Truth, free will, logic

Questions about truth, free will, logic have been raised in another thread.  To help clarify the discussion, let’s separate those from the “necessary premise” discussion.

Here’s an example of the argument being raised:

True statements can only be expected to exist, and we can only expect to be able to deliberately discern them, if we assume the universe is governed by logic (necssarily rationally ordered) and if we assume for ourselves the libertarian free will causative capacity to discern them.

This seems a rather strange claim, given then many people believe that our best and most reliable true statements are those coming from science, and based on describing our world in terms physical causation.  Moreover, science is often considered to provide our best examples rationality and logical reasoning.

The argument presented continues with:

The alternative assumptions that logic may not or does not truthfully describe phenomena, and that deliberacy may not be or is not a sufficient cause in and of itself, is simply not enough grounds to warrant the daily, ongoing, universal expectation we operate from,, that true statements exist, and that we can independently, deliberately discern them.

But why is that considered the alternative?  Why not say that world is governed by physical causation, and that logic is a human tool that we use to structure and organize our descriptions of the world?

Personally, I happen to believe that we have free will (for some suitable meaning of “free will”).  However, it still seems to me that the world is governed by physical causes, not by logic.  And it also seems to me that if all agents with free will were to disappear, the physical world would continue without those agents and their logic.

154 thoughts on “Truth, free will, logic

  1. William J Murray: ” There is empirical evidence that supports the claim that god exists in the form of the scientific evidence involved in both the fine-tuning and the design arguments for god;…”

    The universe is no more fine-tuned for life than a teeter-totter in a playground is fine-tuned for the children that ride it.

    The children of all different weights and sizes, “fine-tune” themselves to the teeter-tooter, just as life “fine-tunes” itself to the universe.

  2. William J Murray: “…there is rational evidence found in the first/sufficient cause…”

    You have failed to limit the universe to one god with any sort of logic.

    If “something as powerful as god can exist without a cause”, then logically so can “something as powerful as god”.

    We already have two gods based on a logical conclusion that resulted from accepting **your** premise, that something as powerful as god can exist without the need of being caused.

  3. You are entitled to view the evidence however you wish, but that there are different interpretations of the evidence, and even though some people deny it as evidence, doesn’t make it “not evidence” in the frameworks where it is such evidence.

    Which is why a rationally coherent worldview to begin with is necessary if one expects to have coherent and consistent interpretation of facts and evidence.

  4. William J Murray: Which is why a rationally coherent worldview to begin with is necessary if one expects to have coherent and consistent interpretation of facts and evidence.

    I have pretty much come to the conclusion that “rationally coherent worldview” is just a meaningless phrase.

    The phrase has been mentioned many times. Yet, there has been no clear explanation of its meaning, in spite of requests.

  5. William J Murray: “Babies don’t make claims of evidence that I know of.”

    They don’t have to make a “descriptive” claim in order for you to see their behaviour change when they see what they believe to be “evidence”.

    Show a crying baby their bottle of milk and watch what happens.

    Does the baby know how to spell milk?

    Nope.

    Does the baby have a world-view that’s grounded in theism?

    Probably not.

    Does the baby know what the milk is for?

    Yes.

  6. It’s self-explanatory. If we have premises that contradict each other, or beliefs that contradict our premises, or views that cannot be justified logically from the premises, then we do not have a rationally coherent worldview.

  7. That a baby – or anyone – can function without having a rationally coherent worldview is not being disputed.

  8. My premises had nothing to do with “powerfulness”, so that’s a straw man.

  9. Arguments are either rationally coherent (logically consistent) or they are not. Worldviews are either rationally coherent (logically consistent) or they are not. That people can function just fine without a rationally coherent (logically consistent) worldview is not being challenged. People can function just fine believing all kinds of inconsistent and/ or absurd things.

  10. William J Murray: “It’s self-explanatory. If we have premises that contradict each other, or beliefs that contradict our premises, or views that cannot be justified logically from the premises, then we do not have a rationally coherent worldview.”

    So then according to you, you don’t have a rationally coherent worldview.

    You have two “premises” that contradict each other.

    You accepted that a being as powerful as god can exist in a “pre-universe void” without anything causing it, but you also accept that no other gods are “allowed” to exist in the same “pre-universe void” despite the fact that there is also nothing to prevent them!

