic, math, good, etc., omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient (inasmuch as other qualities allow), then I have an absolute, objective purpose. Only with such an objective (absolute) purpose can my morality escape being based on “because I say so”.
Now that sounds like Karma.
I think Lizzie already distinguished morals from ethics. Social order will have (ideally, in my view) a set of ethical rules and requirements but should not make moral judgements on others. Are you on board with the distinction between morals and ethics?
I’m fine with you doing as you wish up until the point when you infringe the rights or harm other people.
From Wikipedia:
No, I’m not for society calling any of its rules or systems “ethics”. Nobody has the right to tell me what is right or wrong, which is solely the province of morality. What society can do is tell me what is legal and not legal in that society. Period.
There’s a difference between being wrong and being a criminal; there is a difference between what is right and what is legal. Unfortunately, Liz’s morality has no meaningful way to argue such distinctions.
And if others desagree wich are your rights and think that are allowed to harm you, what do you do?
Depends. there are two, no three options;
1. Complain to the appropriate judicial authority.
2. If the law won’t support me, campaign to change the law.
3. Move to a civilised country
William,
This:
Contradicts this:
And this:
is the kicker.
You aren’t “reasoning from…” a rational basis when you’ve placed your own moral standard in a contraction. You are, in fact, attempting to reason from consensus, not from some absolute standard, based on your statement above. Unless you can come to the other person and both of you have access to an independent list of absolute morals, your “it’s you and me figuring things out is just a “because we say so.” Operating as though this were based on some absolute is just wishful thinking.
I agree.
I agree.
I agree. That ought concerns weighing up benefit to me personally (not getting off my butt to telephone) against benefit to me in the future (not getting a table). I call that the “self-discipline” ought. Let’s call it Ought_Self.
I agree, that is also Ought_Self.
Indeed. Also Ought_Self..
Indeed. Also Ought_Self.
I disagree. I suggest that moral oughts are those oughts in which the benefits to others are weighed against benefits to our selves, as opposed to one self-benefit against another self-benefit.
I will call that Ought_Others. And instead of requiring the postulate of a God who created us to serve his/her purpose, it merely requires the postulate of a society of interdependent actors. The former is highly speculative; the latter is demonstrably real.
And I can’t see where you have made any positive argument that refutes Lizzie’s argument (if I have understood it correctly) that there are no moral absolutes, let alone how you manage to derive your personal morality, let alone what it is. I don’t think a discussion has started yet.
You’re doing exactly the same thing, William. “X is self-evidently immoral” = “I say that X is self-evidently immoral.”
Add that to the list of uncorroborated assumptions you are making.
Doing “exactly the same thing” has nothing to do with whether or not the principle employed is the same. Two people operating off of entirely different principles can do the same thing, but have entirely different principles. The point I argue is that the Darwinist principle leads to an incoherent morality, not that the Darwinist action leads to an incoherent morality.
Then according to you “moral” is equal to legal or what you think are your “rights”?
Which is a because-I-say-so morality, without necessary consequences, with no principle by which to disagree with contradictory because-I-say-so moralities, and without any significant reason to care about it in the first place.
When it boils down to principle, Ought_Others is just self-deceived Ought_Self, because under Darwinism, and without any absolute morality, there is no way to judge what one “ought” do in regards to others without reference to the principle of ought-self.
And that is absolute goal? ( build a society of interdependant actors)
The type of that society is fixed in an abslute way? I mean is necessary a tolerant society with everybody or could be racist society?
Wich is the goal of that society? survival?
Yes, there is. I am saying that what is right – moral – is behaviour that does not benefit self at the expense of others, or more positively, behaviour that promotes th welfare of others, independently of disadvantage to self.
Legal systems, in most civilized countries, are there to provide sanctions against some kinds of immoral (other-harming) behaviour, so that if people cheat, there is a penalty, and thus a self-interested incentive for non-harmful behaviour. But legal systems don’t outlaw (rightly) all kinds of immoral behaviour, nor are all outlawed behaviours necessarily immoral – that’s where ethical decisions come in, and they change over time, and context, with new information.
Absolutely it does. It distinguishes between self-ish (self-before-others) behaviour and altr – uistic (others-at-least-as-important-as-self) behaviour, while allowing for disagreement as to what constitutes harm, and what benefit.
That’s why laws change over time – because we are constantly re-evaluating not whether or not self-ish behaviour is immoral, but what constitutes unacceptably self-ish behaviour.
