In another thread, WJM has frequently made arguments similar to this:
As I have said repeatedly, premises that support one’s arguments are only necessary if one wishes to develop a rationally coherent worldview. One is always, of course, free to believe whatever they wish – rationally justifiable or not.
Several of the other participants in the discussion have found such statements to be unsatisfying. This post is intended as a place where we might hope that WJM will fill in some of the gaps.
In mathematics, if I prove that A implies B, then that is normally taken as saying that A is a sufficient condition for B. In order to show that A is a necessary condition for B, I must prove that B implies A.
By contrast, WJM seems to be saying things similar to “if I can use A to support B, then A is a necessary premise for B.” Perhaps WJM is only saying that he, personally, finds A necessary in the sense that he is unable to find support for B unless he assumes A. That would at least make sense. But that would not make A a necessary condition for B. And since it would be a comment only on the limitations of WJM’s knowledge, it is hard to understand why he would think that to be an argument that he could use to persuade others.
To get to specifics, WJM (if I understand it) claims that he needs theistic assumptions in order for him to develop a rationally coherent worldview.
What seems to be missing is: (a) he has not even made a persuasive case that his theistic assumptions do support a rationally coherent worldview; and (b) he has not shown that there could be no other ways of supporting a rationally coherent worldview.
To further add to the confusion, it has not been made clear what “rationally coherent worldview” even means.
Can we have some of the missing details, please?
OK, let’s get this thread moving. On the Truth, free will, logic thread, William J Murray said:
I’ve flatly stated repeatedly that no such system is needed unless one wishes to develop or maintain a rationally coherent worldview.
What then, is a “rationally coherent worldview,”? Is more than one conceivable, or is William J Murray’s the only conceivable one?
A rationally coherent worldview is one where the premises (a priori statements both necessary and derived) logically comport with and sufficiently warrant our beliefs, views and expectations about “the world” (experience of self and other).
I’m not sure how I would go about figuring out if my particular worldview was the only conceivable rationally coherent worldview; I’d have to know every conceivable worldview. I don’t think I’m up to that task.
I think what I can say is that there are certain premise conditions that must be met for a worldview to be rationally coherent; the premises of such a system must not contradict each other; they cannot contradict their own conclusions; they cannot generate internal contradictions; they must generate sufficient warrant for the other views and beliefs and behavior of those holding the worldview, or at least not contraindicate those other beliefs and views.
Thank you, Mr Murray. You said:
A rationally coherent worldview is one where the premises (a priori statements both necessary and derived) logically comport with and sufficiently warrant our beliefs, views and expectations about “the world” (experience of self and other).
Who decides whether those conditions are met? Specifically, who judges the sufficiency of warrant?
I’m not sure how I would go about figuring out if my particular worldview was the only conceivable rationally coherent worldview; I’d have to know every conceivable worldview. I don’t think I’m up to that task.
Not at all. You would not have to know every conceivable worldview. You would only have to conceive of an alternative to your own worldview. Or, that failing, you might admit the possibility that an alternative worldview is conceivable. As I asked on another thread, do you think that Joe Stalin, Pol Pot, or Osama Bin Laden had rationally coherent worldviews? Is there any reason to think that every one of those persons failed to warrant his beliefs with premises (either necessary or derived)? The point being, if those persons honestly thought that their worldviews were rationally coherent, wouldn’t their actions be rational AND morally justified within those worldviews?
I think what I can say is that there are certain premise conditions that must be met for a worldview to be rationally coherent; the premises of such a system must not contradict each other; they cannot contradict their own conclusions; they cannot generate internal contradictions; they must generate sufficient warrant for the other views and beliefs and behavior of those holding the worldview, or at least not contraindicate those other beliefs and views.
Questions of contradiction can be dealt with by logic. But logic can’t decide whether the chosen premises warrant “the other views and beliefs and behavior of those holding the worldview.” Who decides?
Obviously, the person or persons examining the worldview employing logic as their arbiter.
As I’ve already stated, it is my argument that any rationally coherent worldview requires certain premises. I don’t know of any worldviews that fall outside of those premises that have as yet been shown to be rationally coherent. I also cannot personally imagine how any worldview with different premises could sustain rational coherence. However, I’m not claiming that such is impossible.
I answered you in that thread: I don’t know. I’d have to hear their arguments.
“Honestly thinking” that one’s belief that “A ***can*** both be A and not-A at the same time in the same place” does not make such a belief rationally coherent. People “honestly think” all sorts of rationally incoherent things. “Feelings” and stuff one “happens to honestly think” are not sound logical arguments or justifications for anything.
Maybe not all, but if one premises a god that strikes red-haired people with lightning for cursing, such a premise warrants the belief that red-haired people are always struck by lightning after cursing more than, say, the premise that lightning strikes are governed only by physics and chance. Abductive reasoning to best premise can usually arbit a question of which premises best warrants a particular belief or view.
An excellent question.
It seems to me that, as I view the world, it is neither rational nor irrational, though it is coherent.
As far as I can tell, the “rational” part has nothing to do with the world and everything to do with language and how we describe the world using language. On its face, the term “worldview” does not suggest anything about language. However, when I hear talk of worldview, mostly coming from religion, it quickly becomes clear that what is meant by “worldview” has nothing whatsoever to do with the world, but is instead about the imaginary worlds that we are able to conjure up with the aid of language.
If that is what constitutes a worldview, then I think we are better off without one.
As long as we are using the expression “rationally coherent” in the same thread as we are talking about abductive reasoning, can somebody provide a rationally coherent explanation of what abductive reasoning is?
It has always seemed to me that “abductive reasoning” is being used as a euphemism for “I haven’t a clue, but I’ll try to sound sophisticated and pretend that I know what I am talking about.”
Murray:
As I’ve already stated, it is my argument that any rationally coherent worldview requires certain premises. I don’t know of any worldviews that fall outside of those premises that have as yet been shown to be rationally coherent. I also cannot personally imagine how any worldview with different premises could sustain rational coherence.
That says it: If a worldview doesn’t fit Mr Murray’s conception of rational coherence, given that it must rely on the specific premises he’s chosen to fit his conclusions (as he’s admitted), then it’s either non-existent or inconceivable. In particular, without his premised god, the author of existence, goodness, free will, and reason, no worldview qualifies. By definition.
Argument by definition is so convenient.
Neil Rickert:
…can somebody provide a rationally coherent explanation of what abductive reasoning is?
As I understand the Wikipedia account, if you put the best face on it, it’s probabilistic reasoning about the relative explanatory power of alternative hypotheses. An educated guess.