    The same void that has no power to cause anything, has by definition, no power to stop anything.

    It is a “powerless void”.

    Your god proves it is possible to exist in this “void”.

    What stops the others?

  11. William J Murray: “That a baby – or anyone – can function without having a rationally coherent worldview is not being disputed”

    But the point that I am making is that the baby **does** have a rationally coherent world-view that works well for it’s limited world.

    That world-view is not grounded in what you describe as “theism” or “atheism”, since a baby has no idea what those concepts mean.

    But the baby’s “limited to its nursery world-view”, while not describable to us, allows the baby with confidence, to equate the bottle with a feeding.

    What the baby can’t do, is “describe” it to you.

  12. William J Murray: “Worldviews are either rationally coherent (logically consistent) or they are not.”

    Is being “logically consistent” enough?

    If it is, then by carefully choosing premises, anything goes!

  13. William J Murray:
    You are entitled to view the evidence however you wish, but that there are different interpretations of the evidence, and even though some people deny it as evidence, doesn’t make it “not evidence” in the frameworks where it is such evidence.

    Which is why a rationally coherent worldview to begin with is necessary if one expects to have coherent and consistent interpretation of facts and evidence.

    There is a difference between denying something as evidence and failing to make the potential evidence fit the postulate,

  14. Unless such a difference is logically justified via a rationally coherent worldview and equitably accounted for throughout all of one’s postulates and beliefs, then one can simply be denying evidence for a postulate due to a priori bias against the postulate.

    Which is why an accounting of the logical consistency of one’s views is necessary. If one is applying a hyperskeptical, a priori bias against such a claim (as is usually indicated when one claims a universal negative which is beyond the scope of one’s capacity to know – “there is no evidence”) that they do not apply to other claims which comport with their worldview, then one is not being logically consistent.

  15. I don’t have two premises that contradict each other, your straw man misrepresentations notwithstanding.

  16. Being logically consistent is enough for a worldview to be logically consistent. That is the only thing I’m debating about worldviews – is whether or not they are logically consistent (rationally coherent) with beliefs and behavior.

  17. Whether or not it is rationally coherent (logically consistent) is an unknown until the baby can describe and defend it. That it “works well enough” is entirely irrelevant. You seem to be conflating “a worldview that allows one to function well” with “a logically consistent worldview”.

  18. My premise that god is the source of cause and effect, existence, logic, intention is not the same as your misrepresentation that my premise allows for other, similar gods. I do not postulate god as “a” source of those things, but as “the” source of those things, which means – under my premise – that other such gods (as “the” source of those things) cannot exist.

    IOW, I am premising that there is necessarily a single source for commodity X, and you are claiming that my premise allows for multiple sources of X. I don’t know how to explain it any more clearly than that. My premise not only does not allow for multiple gods; it specifically states no other such gods (as premised) exist. To say my premise allows for something it specifically disallows is irrational.

  19. William J Murray: Unless such a difference is logically justified via a rationally coherent worldview and equitably accounted for throughout all of one’s postulates and beliefs, then one can simply be denying evidence for a postulate due to a priori bias against the postulate.

    Which beliefs do you believe result in such an a priori bias?

  20. The belief that “there is no evidence for god” doesn’t result in an a priori bias, but rather IMO results from the a priori bias (premise) that no god or gods exist.

    IOW, if one is not sorting evidence from the premise that “no god or gods exist”, then one is obligated to sort evidence presented as evidence for a god in the same manner that they must sort evidence for any other claims about things they may not have any first-hand experience of. They must evaluate the testimonial, anecdotal, scientific and rational argument evidence via the same weighted system they apply to any other such claim. Even if they end up unconvinced that such a god exists or is even likely to exist, that is not the same as saying that “there is no evidence of god” (which is an unsupportable universal claim in the first place).

    Testimonial evidence is evidence by definition; anecdotal evidence is evidence by definition. Empirical experience is evidence by definition; rational arguments are evidence (such as: abductive arguments to best explanation). Whether or not such evidence is convincing is irrelevant.

    How one defines, identifies, evaluates, categorizes, and interprets facts into evidence is a result of worldview premises. If one said, instead, “I have not seen any compelling evidence for a god” they are making a more defensible claim.