And it also distinguishes between acts done for amoral or even immoral reasons, but which may nonetheless end up benefiting others, and acts done for moral reasons (to help or avoid harming others) that may nonetheless end up harming others.
In other words, it distinguishes, as indeed the law does to some extent, between good and negligent or malign intentions.
The problem William is you keep noting “if” morality comes from some god (as you’ve defined him) and several of us keep noting back, “that’s great, but you haven’t yet made an argument that goes from “if” to “is”.
Thus, as great as your imaginary morality base might be, until you justify the existence of this “god” of yours, it’s just “whatever William says”.
I grew up in a civilised country and accepted that people have to adopt certain conventions and rules, based on mutual respect and tolerance. Like I had no choice in what became my first language, I had no choice but to conform. It did not stop me thinking that some rules were unfair and that some people ignored rules unfairly. Like I see evolution in pianos, I see evolution in the societal rules of engagement. It’s a slow process, usually, though gross unfairness can lead to revolution and other sorts of social breakdown. I still prefer an unfair society to living in anarchy or isolation. There is always the possibility that one can bring about change.
Whether or not god actually exists is entirely irrelevant to my argument that the proposition of such a god is necessary to reach a rationally coherent morality.
And, having a rational moral system isn’t a prerequisite for leading a moral life.
Racist societies are societies in which some members are considered not full members. That’s why I think we need to constantly re-evaluate our ethics: who constitutes these “others” that we must consider, and what constitutes benefit or harm.
Or, to cite a well-known teacher: “who is my neighbour?”
You always avoid the key of the point. It is mandatory not be racist? From where you derive that mandate?
Wich is the goal of the society?
The mandate of “follow the leader” come again.
So moral mandate is keep the society togheter in order to survive. The scope of morlity is just favour survival of the fittest.
I do not understand how you can lead moral life without a moral system. How do you know that your life is moral if you do not know what is moral?
Can you measure a distance without a unit of measure?
What’s the difference, in principle? You recoil at the idea of a system in which individuals decide what’s right based on their own moral sensibilities, but then you propose a system in which individuals decide what’s right based on what is “self-evidently” moral to them — i.e., what their moral sensibilities tell them.
The principle is the same: obey your conscience.
The only difference is that you add a couple of superfluous and unjustifiable assumptions about God and objective morality, but those assumptions have no effect since we don’t have reliable access to objective morality (if it exists at all).
At one point you expressed a worry that if objective morality didn’t exist (or if people thought it didn’t exist), then there would be no reason for people to care about morality at all.
But they do care. People pay attention to their consciences, and they pay attention even if they do not think that their consciences are hot-wired to some cosmic source of Objective Morality.
Suppose you were absolutely, truly convinced that objective morality didn’t exist. Would you proceed to steal, kill, rape and pillage if you thought you could get away with it, or would your conscience prevent you?
In other words, is your morality motivated at all by love for your fellow creatures, or are you merely following rules?
No. The “scope of morality” is: we do better when we pull together than when we pull apart.
Absolutely it does not. The only “allowing for disagreement” you offer is that which takes place entirely within your presumed framework of morality in the first place – altruism. In other words, you’ve already codified “what is right” in fundamental precept before any ethical arguments begin. Your system condemns as “wrong” or “illegal” any moral views that do not fall under your original premise of altruism-as-morality.
You’ve assumed your consequent to my challenge that your system cannot discern between “legal” and “right” by the assumption that what is right (and thus legal, in whatever ethical form) IS derived from altruism in the first place.
I deny that morality is based on altruism or not harming others. Hypothetically, your system of altruism-based morality has created laws. I deny one of those laws is morally right. You argue that it is provably altruistic. So? I deny altruism is the basis of morality.
Your system cannot make the case that altruism “should” be the basis of morality because your system simply assumes it. Thus, it cannot make a rational distinction between what is “legal” and what is “right” because it presumes what is right in the first place as the basis of its laws.
That’s like saying that one doesn’t know how one can survive a world ordered by gravity unless they have a rational concept and understanding of gravity. People can be utterly oblivious to gravity because it is ubiquitous to their experience and live just fine, knowing (without any formula or specific concept of gravity) not to jump of ledges that are above a certain height.
People innately know what is right and wrong. They don’t need a rational moral system to do what is right and avoid what is wrong.
No. An ethical framework is preferable to me compared to anarchy. What would interest me is what framework would be the most ethical and why. One important ethic for me would be secularity, for instance.
Just curious. If you could choose, Blas (or William, if he wants to reveal his thoughts) what sort of society would you live in?