    Even that less biased and more defensible claim brings up the whole issue of how one sorts identifies and sorts evidence. For example, many atheists dismiss testimonial evidence as not being empirical, but then believe that many things are true in their lives based on nothing more than testimonial evidence (from, say, trusted secular news sources, journals, reports, papers). They appear to be selectively hyperskeptical towards testimonial evidence about certain subjects (god) and not hyperskeptical (in terms of accepting testimonial evidence) about other subjects.

    That indicates an a priori bias against any evidence that supports the claim that a god of some sort exists.

    Another thing to remember: asserting empirical evidence as the de facto standard of evidence as if it doesn’t require a logical framework would be no different from asserting the Bible as the de facto standard of evidence and exempting it from any logical evaluation or reference to consistent premises. Claiming that “there is no empirical evidence for god” without basis or warrant is no different from claiming “there is no Biblical evidence for evolution”.

    Unless you are going to hold all methods of fact-finding and evidence interpretation up under the same light of logical basis and warrant, then anyone can just begin with any basis for evidence and fact they want and assert it as the de facto standard.

  21. William J Murray: “IOW, I am premising that there is necessarily a single source for commodity X, and you are claiming that my premise allows for multiple sources of X.”

    No, what I am claiming is the “existence” of other entities, **not** what they have done or contributed to your commodity X.

    Their mere **existence** depends on one of your premises, that such a thing as powerful as god could exist.

    Please note the term “existence”. We have **not** added any other premises into our logical algorithm yet.

    We have one input reserved for your premise that such a thing, **could** exist.

    What is the environment?

    A “pre-universal void”.

    Can this void **stop** the existence of a powerful entity like god?

    According to you, **no**.

    And the next question by me is, “Can this void, which did not have the power to **stop** the existence of a powerful entity like god, have the power to **stop** the existence of a powerful entity like god?”

    And your answer is, **yes**!

    Why?

    How did this “pre-universal void” selectively gain the power to stop any god it feels like stopping?

    You might have a rational argument if god depended on certain conditions to evolve which then changed **as** time went on thereby shutting the door after him, but we are talking about a “pre-universal void” which does not have the power to build or stop anything.

    Your adopted premise of an **uncaused** god forces you to acccept the existence of others, **unless**, you can logically defend your one-god premise.

    Rhetoric won’t do it. Defend it logically.

    If you can’t defend the statement logically, your position is irrational.

    Any **part** of a premise you make, must be logically consistent.

  22. William J Murray: “As I have already pointed out, one cannot get to “evidence” until one has a worldview.”

    I believe that the terms “evidence” and “world-view”, are dependent on each other.

    According to you, my interpretation of “evidence” is dependent on my “world-view”.

    According to me, my interpretation of “evidence” may alter my “world-view”.

    I hope that you hold the same belief about the power of evidence to change your world-view.

  23. I premise no “pre-universal void”. If you have to change or add things to my premise in order to argue against it, you are not arguing against my premise as stated.

  24. William J Murray: “I premise no “pre-universal void”. If you have to change or add things to my premise in order to argue against it, you are not arguing against my premise as stated.”

    One of your premises is that your god is the source of everything.

    The universe is clearly a part of everything.

    Before god created the universe, there was nothing.

    Nothing is a “void”.

    This “void” is all there was before god created the universe, hence the term, “pre-universal void”.

    I don’t believe I am adding anything to your premise; “A god exists who is the source of everything”.

    All I have done is come up with a term that describes one of the attributes required for one of your premises.

  25. Just like an accountant who has to balance his books by checking some financial data against others, a logical conclusion also needs to be checked.

    You have argued for “logical consistency” and I’m going to agree with you here.

    Your adopted premise of an **uncaused** god forces you to acccept the existence of others, **unless**, you can logically defend your one-god premise.

    It would be logically inconsistent to claim that the conditions that allow a god, i.e., nothing, in essence a “void”, can somehow stop the existence of another being of the same type.

    Do you have an argument that can show the “logical consistency” required for your “one-god premise”?

  26. I haven’t made any claims about “before” god created everything, nor have I said there was a “time” when “nothing” existed. Being uncaused, god has always existed.

  27. It would be logically inconsistent to claim that the conditions that allow a god, i.e., nothing, in essence a “void”, can somehow stop the existence of another being of the same type.

    It would be if I had premised that “conditions” exist independent of the premised god, which I have not. That is your straw man misdirection. As the god I premise is the source of existence itself, no such “conditions” or even “nothing” can exist other than as effects generated by the god I’ve premised.

  28. As the premised god is the source of all existence, you cannot insert independent “conditions” or “a void” or “nothing” or “other entities’ that exist without being caused to exist by the very god I’ve premised as the source of all existence.

  29. William J Murray: “I haven’t made any claims about “before” god created everything, nor have I said there was a “time” when “nothing” existed. Being uncaused, god has always existed.”

    By being “the source of everything”, the universe must have been caused by god, so there was a point, (which we don’t necessarily have to label as time), when the universe did not exist, but god did.

    If there was **never** a time, (point), when the universe did **not** exist, then god is **not** the cause of the universe and therefore god is **not** the “first-cause”.

    To be “logically consistent”, your **implied** premises must hold as well as any you state explicitly.

    Please show the **logical** statements that show only a “single-god” can exist at a point where the universe doesn’t.

  30. You can argue that a different premise for a different god or set of gods, but that is not my premise; my premise is that of one god being the exclusive source of all existence.

    If you wish to compare the premises because you think the existence of two (or more) gods that have created two (or more) separate sources of existence (first/sufficient cause, intent, good, logic, etc.) can lead to a logically consistent worldview, then feel free to try and make that case.

    I would like to see you make the case that a premise of two (or more) independent and different gods, as distinct sources of those commodities, can lead to a rationally coherent worldview.

  31. That there was a time when the universe did not exist doesn’t necessarily mean there was a time when a “void” or “nothing” existed. God is not a “void” and is not “nothing”.

  32. William J Murray: “As the premised god is the source of all existence, you cannot insert independent “conditions” or “a void” or “nothing” or “other entities’ that exist without being caused to exist by the very god I’ve premised as the source of all existence.”

    I am agreeing with you.

    A “void” is not a “condition”.

    It is what is logically necessary before god, the source of everything”, created everything we see.

    If there was no “void”, there would logically be “something”, which clearly is not possible according to your premise.

    God exists, but nothing caused him, and nothing stopped him.

    That is the source of your logical dilemma, that there is nothing to stop anything else.

    It is why ID’ists and theists have problems getting others to accept their conclusions.

    Without even bringing “reality”, (whatever that may be), into it, you already have logical flaws that you dismiss instead of fixing.

  33. William J Murray: “I would like to see you make the case that a premise of two (or more) independent and different gods, as distinct sources of those commodities, can lead to a rationally coherent worldview.”

    Yes, a “good” god and an “evil” god.

    That would explain everything we see.

  34. William J Murray: “That there was a time when the universe did not exist doesn’t necessarily mean there was a time when a “void” or “nothing” existed. God is not a “void” and is not “nothing”.”

    “Void” is the term I use for “non-existence”.

    Clearly it does not apply to god.

    It is an attribute to allow us to distinguish god and the things he created.

    Anything “not god” or “not created by god”, does not exist.

    I call this non-existent stuff a “void”.

    I have to have a term, but a “void” does not exist.

  35. Allan Fox,

    Thanks for the heads up on the Cathars.

    I looked it up and was shocked to find that someone had actually come up with a two god theory ahead of me!

    This is something that William J Murray should look at.

    I think I’ll change my name to Rex Mundi 🙂

  36. Why should I look at it? You’ve just agreed with me.

    My fundamental position isn’t that my particular theistic proposal is the only theistic proposal that can lead to a logically consistent worldview, but rather that theism is the only kind of premise that **can** lead to a logically consistent worldview.

    The claim that some other theistic premise can provide a rationally coherent worldview only agrees with my position that theism **can** offer a logically consistent worldview. IOW, it offers the opportunity for a rationally consistent worldview (even if it doesn’t **necessarily** produce one).

    Since Toronto has apparently agreed that theism **can** offer a logically consistent worldview (whether or not my particular one can), the only challenge we are left against my claim is whether or not any non-theistic set of premises can lead to a logically consistent worldview.

    Anyone want to attempt it? Or are we going to walk back the claim that the two-god scenario can ” …explain everything we see.”?

  37. William J Murray: “Being logically consistent is enough for a worldview to be logically consistent. That is the only thing I’m debating about worldviews – is whether or not they are logically consistent (rationally coherent) with beliefs and behavior.”

    An atheistic worldview can be as logically consistent as any worldview that incorprates single or multiple gods.

    Accepting a worldview based simply on logical consistency, without regard to how valid your premises are, is irrational.

    You are using the terms “logically consistent” and “rationally coherent” as if they were interchageable.

    As an example:

    if (( height > 6 ft ) AND B)
    THEN healthy = 1
    ELSE sick = 1

    That makes logical sense, but what is B?

    According to my logic, B must be a good thing, since that would satisfy the logical consistency of my argument.

    It is highly irrational to actually take some sort of medical course of action based on the above.

    My two-god reality can be proven to be just as logically consistent as your single-god one or an atheistic no-god reality.

  38. William J Murray: “Since Toronto has apparently agreed that theism **can** offer a logically consistent worldview (whether or not my particular one can),……”

    I humbly accept that my theistic world-view is logically consistent.

    I also agree with you, that it is not clear that yours is also logically consistent.

  39. You haven’t shown your no-god worldview to be logically consistent. You haven’t even presented your premises for a no-god worldview. What are they?

  40. I haven’t said that your two-god worldview is consistent; we’ve just reached a fundamental agreement that theistic premises **can** produce a rationally consistent worldview. Now it is up to you to produce your “no-god” premises and offer up a supposedly rational “no-god” worldview for logical examination.

  41. William J Murray: “I haven’t said that your two-god worldview is consistent; we’ve just reached a fundamental agreement that theistic premises **can** produce a rationally consistent worldview.”

    We have agreed on “logical consistency”, which is not in any way an indication of “rationality”.

    Here’s what I responded to:

    William J Murray: “Since Toronto has apparently agreed that theism **can** offer a logically consistent worldview (whether or not my particular one can),……”

  42. Obviously, I cannot comment on whether or not your “two-god” view is actually consistent until you actually present the premises and the argument for it.

    Also, I didn’t say that it is unclear that my worldview is logically consistent. It might be “unclear” to you, but it is not “unclear” to me.

    However, both of those corrections are at this point irrelevant, because we’d just be arguing about which particular theism was rationally coherent, when we’ve agreed that theistic principles can produce a logically consistent worldview.

    Now please, present your “no-god” case for a logically consistent worldview.

  43. And nowhere in that did I imply that I considered that my one-god theory was “not clearly” logically consistent, and nowhere did I imply that I thought your two-god theory was logically consistent. I only said that we agreed that theistic premises can produce a logically consistent worldview.

    I use “rationally coherent” and “logically consistent” interchangeably as meaning the same thing – establishing and producing no internal contradiction, supporting the beliefs of the worldview (which do not contradict each other) comporting with how one necessarily behaves (for instance, as if one has free will), and not establishing any other logical inconsistencies.

  44. William J Murray:”You haven’t shown your no-god worldview to be logically consistent. You haven’t even presented your premises for a no-god worldview. What are they?”

    Premise A: The universe is uncaused.
    Premise B: Things that **begin** to exist must have a cause.

    Since the universe is uncaused, it has always existed.

    Since we humans have **not** always existed, we are a result of the universe and/or the things the universe has caused.

    Since the universe itself does not **appear** to be intelligent, our existence is not due to any **apparent** intelligence.

    Since there is no “apparent” intelligence, there is no point in assuming any sort of intelligent guidance to be discovered by us.

    Therefore, my atheistic worldview is as follows: You should live your life as if you have the free-will to make any decision you feel acceptable in your environment.

  45. William J Murray: “Yeah, that’s about what I expected.”

    You got what you asked for, and that’s “logical consistency”.

    There are no holes in my logic at all.

    There might be in my premises, but you have relieved me of the requirement to validate them.

  46. William J Murray: Now please, present your “no-god” case for a logically consistent worldview.

    Start with your logically consistent set of beliefs.

    Now throw away all of the beliefs that refer to a deity, either directly or indirectly.

    What remains, is a logically consistent set of beliefs that do not have any dependence on a god.

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